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Abstract 
The thesis considers what the difference is between generating an appearance 
by making something and generating it by thinking it (including naming it). By 
considering phenomenologies of agency in a variety of contexts, the argument 
questions the presumption that judgment determines the appearance. Judgment, 
understood as a disembodied, punctal decision-making is seen to be of little value 
for doing or understanding painting. Thus the (art-) theoretical acceptance of a 
distinction between 'craft' and 'judgment' is found to be misleading. The claim is 
then that painting constructs its domain of embodied thought through the 
gesture, and not through a disembodied act of judgment. 
The mark is, however, what allows painting to be commodified with a 
vengeance: individuated gesture as branded signature. Given the interwoven 
contexts of production and reception, however, - where agency resides then 
becomes hard to determine. The thesis takes this up this problem through a 
reading of Hegel's Master and Servant dialectic. The outcome is that the 
commodity form can neither be side-stepped nor straightforwardly assaulted; a 
discussion of Haim Steinbach's work is central. The proposal at this point is that 
artworks nonetheless retain their power according to the kinds of series they 
articulate; here various concepts of seriality are considered including Badiou's. 
It is then argued that the mark is best modelled through Del1:ida's notion of 
the trace. Barnett Newman's paintings are then re-considered through the lens of 
the trace, and vice versa. The argument here is that the critical gesture is the 
gesture that adequates itself to the trace. The painted mark is interrogated in 
these terms through close readings of works by Duchamp, Reed, J om and Brown 
among others. However, the limits of the Derridean vision are reached in 
thinking colour. For colour exceeds the logic of the mark insofar as the latter is a 
logic of inscription. 
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Introduction 
The text that follows this preamble considers the circumstances of painting today 
on the assumption that the key to painting - what makes it possible and what 
sustains its fascination - is the gesture, or, to use a less freighted term, the mark. It 
is self-evident that the circumstances of the mark today are not the circumstances 
of the past, certainly not the recent past either. 
This text is offered in conjunction with an exhibition of artworks. The 
text does not refer to those works. That the terrain of concerns is common will be 
obvious to any mindful viewer cum reader. 
My intention has been that the text address the ontology of the mark in 
painting. The unspoken assumption throughout has been that it is of little interest 
to expose my own artwork - other than in this oblique sense - to textual scrutiny. 
The artwork does its thinking as artwork. Textual supplementation is never 
identical to the thought that the artwork embodies. The textual investigation is 
then a parallel activity. to the painting activity such that the .two cross-pollenate 
and sustain a conversation in which each is in principle capable of refuting or 
diverting the other. Neither has privilege or priority. Each is defeasible. 
The issue for the text is largely ontological. It is appropriate then to say 
something about ontology here. It has been said that ontology designates 'what is.' 
But something very important is missed in such a compressed statement. 
Crucially, ontology has to grasp also in the thinking of 'what is' what is done to 
'what is' by the thinking it. This is not unlike a philosophical version of Brownian 
motion. In other words, like Russell's paradoxical set that includes itself as a 
member, ontological thinking must account for its own relation to 'what is' as part 
of its description of 'what is.' Such is its heightened reflexive responsibility. 
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Therefore, insofar as the ontological account must also grasp the movement of 
itself qua intervention, it is not possible to divorce the ontological from other 
discourses, whether ethical, political or epistemological. Or, in other words, the 
ontological account does not succumb to what is, a what is that precedes it and 
remains oblivious to its contestations. 
I have said that neither my studio activity nor the writing has priority. The 
method of written investigation follows from that commitment. Arguments and 
concepts are borrowed from philosophical texts in an overtly instrumental spirit, 
as tools to bring particular artworks into fresh and compelling focus. However, 
close scrutiny of exemplary artworks frequently leads to philosophical objections 
being overruled. So, although it's fair to say neither 'theory' nor 'practice' are 
privileged, nonetheless, the underlying wager is that it is of no interest to argue 
these thoughts through to purely philosophical settlements - if such a thing were 
even possible. The expectation that problems in painting could be settled by 
philosophy, critical theory or visual culture theory, or whatever, is like expecting 
weather forecasts to be decided at the level not of probabilistic meteorology, but 
that of particle physics, or fluid dynamics. It would be worse than what Gilbert 
Ryle long ago tenned a category mistake. It would be to mistake a fonnal domain 
of abstracted modelling for a nodal moment within an ultra-complex field of 
contingencies (such as the rainstonn, the rainbow, or the painted image). In this 
spirit, the examples of artworks I select for scrutiny acquire massive weight in the 
text, as soon becomes apparent: exemplification does most of the decisive work in 
this text. 
If the negative tone lies in the averS10n to theoretical resolution, the 
positive note is the assumption that artworks are operative, and must be grasped as 
such. In their operativity they undertake thinking which may chime with particular 
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aspects of critical and philosophical thinking. Thus for instance I consider 
Newman's paintings, with their preoccupation with origination and presence, in 
relation to those very notions in Derrida's writings. But I am not persuaded that 
Newman's paintings dwell on those themes just because Newman said they did. 
Rather they can be seen to engage with such themes through their operations, and 
I describe these operations. My broad sense of what operativity comprehends is 
strongly informed by Michael Fried's books on Courbet, Manet, Menzel and 
French art in the age of Diderot. The fundamental move in the Courbet book is 
the claim that Courbet's figures must be seen as demanding a physical 
identification with the embodied painter and/or viewer. This move is ushered in 
through the insistence on the importance of figures in Courbet frequently having 
their backs turned to the viewer. Fried points to something - I call it operativity -
that is distinct from cultural knowledge: a domain of determinations that is 
structural yet relational, in that it is an effect of the way the artwork casts its 
relation to the viewer. The assumption is not simply that its operativity is what is 
pertinent to the artwork, though it is in part that. It is more practical than that: the 
assumption is that operativity makes the artwork viable. 
In Chapter One I depart from Thierry de Duve's claim that modernist 
painting institutes a substitution of judgment for craft. I argue that instead both 
terms - craft and judgment - have to be freed up from their characteristic 
moorings in art discourse. I consider painting in its relation to Marcel Duchamp's 
readymade, and to Conceptual Art in general. I argue for the gesture as the means 
to realising painting's power. It has a power as a mode of embodied judgment, 
which can be compared in certain respects to instances of inventive thinking in 
sport. Chapter Two examines the commodification of art in general and the 
special liability to brand management of painting in particular. The philosophical 
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text applied to the discussion is the Master and Servant section of Hegel's 
Phenomenology if Spirit. Several artworks are considered from various periods, with 
special prominence given to the shelf works of Haim Steinbach. The chapter 
adapts freely from Jean-Luc Nancy's concept of community, and compares Alain 
Badiou's notion of the event as that which inaugurates an infinite series with 
Gilles Deleuze's notion of the series within inventive repetition. The latter are 
contrasted with the very different meaning of series in Sartre's critical concept of 
seriality. Finally in Chapter Three I develop in detail an account of the kinds of 
gesture that are viable in contemporary painting. I introduce Derrida's notion of 
arche-writing as a key concept for understanding the mark. I propose that the 
viable, critical mark must adequate itself to Derrida's arche-writing or 'trace.' I end 
with a proviso. In its encounter with colour the mark steps beyond itself. Thus 
when the mark embraces chroma it enters a domain beyond its own logic, that is, 
the logic of inscription. Thus, although the mark is, as I claim, the key to the 
ontology of painting, colour traverses and exceeds the logic of the mark. By way 
of colour, we are brought back to Duchamp, and in particular to Duchamp's 
attempt to institute an art practice of disembodied judgment. In the wake of the 
colour discussion then we can reconsider the critique of Duchamp, and re-affinn 
the commitment to embodied judgment. 
It should be clear from these brief chapter digests in what senses the 
account of painting offered here is ontological in emphasis. However, I'm a 
painter. I know that the realm of ontology finalizes nothing from the point of 
view of a practice. Do I paint a bird or a monochrome, or both together or 
neither? Ontology doesn't bury these questions. They are answerable only for a 
historical agent, which is to say, an agent mired in the vicissitudes of the social. 
The difficulty of painting is to nurture a feeling of necessity within the implacable 
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contingency of the contemporary image, whatever that image is. To return to 
Fried's Courbet: the claim here is that a figure turned with her back to the viewer 
constitutes a strong ontological determination. As an element in a picture it is 
nothing highfaluting. A figure with her back to us. Let's be clear that the 
particularity and contingency of the image are beyond the reach of general 
ontological insights. It doesn't matter much to this text how and why those 
particular and contingent determinations are arrived at in artworks. What matters 
is that they are arrived at and that they catalyse that which is operative in the 
artwork. Ontological insights cannot in and of themselves generate a painting, or 
even a full set of terms for a painting to address. Nonetheless, it is Badiou who 
propounds the definition of thinking itself as the coming together of theory and 
practice. 
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Chapter 1 Embodied Judgment 
1.1 Making Making the issue 
It sounds an innocent question. But in the swelling corpus of so-called 'art theory' 
it doesn't get asked. The question is this: What is it to make an artwork? To say it 
more precisely and to bring out the stress on the making: What is it to generate an 
appearance by making it? And how is making it different to thinking, conceiving 
or nominating an appearance? Put like that, the set up already beckons us towards 
a showdown, featuring a quasi-artisanal, getting-the-hands-dirty posture on the 
one side, pitted against a keeping-them-clean Duchampian conceptual lineage on 
the other. That showdown features as a central scene in this chapter. But that's to 
look forward to. Before we can push the plot along in that direction we must 
establish a milieu, compose a set of circumstances in which the necessary tensions 
can take root and find their rightful agents. 
Berlin, September 2002: dinner with a curator of a Swiss museum of 
contemporary art. The conversation turns to an artist who has just shown at 
the museum, and said artist's refusal to allow her 'actual' intentions in specific 
artworks to be discussed in pressireleases or exhibition guide leaflets. For the 
curator this refusal is - aside .from being naive and poor public relations - a 
masking if not a misrepresentation of the genesis of the artworks in question. 
For the artists having dinner, the refusal is a legitimate defence of the 
openness of the works to interpretation and/or an insistence upon the 
incapacity of intention to circumscribe what happens in the making of the 
work. Not surprisingly the talk moves on to just what is meant by the making of 
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the work The curator says .. Well, anyway, how many artists actually make 
things themselves nowadays?" The dining artists, who mostly make their things 
themselves, admit to themselves that this is fair enough as conversational 
polemic, and not without factual credibility, but nonetheless representative of 
an unexamined and unexamining curatorial consensus. 
A propos of this fragment of my artworld life, one could discuss hoJ European 
curators tend to come from a discursive educational background, and how in the 
German-speaking world, for instance, curators tend to be people who have 
studied art history or K.ulturwissenschaft rather than being people who went to an art 
academy. All that needs to be said here however is that the curator's hope for a 
more or less transparent account of generative intentions at the very least 
overlooks what happens in the making. Put another way, the curator overlooked 
the inevitability that the making is never the execution without remainder of a 
pre-existing and separate plan or thought. 
London, autumn 2001: a drink in Broadway Market with Liam Gillick's London studio 
assistant. Asked whether Gillick is in his London studio much, the assistant tells me that no he 
doem't reallY -get to the studio but sends instmctions; that a'!Yway, he doesn't have time to be in 
the studio because everyday he's too buD' meetingpeople. 
It should be clear why all this is especially important for painting. It is true 
that artists have tried to make painting into a matter of pure execution without 
remainder. One thinks of Rodchenko as long ago as the early 1920s ordering 
paintings by phone. My argument in what follows will be that painting is necessarilY 
concerned with generating an apparition ~ making it rather than ~ conceiving it. So although 
43 
it is possible to cast painting in a transitive instrumental role, as a machine that 
executes a programme, this is to fall short of painting's power, and therefore to 
leash its potentiaL Painting is at its most potent when it sets up a complex field of 
contingencies for itself in and through the activity of making. Painting's power of 
immanent thought lies in its capacity to simultaneously summon up such a field ex 
nihilo and interrogate its relational terms as they are being born in and by the 
making. But painting accomplishes its thinking exclusively in and through making. 
Painting is a thinking only qua making. More than that, painting is a kind of bodily 
or embodied making. What that does and does not entail is the concern of this 
chapter, and the text as a whole. In a circumstance in which the dominant artistic 
ethic is, in 1bierry de Duve's phrase, 'Do whatever,' it is painting's identification 
as an embodied making that distinguishes and empowers it. As we will see in 
Cha~er 2, this distinction is not without its cost. 
This entire chapter and this entire text serve to pose an approximately 
adequate though nonsimple answer to the question we started with. The stress on 
making was brought to light through a contrast with thinking, conceiving or 
naming. With that contrast in mind, the text will tum next to painting's specificity 
in relation to art's genericity. 
In Thierry de Duve's painstaking book on Duchamp, Pictorial Nominalism, the 
argument is rehearsed that with his intervention known as the readymade, 
Duchamp both commemorated and ratified art's substitution of judgment for 
craft. De Duve spells out this model further in his Kant After Duchamp. The 
manner in which the readymade undercuts the status of making in generating 
artworks is succincdy put by de Duve: "In front of a readymade, there is no 
longer any technical difference between making art and appreciating it." 1 The 
claim here is that Duchamp's readymade, in particular the inaugurall'ountain of 
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1917 2 [Fig.i], stands to assert that art is now a matter of judgment where once it 
had been a matter of craft. According to de Duve the move made with Fountain is 
both new and not new. Manet's painting was, he says, already a case of judgment 
surplanting craft, without the act necessarily understanding itself in those terms. 
The scenario - rationally reconstructed - goes something like this: Manet finds the 
received craft criteria for painting unusable and is forced to resort to judgment in 
accomplishing, i.e., deciding his work which, necessarily, must be accomplished in 
the absence of a relevant precedent. On this account, Duchamp makes explicit 
and grasps reflexively what the artwork has already been doing for some time in 
the guise of the avant-garde, though it didn't quite know that it was doing that. 
This model of judgment versus craft is still very much alive, still the horizon 
within which Conceptual Art and its successors stake their ground. But it is, I 
argue, a mistaken model. And its consequences for our attitude to issues of 
making are profound. For it always tends on the one hand to conflate making and 
craft. On the other hand, its elevation of judgment tends to cast the making as 
cursory, learnable, less than intelligent, not the work of the intellect, and 
reductively instrumental. We come close to the time-honoured prejudice of 
intellectual over manual labour here.3 But what is being described is far more 
precise than that. Craft in de Duve, as anywhere, means or at least implies 
tradition. The English noun 'craft' 4 means a stabilised and more or less 
institutionalised mode of making. Craft is understood as normative making. But 
making that is interesting is not normative. Is interesting making then making that 
is bound, formed and structured by judgment? Surely it is not, though judgments 
may subsequently be visited upon it. Rather interesting making requires 
suspension, or at the very least, a deferral of judgment. 
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De Duve's reading of tountain, and the readymade in general, conflates 
making and craft, and then implicitly conflates craft with tradition. In the other 
direction, its worship of judgment casts the latter as a kind of decisionism, a 
cerebral and disembodied choice that doesn't itself unfold in time, though its 
consequences as well as its preconditions must. For this understanding, judgment 
is separable from any encounter with materials and making processes. It is 
implicitly removed from the linear time both of the making process and of the . 
traditions and legacies of making. De Duve's analysis points to the work that this 
text will need to do. In particular, it will need to find a very different 
understanding of making that is not denigrated under the rubric of craft. And it 
will need to stake a territory in which a different notion of a richly temporalised 
and embodied judgment can be sustained. 
The prejudice that understands making as craft, and therefore places making 
under the rubric of a dumb, reductive instrumentality is one that will be 
challenged in what follows. It is not unrelated to the presumption that materials 
are brute, stupid and inhuman until they are transformed by the spell of form and 
concept, which is to say, intention. This chapter will argue that, on the contrary, 
things are never so simple. As we will find in Bernard Stiegler'S investigation of 
'technics' - embracing both technology and technique in general - there is at 
work something that Stiegler calls "the dynamic of the what," whereby it is 
precisely dumb matter that creates forms and intentions for situated human 
actants. There is an unspoken alliance between the prejudice that cuts off 
judgment from making and the echoing one that radically distinguishes form and 
matter. For in each opposition, the first term is deemed intelligent, clean and idea~ 
concerned with telos; while the second, by contrast, is stupid, soiled and 
considered to be alienated from the purposes it has been put to. It's somewhat 
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cheap and more than a little lurid to make the following connection, I know, but it 
is too potent to resist; here, for anybody who thought that the relation between 
making and thinking is a purely sterile academic consideration, is what the 
General Inspector for the German Road System proclaimed from Berlin in 
February 1940: 
Concrete and stone are material things. 
Man gives them form and spirit. 
National Socialist technology possesses in all 
material achievement ideal content.5 
2. There is do such thing as Conceptual Art 
One of surest rhetorical ploys for assaulting an opposing position has always been 
to deny its existence. Can we forget Margaret Thatcher's denial that society exists? 
In this spirit, it is tempting to deny that Conceptual Art exists, or has ever existed. 
Venturing beyond the pleasures of provocation, closer inspection of the 
phenomenon reveals that the artists themselves deny the term. Lawrence Weiner 
rejects it, insisting that he has to give time to dealing with materials encountered 
in a situation in order to get to the work.6 Robert Smithson rejected the term too, 
for comparable reasons. Art movements have so often been christened by their 
enemies and observers, never or rarely by the participants. Yet those labels that 
began as pejoratives end up as affirmations. And so the success of the term 
Conceptual Art is widely assumed to affirm the sovereignty of the concept in art. 
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It should be obvious why Conceptual Art confronts this text. First, 
Conceptual Art as the faithful heir of Duchamp's Fountain affinns art in general at 
the expense of the medium in particular, with painting positioned as the specific 
medium par excellence. Second, Conceptual Art is widely assumed to make - indeed 
to have made - making as such a side issue in art, if not redundant altogether. As 
we know, Liam Gillick is much too busy to make things. As we have also seen, 
the readymade dispenses with the distinction between making artwork and 
appreciating it. And in the vicious logical bind that Conceptual Art is driven to in 
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the work of Joseph Kosuth, making is indeed rendered explicitly redundant. It is, , 
Kosuth believes, explicitly and conclusively surplanted by ideal content. 
Before examining Kosuth in greater detail, some determinations need to 
be given their due. Firstly, Conceptual Art of the classic period of roughly 1965-
1975 does not conclusively substitute conception for making in the spirit of de 
Duve's substitution of judgment for craft. Artists of the period evidenced a wide 
range of attitudes to making. It is clear that for many, a commitment to something 
we can call specificity of making remained central to their practice. This is 
manifest ill statements and practices of, for example, Richard Serra, Vito 
Acconci7, Robert Morris8, Lawrence Weiner, Robert Smithson. Secondly, 
Conceptual Art does not conclusively democratise art through de-skilling, as is 
often claimed in its favour. It rather extends a longer and much earlier modernist 
logic of de-skilling - or more accurately, of re-evaluating artistic skills - traceable 
back to Monet and Impressionism. For the critical barrage that hounded the first 
Impressionist exhibition was based precisely on the scandalised sense of affront at 
the de-skilling that it was seen to propose. In reality, Conceptual Art as a strong 
style of display and a specialised mode of attention tended often to require a high 
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degree of prior discursive immersion. Put another way, Conceptual Art required 
and instituted its own discursive re-skilling9• 
Thirdly, Conceptual Art does bring about the hegemony of art in generaL 
This is Duchamp's irresistible legacy and for painting it makes trouble. Before the 
readymade, one experienced painting or sculpture, and one came to art in general 
via the particular medium. After Duchamp tables are turned and it becomes 
possible for the general to precede the particular. On this count de Duve is 
correct: 
If, for example, "sound" is now regarded by many musicians as a legitimate 
definition of their domain, if some musicians, even, prefer to call their work 
"sound" rather than "music," no musician would claim that he or she is 
doing "art" and nothing but "art." The readymades, by contrast, are "art" and 
nothing but "art." Whereas an abstract painting reduced to a black square on 
a white background is art only when you accept seeing it as a painting, a 
urinal is a sculpture only when you accept seeing it as art. Otherwise it is 
simply a urinal. The generic seems to precede the specific.lO 
This situation is troublesome for painting because it always sets painting and art in 
different starting positions: painting is a process which mayor may not coincide 
with art, and in fact frequendy does not (pub signs, painting and decorating, 
children's painting, and so forth); art by contrast is not a process, or any definite 
set of processes, but a value occasioned by some public display of an apparition. l1 
In the post-Duchampian state of things, painting is cast as a particular forever 
chasing after the generality that surpasses it. It is as if painting starts with a 
handicap which it must overcome in order to partake of the generality of art. For 
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many, and one presumes de Duve is among them, that handicap goes under an 
old name: craft. The burden of proof is now upon painting to prove that it 
belongs with art, and that, in its heart of hearts, it is innocent of the charge of 
craft. 
If anybody really believed that Conceptual Art made the concept king, then 
Joseph Kosuth is the artist best suited to be the didactic fall guy for their disabuse. 
Kosuth loved Duchamp enough to collect his work, so long as he could afford it. 
He stands for a very precise reading of Duchamp and his legacy. "All art (after 
Duchamp)" he said, "is conceptual (in Nature) because art only exists 
conceptually.,,12 More than anyone, Kosuth stands as the non pitts ttltra of the 
Conceptual Artist as the voice of the concept. No other artist took the 
Conceptual of Conceptual Art so literally and so conclusively. Kosuth can be seen 
as responding to Duchamp's readymade in a particular way. Richard Mutt's 
Fountain is understood as the intervention to end art as a critical phenomenology 
and instead to usher in art as critical performativity. In the critical 
phenomenological art of Cubism, consciousness is exatnined as a temporal fllL'C of 
vision and cognition. In the critical perfOl"mative art of the readymade it is rather 
art that is put to the test as contextual value. What is peculiar about Kosuth is that 
he takes this reading of Duchamp - actually an entirely defensible reading - and 
filters it through the purist, late modernist position of Ad Reinhardt. Reinhardt 
was both a fascinating artist [Fig.2] and a wily, humorous writer, part aphorist 
and part wag. His theoretical position is that art is a substantial yet tautological 
concept, which in theory and in practice marks itself off from non-art through its 
refusals and negations.13 And for Reinhardt the writer14 that's what art does: it 
operates by negating non-art. The bastard offspring that results in Kosuth's theory 
and practice is a bizarre but wholly logical blend of Reinhardt's "art-as-art" and 
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the critical perfonnativity of the readymade. So it is that Kosuth comes to his 
view that art's role consists exclusively and exhaustively in its own perfonnative 
self-definition. 
How do we then approach Kosuth? As a dogmatist? A period curiosity? 
Certainly he is an unsatisfactory artist but an incisive writer. Yet we need to 
engage with the theoretical position. In his text Art After Philosopf?y Kosuth staked 
out clearly and elegantly the territory we have just examined. What matters for this 
discussion is that Kosuth elevates the concept. For him, art's task is to 
demonstrate the concept that it is. Thus art is a general concept and particular 
artworks serve to demonstrate the concept which they both serve and create 
petfonnatively. But this demonstration is not one that could flesh out a notion. 
Kosuth is more than happy to welcome a demonstration that is a contentless 
tautology. This is how Kosuth puts it: 
A work of art is a tautology in that it is a presentation of the artist's intention, 
that is, he is saying that that particular work of art is art, which means, is a 
definition of art. Thus, that it is art is true a priori. IS ••• 
Works of art are analytic propositions .... they express definitions of art, or 
the fonnal consequences of definitions of art. 16 
Better than anyone, Kosuth thus exemplifies the reduction of art and artwork to 
the concept. As we have seen, this reduction was never generally accepted by 
artists understood as Conceptual. And it is at this juncture that we can return to 
the spirit of our earlier provocation to ask: Does Conceptual Art exist? Has it in 
fact ever existed? For on the one hand so-called Conceptual Artists rejected both 
the tenn and the notion of reducing artwork to the concept. On the other hand, 
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Kosuth's project produced no consequential artwork and is anyway not 
theoretically sustainable. Therefore there has never been artwork - not even a 
work of Conceptual Art - that succeeded in reducing art or artwork to a concept. 
But we need to pause to consider why Kosuth's theoretical position is flawed. 
Shelving other complaints ag:Uilst Kosuth, the key flaw lies in his account of 
the tautological assertion made by the artwork. Kosuth says that the artwork 
declares itself as defining art, and that it is therefore art "a priori" since it institutes 
itself as art. The first kind of doubt here has to do with the assumption that art is 
what artists do, or as it is frequently told, art is what happens in the art context.17 
Kosuth appears to be affirming such an attitude, along the lines of 'art is what 
artists define as art.' The dumb but correct retort is then: But how do you know 
they are artists? If Kosuth's position is to have any stringency, his reply cannot be 
'Because they make art!' And nor can it be 'Because we see their work in art 
galleries!' since this would be merely a conservative acquiescence in a given 
cultural settletnerlt, ahd thus nothing but a failure to question the category art in 
the term 'art gallery.' 18 In a paradoxical reversal then, the tautological definition of 
art espoused by Judd and Kosuth and others as a path out of restrictive 
definitions of art, such as those that tied it to traditional skills, turns out to be a 
position that itself suctumbs to institutional power without holding it to account. 
The secohd kind of doubt, which is related to the f1±st, is about 
performativity. Kosuth doesn't employ the tern. But it would suit his procedure. 
For what is the intervention of the self-defining artwork - the artwork that posits 
itself as a definition of art - but the performative act par excellence? 'Performative' is 
used loosely in art-talk today as little more than an inflated rendition of 
'performed'. But as birthed in J-L. Austin's sanguine text Peiformative Utterances,19 it 
is a distinct construct with immense scope. The 'discovery' of the performative 
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seems to open up a new model of how language could be freed from an assured 
anchorage to the referent: 
As opposed to the classical assertion, to the constative utterance, the 
performative does not have its referent (but here the word is certainly no 
longer appropriate, and this precisely is the interest of the discovery) outside 
of itself or, in any event, before and in front of itseleo 
Though everybody from Derrida to Deleuze to queer theory has taken a hike on 
the notion, it is often overlooked21 that Austin's idea is hugely ambivalent as 
between its emancipatory and its conservative implications. While it offers the 
promise of inaugurating fresh relations through performative acts and projecting 
new identities through protensive iteration, it however insists on the authority of a 
context of reception, so to speak. Performative acts are never solipsistic: they 
must be received and remarked by a cotrtmunity which stands toward them as 
addressee. This is the deep and robusdy conservative force of Austin's 
performative act: it conjures new relations only where the addressee recognises it 
as so doirtg. Attstirt's examples of petfbrmative speech acts are more than 
conservative: they are the extteme gestures of the 'status quo,' such as the 
language of the coronation ceremony. The most conservative act 1S a 
petfottnative. Writing of the "paradox of the notion of the 'peHottnative', " ZiZek 
makes just this point: 
in the very gesture of accomplishing an act by uttering words, I am deprived 
of authorship; the big Other (the symbolic institution) speaks through me. It 
is no wonder, then, that there is something puppet-like about people whose 
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professional function is essentially perfonnative Gudges, kings ... ): they are 
reduced to a living embodiment of the symbolic institution .... 22 
Thus if the artwork is to be understood as saying, perfonnatively, "I am art!" or 
"Art is me!" - and it isn't doing anything else, such as generating percepts and 
affects - then it is starting to sound like Louis XIV's celebrated "L'etat, c'est 
moi!", except that Louis was arguably uttering a mere description and not a 
perfonnative at all. If it were a perfonnative speech act, then by ZiZek's logic, it 
can be heard as primarily the voice of the state, not the voice of the king, this 
"is"("est") being, after all, the "is" of identity, not the "is" of predication. Thus 
"The State, it's me!" can be flipped around to become "The King, it's me!" as 
uttered by the state. The consequences of this for Kosuth's 'theoretical conceptual 
art' are far from rosy. Yet it is crucial not to miss the precise point here. It is not 
simply that Kosuth gambles on the institution accepting his disclosures as art, 
where they don't deserve such acceptance, which would merely put him on a par 
with Hider the painter - who clearly wasn't committed to 'theoretical conceptual 
art' - as a failed student applicant to the Vienna academy. That is not the point. 
The point at its root, its 'radical', is that the artwork cannot by fiat abolish the 
mhlliria1 disbitite between itself and its addressee, its cotn111unai etivitontrlent. 
Kosuth's position is exquisite and shameless in its circularity: art is dtjined as the 
difiner if art. As with Louis, it goes both ways: art here becomes its institutional 
surroundings, or, vice versa, the institutional environment becomes art. 
Declaration of independence becomes declaration in dependence. In other words, 
when art claims to liberate itself by perfonnatively re-inaugurating and re-defining 
itself, in practice it ends up declaring the power of the surrounding institutions. 
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Paralleling the inversion of the King's utterance as the utterance of the State, we 
can now regard the Conceptual Artist's utterance as the utterance of the museum. 
To an extent I have overegged the debate - I admit - by forcing a 
somewhat reductive reading of the power of the institution over the success (or 
failure) of the performative. Derrida, in his characteristically nuanced yet 
strategically pedantic analysis of Austin, emphasizes that Austin is unable to 
provide any general model of the performative that might afford generalisable 
criteria for its success or failure.23 He concludes from this that the performative is 
no more under the domination of the symbolic status quo, and by the same token, 
no less capable of being placed into a state of risk, than any other kind of 
utterance. However, the theoretical distinctiveness of the peformative is eroded by 
this thinking. Its context is seen to be equal to the 'grammar' of any other type of 
utterance. In the end, Derrida turns the discussion toward the issue of iterability 
as a general condition for signification, where iterability requires the repeatability 
of a more or less idealised form. Thus for Derrida iterability in general already 
summons up a powerful tension between the creativity of the present utterance 
and the demand for a repeated and therefore recognisable form of utterance by 
means of which a signifying institution may be established and sustained. We will 
revisit these consequential topics more than once in the coming chapters. What 
matters here is that although Derrida insists that the performative can still take 
risks with respect to its governing institutions ("But are the conditions of a 
context ever absolutely determinable?" 24 ), nonetheless it is contained within the 
structure of iterability. 
Turning back now to Kosuth's bid for a purified art of the concept: it is 
worth noticing the crucial contrast where artworks are conceived not as concepts but 
as generators of ciffoct: they regulate themselves at a distance from the institutional 
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setting insofar as and to the degree that they emit their affective rays regardless of 
whether they are judged to be art or not. Thus where making involves risk, which 
it must if it is to constitute a thinking, the deferral of judgment - of the art status -
is a real and vital exclusion, not a mere notional entertaining of antitheses. Here 
then we come to a new paradox. Artworks, I argue, are operative. Being operative 
they emit affective rays and pose as attractors of affected and affecting attention. 
Yet their operativity is prior to and separable from the judgment that they are 
works of art. What is interesting about artworks is what they do rather than the 
judgment that they are art, or the bids they make to elicit such a judgment. And 
anyway, isn't the judgment "This is art" more plausibly understood and more 
plausibly sustained as the claim that the artwork's operation - whatever it may be 
- cannot be seen to be yoked under the purposes of something other than its own 
cjynamis? This is not yet again to propose art for art's sake. Why not? Because the 
operative artwork affects our position and our terms of address, including what 
might have been imagined to be the terms of 'art's sake.' Thus in its very 
operation the artwork fails to oblige as the stable and reliable servant of some 
prior and expectant sake. 
It can never be sufficient, thell, for accomplishing an artwotk merely that 
I intend the work as an enactment of a definition of art. Of course one could plea 
for a reprieve for Kosuth on the grounds that the avant-gatde presumes a 
temporal displacement of addressor and addressee whereby the addressee is 
distant in the future. That is the standard messianic avant-garde wager: it awaits 
expectantly the coming of the competent addressee. But that is not Kosuth's 
position. He presumes that the petformative is accomplished already by 
intentionality alone. Kosuth demonstrates what happens wheh one attempts 
rigorously to reduce, or even to elevate art and the individual artwork to a 
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concept. What happens is a theoretical lapse and a foreclosed, dogmatic practice. 
Peter Osborne's writes a propos of Kosuth in particular, and dogmatic 
Conceptual Art in general: 
It is the ironic historical function of theoretical or strong Conceptualism, 
through its identification with philosophy, to have reasserted the 
ineliminability of the aesthetic as a necessary element of the artwork, via a 
£:0_;, d 0 15 aile nega11ono-
As Margaret Thatcher might have put it, There is no such thing as Conceptual 
Art. There are however Conceptual Artists - no doubt the ones Kosuth would 
have denigrated as "stylistic conceptual artists" 26 - who exploit a rich area of 
overlap between 'display making' and discursive thinking. And, to repeat, these 
artists, like Duchamp with the readymade, substantially dispense with the 
distinction between making and appreciating art. This rendering irrelevant of 
making would seem to place art in general at a remove from painting, with its 
unsevered umbilical link to making processes. Then painting's specificity would 
seem to have alienated it from art's newly intensified generality. 
In the next sections of this chapter the positive account of what accrues to 
painting as a type of making will reflect back on this issue of painting's apparent 
estrangemertt from art in general. this will require revisiting the cited distinction 
between making and appreciating art, - the one the readym.ade is said to have 
cancelled - but from another direction. As for the other issue that has been crucial 
to this discussion of Duchamp's impact - namely the opposition in De Duve's 
account between craft and judgment - the remainder of this chapter is written in 
the hope of unweaving the threads of its construction. 
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What should be obvious still needs saying: art is concerned with percepts 
and affects. It is poorly equipped to handle concepts. Art in fact does little more 
than adopt them, though sometimes it has succeeded in accomplishing what 
Deleuze called the expansion of a concept.27 A good way to consider art's relation 
to concepts is to pose the question of what concepts art has generated. It doesn't 
take much reflection to realise that the answer is none. An has never generated a 
concept. Art has adopted concepts, such as the concept of perspective taken from 
architecture in the Italian Renaissance.28 Or, during the 1920s and 30s, the 
concept of the mark as mark, adopted from psychoanalysis in the guise of 
automatic writing. Or indeed Duchamp's concept of the readymade, which is 
really at its root an expansion of Henry Ford's concept of standardised 
production. And clearly art did not create its own concept. An has never generated a 
concept. Day in, day out it nonetheless creates percepts and affects. 
1.3 Perception, Thinking, Making 
Giveh that buchamp's readymade seems to have eliminated the perceptua~ 
morphological and technical distinction between art and everything else, and 
thetefore between making and appteciating art, how are we to cot1ceive making in 
a way that's not defensive, even sentimental? Mote than that, in a way that affirms 
its specific value? And then given de Duve's powerful claim for a substitution of 
judgment for craft in art from Manet to Duchamp, how are we to develop a 
notion of making that is not artisanal, not 'mere craft'? The response to the 
second question will be substantially supplied in the next two sections of this 
chapter. In this section I want to enlarge the notion of making and its specific 
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intensities through considering its proximity to perception. As we proceed it will 
become clear that painting and the readymade are less unlike in important respects 
than we may have expected, since each, in their very different ways, indicate a 
certain whittling down of the distinction between making and perceiving. But 
before continuing, we should capitulate before the readymade: without question, 
it has won its chosen battle. In its wake, art, insofar as it continues to embrace 
painting and sculpture, among everything else, is irretrievably or blessedly -
depending on your preference - various, plural, heterogeneous, and above all, 
from the point of view of painting, discontinuous. There is art that foregrounds 
its making and identifies agency with the temporality of making, as paintiilg 
continues to do, and there is art that is all prior conception and ex post facto 
execution. Neither has priority, though increasingly the latter has an easier time of 
it in the paradise of 'friction-free capitalism' that some imagine the era of e-
commerce to be. So then the tolerant response to the current situation - and this 
is the characteristic response of the present era - is 'OK, art is discontinuous. 
Let's have morel' And that means more art as well as more discontinuity. In this 
universatising melee of seeming tolerance and good will, painting continues to 
enjoy robust health, or it would appear so. More on that in Chapter 2. tn thinking 
painting, then, I'm not concerned to adequate it to the readytnade or to 
Conceptual Art; we are not in awe of other art that claims to hold the intellectual 
high ground, and claims that holding it obliges one to disdain making. As we've 
seen, art has never generated a concept; as painters we are not in thrall to the 
sovereignty of the concept. On the contrary, the task is to re-describe how 
painting as a specific agency through making releases its own affects, which is to 
say, appears as a thinking and sensing through making. Therefore our approach is 
not inherendy negative qua polemic against certain determinations of the 
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Duchampian legacy, such as Kosuth's. Beyond the horizon of that polemic, it is 
affirmative of painting's specific intensity as a thinking and sensing through and in 
making. 
The fundamental point then is not to deny the realm of the readymade. It 
is to develop the notion of an agency particular to making in painting. In this 
agency making is at once a thinking and a perceiving. To introduce these issues I 
want to consider examples that stress the open, dynamic and dispositional aspects 
of visual perception. 
Wittgenstein introduces the concepts of "seeing as" and "aspect blindness" 
through the duck/rabbit figure.29 The figure can be "seen as" a rabbit or a duck 
alternately, though never both simultaneously. A viewer who can see one but not 
the other is said to be subject to aspect blindness. 'Seeing as' is important because 
it offers a model for vitiating any posited closure of perception for a given 
organization of marks, or in general anything in visual space. Thus anything visible 
is liable to be induced into a condition of perceptual instability: no thing can 
guarantee immunity from perceptual ambiguity. In the making activity, the maker 
sees the organization of materials as given and as potentiality, and sees it in 
relation to other potentialities. The simplest case could be seeing the given 
organization of materials as symmetrical, and then as asymmetrical in relation to a 
potential addition. 
Amheim outlines a puzzle as an example of a specificaily visual thinking. A 
cube is composed of twenty-seven small cubes configured in thtee layers of nine. 
The entire outside of the composite cube is painted red. The task of the puzzle is 
to say, without using a drawing, how many of the small cubes are red on zero 
sides, how many are red on one side, on two sides and on three sides. To solve 
the problem it is necessary to form an appropriate mental image. There may be 
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more than one suitable image to do the job. One possible image is an isometric 
projection viewing the cube symmetrically from above and on two sides; I think it 
also clarifies the problem to then visualize the three layers of small cubes as three 
horizontal layers slighdy spaced out one above the other. The solution, which 
must be visually ascertainable, is: one cube is red on zero sides; six cubes are red 
on one side; twelve are red on two sides; eight are red on three sides, adding up to 
the total of twenty-seven. "Did we need language to perform this operation? Not 
at all; although language can help us codify our results. Did we need intelligence, 
inventiveness, creative discovery? Yes, some .... Was it seeing or thinking that 
solved the problem? Obviously the distinction is absurd. In order to see we had to 
think and we would have had nothing to think about if we were not looking." 30 
What is the moral of the story? As Arnheim argues, that the distinction between 
thinking and seeing, between thinking and perception, cannot be secured in 
practice. 
The example is comparable to the account of visual guagmg ill Italian 
painting of the early Renaissance given by Michael Baxandall?l Visual gauging 
means looking at a complex volumetric form, imaginatively breaking it down into 
geometrically regular constituent parts, and thereby estimating its volume as a 
determinate quantity. Baxandall argues that the appeal to visual guaging is a 
constant motif in early Renaissance painting of the 1400s, such that this trope can 
be found to be smuggled into depictions of a huge variety of artefacts and objects: 
he cites the complex but regular volumetric geometries of hats, wells, containers, 
architectural fragments that would have irresistibly invited visual gauging from 
their viewers. He traces the inculcation of visual guaging, a skill necessary for 
merchants of the period, through the contemporary commercial manuals, in 
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which visual perceptual skills are interlocked with arithmetical skills that typically 
allow relative proportions to be quantified rapidly, at a glance. 
But Arnheim wishes to make a stronger claim, which he goes on to develop 
with reference to diagramming. Diagrams, he argues, show how relationships 
between terms, between concepts, can be brought into special focus by being 
placed in a relational space that is a perceptual space, a visual space. Nor is this a 
matter of the exigencies of pedagogy: diagrams are not merely handy instruments 
of presentation. The working diagram is a means of thinking conceptual relations 
by introducing them to the analogising possibilities of perceptual space, where 
such analogising possibilities are not otherwise available. This is viable regardless 
of the degree of abstraction of the concepts in question, as Arnheim argues with 
recourse to Freud's use of a diagram to show the relationships between the id, ego 
and superego. 
The three examples produce distinct outcomes. The concept of 'seeing as' 
persuades us that perception is provisional, almost hypothetical in its 
undertakings. It indicates that there are no final, unambiguous perceptual 
contexts. Visual artists indulge these ambiguities well beyond the scope of the 
quotidian pragmatics of vision. 
Arrlheim's example shows how the visual can operate in contexts inaccessible 
to discursive thought. What visual thinking offers that verbal thought cannot, as 
Arnheim argues through his description of diagramming, 1S spatial 
(dis) organisation. This matters because language on its own is restricted to linear 
organisation plus differential value. The latter does of course institute a network 
of relationships extending out from every linguistic unit. But this differential 
network is precisely not spatialised, since its intervals and interstices are never 
graspable as such. The visual allows those in-between zones to be scrutinised. The 
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point in diagrams like Freud's is not that the concepts in question are in any way 
visual but that the spatiality of the visual permits us to scrutinise their 
relationships. 
Finally with Baxandall we get a sense of how particular visual perceptual skills 
are promoted and inculcated historically. Because it reveals the feedback between 
the discursive and the visual, this is a case that first generation Conceptual Artists 
would have approved of. But my argument does not oppose nor does it deny the 
discursive and the perceptual inflecting one another - how could they fail to do 
so? In quattrocento visual guaging the visual perception of volume mingles with 
numerate determination of proportions and geometries to result in a visual-
discursive skill. This looking is a kind of thinking that requires training and 
practice. The attainment of this disposition to enact a way of looking comes at the 
end of the period of training and practice; it cannot precede it. Similarly, insofar as 
painting is a thinking in and through making, ohe is enabled to look as a result of 
having done the painting. It's a case of painting in order to look, not the other 
way round: it is not that the mode of looking is a stabilised and settled disposition 
that precedes and generates the painting. Rather the thinking through making is 
what unsettles and destabilizes existing modes of looking. 
In the practice of painting the categories of making, thinking and perceiving 
are indistinguishable at important moments, though they may become separable at 
other times. The duck/rabbit figure, I claim, is comparable to seeing an 
organisation of marks as now symmetrical, now asymmetrical. Johns was 
preoccupied with exacdy the issue of 'seeing as' in relation to a perception flipping 
between symmetry and asymmetry in his somewhat mandarin crosshatch 
paintings of the early 1970s. The exemplary works for my purposes are his Corpse 
and Mirror, 1974 (Collection of Sally Ganz, New York) [FigA] and Corpse and 
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Mirror II, 1974 -75 (Collection of the Artist) and Untitled, 1975 [Fig.3]. These 
paintings are among the most homogeneous and restrained in the Johns oeuvre. 
They ought to be boring but are not. What one attends to here are the 
relationships between the clusters of hatchings placed in varying orientations. The 
organization of these clusters is partially determined by patterns of symmetry 
which, however, shift according to the various seams within the paintings which 
act as axes of symmetry. Horizontal as well as vertical seams operate as axes. 
However, the competing axes frequently disrupt one another, forcing symmetry to 
disappear here and there before re-emerging. I understand these paintings as 
directing the viewer toward the same perceptions - the same instances of 'seeing 
as' and the same flipping illversions of 'aspect bllndness' - that the artist had ill 
making them. The Johns painting elicits from the viewer a heightened awareness 
of the becomillg asymmetrical of symmetry, and vice versa. More than that, it is 
made apparent that such an awareness was necessarily the perception of the 
paillter ill order for the painting to appear as it is. Much the same is true paintings 
like Eden, 1957, or Seascape with DJmes, 1962 by Helen Frankenthaler. These 
paintings, like those of Johns, illdicate a preoccupation with (a) symmetry as 
constitutive of the image. Thus the making has both produced and been the result 
of a heightened awareness of the vagaries of symmetry. The illtertwlning of 
making and perception is complex and paradoxical: the modes of attention drive 
the making yet are extended by that making. Luhmann contends that the artist "is 
illvolved ill the creation of the work primarily as observer".32 What I wish to read 
from the remark is the insistence upon the primarily perceptual nature of the 
painter's engagement in making a work. 
At this juncture then, we regain contact with the readymade in at least one 
respect. For the repeated claim was that the readymade undid the distinction 
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between making and appreciating art. That comes pretty close to what I'm 
claiming for the Johns paintings, namely, that they compel the viewer to follow 
the perceptual paths that conditioned and constituted their making. And what's 
more, there is little traditional skill involved in making a Johns painting. Then, if 
these paintings both reduce the distinction between making and perceiving, and 
require minimal craft skills, what is the relevant difference between these paintings 
and the readymade? Crucially it's that with painting, perception is occasioned onlY i?Y the 
making. Here is again the irreducible paradox that will receive further examination 
in the remainder of the chapter: the perceptual paths both condition the making if the 
paintings and are conditioned i?Y that making. For the readymade, however, it is enough 
to perceive, or merely conceive, and nominate33 a thing as artwork. We do not 
though enter into a terrain in which judgment, as a punctal and disembodied 
decision-making, is sovereign over craft. This scenario is deeply misleading for 
painting. 
Because firstly, 'craft' is too easy a victiin, too obviously predetermined as 
prescribed, normative, regulated artisanal procedure and therefore defined in 
advance as a modus operandi devoid of spontaneity. Painting cannot evade its 
artisanal-tethrtical netessities: like any material, paint is bestial and uncooperative, 
oblivious to artists' desires, but that is not to say that it is devoid of its own 
dynamics. Of necessity painters develop technical iioclns for manipdhting it. But 
that is not to stigmatise painting technique as craft in the despised sense. Any 
fruitful relation between pigment and its deployment cannot be a case of a 
resource subjected to a technical domination that ends up estranging that resource 
from its inherent qualities. All painters learn this lesson early on: that technique 
from its very beginning has to abandon the hope of domination for the simple 
reason that pigment has its own dynamic, what Bernard Stiegler in a different 
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context calls the "dynamic of the what'. Technique - or what we should prefer to 
call engaging the painting apparatus/4 meaning the entire assemblage of materials, 
procedures, tools, gestural registers and modes of pictorial address and attention -
demands a spirit of reconciliation and accommodation with pigment, which is of 
course, simultaneously chroma and matter and therefore inherendy unstable as the 
flesh of optical stuff. Technique in painting therefore is never the domination of a 
materiality that is received abjecdy as inert, formless and destitute. Pigment is after 
all chosen because of its qualities. These already bestow certain orientations and 
dispositions which have to be found, observed and respected rather than 
commanded and dominated. The expanded notion of the painting apparatus 
indicates how perception and technique fold into one another, and so can come 
to extend and amplify each other. 
In any case, the technical goals of painting are open to question. For 
exrtmple, Old Master technique assumes that a finished oil painting should last for 
centuries, and it works to that end. As we know, certain paintings of the 1940s by 
Pollock, Rothko and de Kooning are now deteriorating fast to a point where the 
value of seeing them is moot. One sees the ruins of an eatlier state. Pollock and 
co assumed that prtintings were for the here and now more than for the future, 
therefore they were unconcerned about the stability of their paint surfaces. 
Tedihid.i fteedottis thus follow or do ndt ftJlld*tr from certa1±i very g~tieral 
assumptions about the kinds of objects paintings need to be and the roles they 
must play. Historically, technical norms have always been challenged. So the 
identification of painting and craft is far from straightforward. Further, judgment 
set against craft amounts to judgment separated from the act of making. For 
painting that is not credible. 
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The examples from Wittgenstein, Arnheim and Baxandall are meant to disallow 
the distinction between perception and thinking. What I have sought to establish 
is the unity of thinking and visual perception in practice. It should be clear that 
thinking, perceiving and making are therefore not practically distinguishable in the 
activity of generating artwork. Or, to be more precise, where they are distinct, the 
resultant artwork sacrifices much of the resource available to it as a specific mode 
of affective exchange. The examples are also intended to prove the non-
equivalence of visual thinking and verbal thinking by indicating how verbal 
thinking fails to parallel resources of visual thinking. 
1.4 Embodied Judgment 
Technique is the unwelcome guest in contemporary art discourse. To mention it 
without derision amounts to a faux pas. If one wanted a field of aesthetic 
spectacle around which discourses of technique still flourish, one could do worse 
than consider fashion and sport. Here is a joumalist describing a contemporary 
footballer's approach to long range shots: 
If we look at it closely we see further clues to the secret of his extraotdinary 
gift. Thete is the turn of the body, with his left shoulder facing the target, like 
a right-arm outswing bowler. Thete is the extraordinary hinging of the right 
ankle, which allows him to wrap his instep around the ball. There is the 
positioning of the standing foot very close to the ball and the left leg'S 
extreme angle from the perpendicular .... 35 
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This sounds mechanistic: the "extraordinary hinging of the right ankle" and so 
forth. Sport's universality is related to its capacity for mechanising and 
rationalising bodily dynamics in the sense that sport generates unequivocal 
outcomes, like a goal in football, which then serve as universal criteria for the 
disciplining of players' bodies. This suggests that a sport like football allows for 
little creativity by players. Yet I propose to describe two kinds of creativity in 
football: we could call them the normal and the radical. Football's universal 
popularity has to do both with its relative lack of specialisation, as compared to 
baseball or cricket, say; and its fertility as a field of contingencies. That's to say, it 
is remarkably effective at generating an infinite series of unique situations, which 
differ slightly but crucially from one another. Exploiting the possibilities of these 
situations requires the creativity that is normal to playing the game. In normal 
creativity the existing repertoire of moves and tactics is applied intelligently to the 
particularity of the situation. But in radical creativity the repertoire of moves and 
tactics is itself extended. The obvious case of the latter is the Cruyff turn, which 
looked incredible when Johann Cruyff invented it in the 1970s but is now a 
standard move for any self-respecting player. The turn indicates a kind of 
embodied double-think in which the attacking player who is obstructed by a 
defender appears to advance with one leg, while simultaneously flicking the ball 
under himself in the opposite direction with the other foot. Thus it combines an 
advance with an opposing feint. With the Cruyff turn we have an exemplary case 
of embodied judgment. For as a new move it could not be thought except by a 
body. No amount of cerebral calculation or speculation could produce it. Crucially 
it constitutes a thinking that is not plausibly separated from the moving of the 
player'S body. The player is not thinking about his move, rather the moving is the 
thinking. Massumi develops the same point here: 
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The player must pare himself down to a channelling of the play. The player's 
subjectivity is disconnected as he enters the field of potential in and as its 
sensation. For the play, the player is that sensation.36 
In Massumi's account of the football game it is the agency not of individual 
players but of the ball itself, qua catalyser of potential action, that is given 
emphasis. Massumi stresses that self-conscious thought is not merely unhelpful 
for the player in the flow of the game, but is actively destructive of the disposition 
to play responsively and effectively. The player cannot deliberate reflexively while 
playing. This shouldn't surprise us. It is analogous to the impossibility of speaking 
fluently while simultaneously reflecting on the grammatical structures that one is 
producihg. In Massumi's account, the emerging description of agency is 
nonsimple in that it distances agental power from the circumscribed competence 
of the player as subject. For Massumi agency is catalysed by the situation within 
the game, for which, in this instance, the ball, the goalposts and the other players 
are the pertinent tertns. As he describes it, the very architecture of the pitch with 
its opposing goalmouths lays down an irresistible dynamic of combatorial drama. 
Within this accelerated and intensely channelled drama, effective play requires an 
emptying of the players as subjects: 
The players, in the heat of the game, are drawn out of themselves. Any player 
who is conscious of himself as he kicks, misses. Self-consciousness is a 
negative condition of the play. The players reflective sense of themselves as 
subjects is a source of interference that must be minimized for the play to 
"7 
channel smoothly." 
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This insistence on subjective evacuation as a condition of participation in the 
event is correlative with an insistence that agency in this situation is not in the 
realm of subjects. Rather agency here is and is occasioned by the intermingling of 
player, ball and the drive to score, which itself surpasses the motivations of 
individual players. As the discussion turns to painting it will exhibit the impact of 
these understandings. 
Moving, obviously, takes place in time. It is an unfolding in time, not a point 
in time. So if embodied judgment is to be identified with the moves of a creative 
athlete, the strong implication must be that it is not a punctal decision at all. 
Instead it is something like the interweaving of expectation with agency in a 
spatio-temporal sequence that in its difficulty drives agency to its limits. 
Bergkamp is another Dutch player who comes close to the creative level of 
Cruyff. 38 Bergkamp undermines my distinction between normal and radical 
creativity because his solutions for local situations are so extreme and so 
surprising that they are radical, but their virtuosity is such that his moves can't 
become repeatable repertoire. Bergkamp's best goals alter our sense of what is 
possible. But what is significant for the argument is that they are not moves that 
anyone could rehearse: rather, they are context specific improvisations. That's why 
they are on a different level to, say, Beckham's spot kicks, which are hardly less 
generic than penalty kicks. It is interesting to see that Bergkamp sometimes gets 
drawn into footballing arguments about intentionality. His goal for Holland 
against Argentina in the 1998 World Cup quarterfinal was extraordinary. Yet his 
most remarkable goal was for Arsenal and it was strange enough to prompt 
accusations of a fluke.39 Berkamp insisted it was no fluke and went on record 
declaring "I meant it." I don't for a moment doubt his intentionality here. But the 
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issue for us is that his intentions are in the structure of a future anterior: an 
interiority that is subsequent to an exteriorization. We find the direct link from 
this to the painter's situation through Luhmann's claims: 
A primary intention is necessary to pass from the unmarked to the marked 
space; but the activity of traversing this boundary - an operation that produces 
a distinction (delimits a form) - cannot itself be a distinction, except for an 
observer who observes (creates, delimits) this distinction. The first impulse is 
never the artists "own" intention - in the sense of self-observed mental states 
- but something one attributes to the artist as intention when observing the 
work.4D 
Thus for the painter as for the athletic body thinking is doing - is moving and 
interacting with the ball and the situation in an accelerated temporal sequence. It 
is not separable from doing. Hence insofar as subjective consciousness presumes 
a reflexive distance from acting in amongst things, the agency of the athlete, or 
painter, requites a subjective self-evacuation. As in Massumi's account, the 
virtuoso like Bergkamp or Cruyff is predisposed to the subjective emptying that is 
the necessary precondition of effective play. 
At the beginning of the chapter I noted that making as such has gone largely 
rthexatttirteclln theoretical writing. To sbfue degree that theoretitallack must be a 
consequence of the division of labour: practitioners generally don't write, and 
writers generally don't make things, and their separation is reflected in the 
theoretical neglect of making. The most pertinent text on the issue was written by 
a practitioner. This is Robert Morris' 1970 essay Some Notes on the Phenomenology of 
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Making. The strength of the text is Moms' critique of art interpretations that 
assume an instrumental role for the making of artworks. Morris argues that 
instead of interpreting works as perfected symbolic complexes, i.e. symbolic end 
products, we should consider how meaning is articulated in their making itself. 
Much attention has been focused on the analysis of the content of art making 
- its end images - but there has been little attention focused on the 
significance of the means. George Kubler in his examination of Machu 
Picchu is startlingly alone among art historians in his claim that the significant 
meanings of this monument are to be sought in reconstructing the particular 
building activity - and not in a formal analysis of the architecture. I believe 
there are "forms" to be found within the activity of making as much as 
within the end products .... The reasons for [the neglect of this aspect] are 
probably varied and [include] the deep-seated tendency to separate ends and 
means within this culture .... 41 
Morris' text affirms process over product. Yet that posture is also the limitation of 
the essay. it's partly that as a 'process aesthetic' becomes established the 
process / product distinction is eroded. In other words, if process emerges as an a 
priori value - as it did for Mottis' generation - it becomes equivalent to a 
symbolic product. But beyond this point, there is a distance between Moms' 
affirmation of making and mine. While he was right to direct the discussion 
toward the question of means and ends, it does seem that he simply inverts the 
received preference by affirming means at the expense of ends. But that inversion 
remains inadequate for thinking painting. Some of our best contemporary 
painting retains a broadly traditional conception of the finished picture: I think of 
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Glenn Brown varnishing his completed paint surfaces much as a rococo painter 
would have done. In Brown's paintings as in Dali's, technique works to make 
itself invisible in the finished picture. Yet such technique that aims at self-
concealment is also and necessarily supremely respectful of the vagaries of 
process. Is this process a means enslaved by an end? Obviously this technique is 
instrumental with respect to the pictorial effect that it produces. However, in Dali 
and Brown, it is undeniable that it is the technique that allows new pictorial 
effects to be conceived at all. Indeed, it is this constant looping back on one 
another of means and ends - of process and product - that sustains their work. 
The affirmation of making in the present text is in this way more complex than 
merely championing process over product. 
The other central issue in Morris' essay is the arbitrary. The arbitrary for 
Morris means that which is grounded in personal preference, such as taste. Morris 
suggests that it is important that art rid itself of the arbitrary and replace it with 
what amounts to structural or procedural necessity. This, he claims, is precisely 
what ptocess offers. The exemplary process for the argument is Pollock's drip 
painting. What matters for Morris is that the drips fall where they may and are 
brought to the canvas surface by gravity. This is said to be non-arbitrary because 
the appearance of the drips is not determined by taste or tradition, but by the 
impersonal variables that structure the procedure. The argument here is plainly 
false in that every art-making process is equally arbitrary and equally 'creationist': 
there is no process that isn't artifice and no evolutionary dynamic that could 
develop artwork out of the primordial sludge of sheer matter, or the objective 
properties of materials. There is of course a historical issue of the relative 
credibility of competing processes at specific times. As Greenberg remarked, 
"surprise demands a context," 42 and the contingencies of the context indicate the 
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arbitrary. I dwell on these issues to stress that the argument of the present text is 
not purely ontologicaL That is because in art the ontological is always nested 
within the historical, which is to say the arbitrary and the contingent. Therefore 
the centrality of making in the presentation is by no means an adulation of sheer 
process or the properties of materials. Rather making qua mode of thought is 
always a historical intervention and as such always mired in the arbitrary. 
If Pollock is an exemplary case of embodied judgement, it is because in his 
drip paintings thought is enacted through the movement that creates the mark. 
And as Charles Harrison argues, Pollock's technical innovations led him into a 
kind of painting in which arm's-length discrimination - both literal and intellectual 
- became impossible. 
The adoption of the drip-and-spatter technique and of dried-out brushes, 
sticks and trowels as tools, can also largely be accounted for in practical 
terns: Pollock was enabled by this tneans to maintain a relatively upright 
position, a distance away from the floor and the canvas. The painting-at-
arm's-length stance cannot be sustained for a painting on the fldor as it can 
bdbte an el1sel or a wall. the point of balance for Pollock became the hips, 
not, as before, the shoulder; the natural rhythm - and Pollock was a 
'rhythmical' painter from the start - became inevitably more exl'ansive, 
irlvdlved longer, more sweeping movements of the hand controlling the 
application of paint.43 
Thus Pollock's entire modus operandi forced him to be in among his marks. 
These were flung and flicked down from above. So the set-up precludes the 
possibility of stepping back from the picture plane to look. In other words, 
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Pollock disallows any looking-pausing-thinking that is separate from marking. The 
picture plane placed upright and parallel to the wall invites this contemplative 
visual distance. The swathe of pictorial space constituted by the canvas on the 
floor can be occupied and inhabited by the working painter, but is utterly resistant 
to such distanced viewing by the artist. More than that, Pollock is exemplary 
because he indicated that the judgement in embodied judgment is by definition 
not a verbalized statement. It is certainly not the judgment 'This is art!', but is 
much more like the intuition 'This feels strange.' 
1.5 The Prosthetic Priority 
In Massumi's football match we are invited to grasp agency as distributed across 
the interstices of ball, players and goalposts. It is the ball that catalyses action. The 
players become transducers of energy. The players' bodies are endlessly rehearsed 
as finely honed repertoires of reflexes. I want to suggest that we understand the 
skilled footballer as enacting thought through the medium of bodily movement. 
Football always requires a minimum of normal creativity or, in other words, 
thought. And that thinking isn't done with words or intentionalities, but with and 
by movements of bodies. Or to put it more painstakingly, intentionality here 
cannot be identified with individual players but is more like a vectored fotce that 
we can tie to the role of the goal qua attractor in competition with the dpposing 
goal. In what follows, we will amplify this account by considering the role of the 
prosthesis in making. By implication this is as significant for football as it is for 
painting. The argument around the prosthesis will further displace the common 
sense ratification of intentionality. 
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The account of prosthesis draws heavily on Bernard Stiegler's discussion of 
technics, which in its tum draws extensively upon Andre Leroi-Gourhan's Gesture 
and Speech. Leroi-Gourhan's fundamental move 1ll his narration of 
anthropogenesis is to fuse the technological with the zoological. In this scenario 
each organism is regarded as a technical apparatus with distinct potentialities that 
channels the developmental through the technical. The human stands out because 
s/he stands up. Standing on two feet, the human frees two other feet from their 
originary instrumental logic: two idle feet become two hands. What is vital about 
hands is that they have no preordained function, yet the individual must find 
something, anything for them to do or to grasp. They can't do nothing. They are, 
after all, hands therefore they anticipate certain kinds of functions. In a sense, the 
arbitrariness of this 'anything' in 'anything to for them to do', is the origin of 
artifice itself, thus of the cultural as such, and by implication, of the huma.n as 
such, in Leroi-Gourhan's, as well as Stiegler'S, account. 
From the absence of unity in the huma.n, it would be better to conclude 
instead that the human can only be defined negatively, by the trait of this 
technical inhumanity that allows it to be differentiated without, however, 
permitting its identification. This impossibility of anything but a phantasmatic 
identification is "the mirror stage." 44 
The originary paradox is of a functional apparatus - a hand - deprived of any 
necessary or inevitable functional setting: an instrument displaced by leisure, 
unlike the foot which is obliged to take a walk, step up and down, suffer gravity. 
When the human stands on two feet everything is transformed: "the huma.n did 
not begin with the brain, but with the feet." 45 The hand is condemned to a 
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functional schizophrenia in which it is both liberated from a functional destiny 
because freed from the burden of gravity and, by the same token, condemned to 
keep busy and find new employ. In this state, the hand is freed to make gestures. 
It is freed up also - and here we anticipate a contact with Derrida's topic of the 
originary supplement that will be considered in Chapter 3 - to extend itself. 
Extend itself it does through tools and implements and equipment that both 
diversify and intensify its operations. The strangeness of this narrative of the 
onset of the prosthesis should not be squandered by being normalised or taken 
for granted. For isn't it strange that at the very point at which the hand is set free 
to handle things, to literally grapple with its milieu, it chooses to defer itself, to 
supplement itself, to substitute itself: to place the prosthesis between itself and 
things? It is valuable to retain a feel for this strangeness, though Stiegler's 
response will be to invert its assumptions. Like Derrida's originary supplement,46 
Stiegler's prehensile hand, he will argue, must be understood as being itself always 
already a prosthetic. 
A prosthetic is an implement or tools that brings its own milieu with it as an 
inbuilt immanent collective memory. Fdt the tdbl both embodies a collective past 
culture, and. expects to be used in particular, prescribed ways in the future. The 
tool is like the goalmouth in Massumi's football game: it anticipates certain 
satisfactions and channels activity towards particular kinds of outcomes. Thus the 
ptostb.etic is always a complex temporal transmitter of expectation: it contains 
itiunense ptotentional power. The cllffetence between protention arid intention 
here is hard to secure. The tool carries it own intentionai mo1i1enttlm with it, since 
it channels action and interaction with the environment in particular directions. 
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The whole problem, which thus becomes the distendedness of the past, the 
present, and the future, is caught in a circle in which the tool appears at one 
and the same time qua the result of anticipation, exteriorization, and qua the 
condition of all anticipation, anticipation appearing itself qua the 
interiorization of the originary fact of exteriorization.47 
The tool thus protends forward in time by indicating its contexts of use and 
therefore inviting future application, but is also imbued with a complex communal 
memory: indeed, its futural force is an effect of its containment of memOl"y. In 
Leroi-Gourhan's words, "From the emergence of Homo sapiens, the constitution of 
an apparatus of social memory dominates all problems of human evolution." 48 
The tool qua apparatus of social memory faces both to the future and the past. 
But it will be asked: Doesn't the invention of the tool require a prior conception, 
or intention to find the right implenient fot a certain need? Stiegler's atiswet is an 
emphatic no. 
The question is the very ambiguity if the word '~xtetiotization" and the hietarchy or 
the chronological, logical, and ontological pre-eminence that it immediately 
induces: if indeed one could speak of exteriorization, this would mean the 
ptesellce of a pteceding interiority. Now, this interiority is nothlrlg outside of 
its exteriorization: the issue is therefore neither that of an interiority nor that 
of an exteriority - but of an originary complex in which the two terms, far 
from being opposed, compose one another (and by the same token are 
posed, in a single stroke, in a single movement). Neither one precedes the 
other, neither is the origin of the other, the origin being then the coming into 
adequacy or the simultaneous arrival of the two .... A prosthesis does not 
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supplement something, does not replace what would have been there before 
it and would have been lost: it is added. By pros-thesis, we understand (1) set 
in front, or spatialization (de-severance); (2) set in advance, already there 
(past) and anticipation (foresight), that is, temporalization.49 
This is also Kubrick's answer in the opening scene of 2001: A Space Ocfyssry, where 
we see gangs of testosterone-fueled apes on the African savannah facing off 
against each another [Fig.5). One aggressive male picks up a thigh bone and 
crashes it around him. What's crucial here is that only in retrospect does the ape 
reflect on what has happened, that he has used the bone as a weapon. One is 
tempted to say that he has transformed the bone into a weapon. But what's 
wonderful in Kubrick's pacing of the scene is that it's made quite unambiguous 
that it is precisely the bone that transforms the ape into an armed combatant, and 
more pessimistically, as the film implies, into the human or ptoto-human as such. 
The movement inherent in this process of exteriorization is paradoxical: 
Leroi- Gourhan in fact says that it is the tool, that is, tekhne, that invents the 
human, not the human who invents the technical. Or again: the human 
invents himself in the technical by inventing the tool - by becoming 
exteriorized techno-logically. 50 
UliextJedectly we are back with Duchatnp insofar as the bone/weapon in 2001 is, 
of course, a readymade. (And just as the primal ancestor of the human doesn't 
need to fashion the tool for it to be a tool - he needs only to use it as a tool - so 
we saw with Duchatnp's readymade, the received object needs only to be deplqyed 
as art for it to become art. This affirmation of the logic of the readymade is fine 
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so far as it goes; however, our argument claims the very different parallel with the 
wound that the primal primate inflicts using his weapon-implement: for it is 
precisely this wound/mark that must be made rather then thought. It is this 
analogy that is decisive for the artwork that we have in mind.) Technological 
development hones such natural readymades and gathers them into assemblages. 
The point to hold onto here is that intentionality is generated in and by a 
combination of situation, implement and mobilised body. It is not a mental 
content at all. This again is to come close to Massumi's account of the football 
game. What emerges from Stiegler's position, as it does from Massumi, is that the 
actor becomes an agent - participates in agency - at a point of encounter with a 
dynamic situation in which objects and bodies mingle. But in that dynamic of 
mingling, agency is sprinkled across the participant elements. 
Stiegler'S argumentation is frequently torltextualized by and differentiated 
from Heidegger's account of technics. His complaint is that though Heidegger 
challenges the instrumental understanding of language in particular - especially 
the notion of language as a technique for communication - he fails to question the 
concept of inst.rurt1bitality per se. 
The metaphysical illusion from Plato onward that turns language into a 
means through which humans express themselves, rather than its being 
located as the site of their very constitution, is abundantly criticized by 
Heidegger. Yet it is the same error that induces consideration of an 
instrument as a means.... It is a question not of struggling against the 
instrumentalization of language but of resisting the very reduction of an 
instrument to the rank of means .... The issue is rather that of addressing the 
modalities of instrumentality as such, modalities that harbour the condition 
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of idiomatic instrumentality as much as that of the condition of massive 
indifferentiation, together with what we might call, here, the instrnmentai 
condition. 51 
At this point it's appropriate to remove the possibility of a certain misreading of 
the chapter. I have talked about making, about movements of footballers and 
primeval combatants. There is in all this the undeniable sense of purpose. Plainly 
these are images of the gesture that characterise it as purposive action. Here we 
need to insert a stem proviso. The gesture in painting is quite unlike the 
movement of the footballer in that the 'productive value' of the latter is explicidy 
demonstrated with respect to the goal of the game. The footballer's pass is 
therefore exhaustively definable as purposive act. The painted gesture is not. Its 
condition in this respect is better described by Giorgio Agamben's remarks: 
What characterizes gesture is that in it nothing is being produced or acted, 
but rather something is being endured or supported. The gestute, in other 
words, opens the sphere of ethos . ... if producing is a means in view of an end 
and praxis is an end without means, the gesture then breaks with the false 
alternative betweeh ends and means that paralyses morality and presents 
i.bstead means that, as such, evade the orbit of mediality without becoming, for 
thi d 5" S reason, en s.-
Isn't this compatible with Stiegler's claim that there are different modalities of 
instrumentality? To return to the opening concerns of this chapter, isn't the 
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denigration of the pamtmg apparatus as craft an attempt to delimit its 
instrumental mode and to constrain it within the "orbit of mediality?" 
The priority of the prosthesis, as we have seen, is a decisive anthropogenetic 
concept for Leroi-Gourhan and Stiegler. But we can also trace it in more ordinary 
terms. Writers too have frequently insisted on the priority of the prosthesis, or in 
Stiegler'S other register, the priority of exteriorization over interiorization. Don 
Delillo has talked of his inability to write on a word processor, and his preference 
for the tactile and sensuous engagement with an old-fashioned typewriter. 
Similarly Paul Auster has spoken about his inability to write on a laptop or 
desktop computer. In his words, "it's not possible for me to think with my hands 
irt that writing position." 53 Thus many writers recognise that they depend upon a 
decisive prosthetic identification to drive their thought. To a pairtter, these 
adtnissions come as no surprise. Only for those who hope to determine an 
originary intention that ptecedes and directs the extetlbtizatiorl df thbught is there 
a theoretical disappointment. What we find is, on the contrary, that the value of 
the making activity is that it can constitute an originary exteriorization of thought; 
in other words, the paradox whereby the intention finds and identifies itself 
retroactively in the exteriorization (for example, of the mark in pairtting or in 
writing; of the tool; of speech; of the move in a game). In Massumi's soccer 
scenario we saw that agency is nowhere reducible to the intentional consciousness 
of the single player, and is rather a function of ball and players in a dynamic and 
orientated situation. Similarly, in Stiegler'S narrative, intentionality and 'interiority' 
can grasp themselves only in a future anterior structure after the event of 
exteriorization. In Chapter 3 we will find the equivalence of this position in 
Derrida's notion of arche-writing, a theoretical scenario in which writing is said to 
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anticipate speaking, or at least, to be equiprimordial with speech. This is Derrida's 
rendition of the exteriority that makes possible the interiority. 
We arrive then at an additional affirmation of the immanent power of the 
externalisation, which for painting I call the mark, or gesture. These 
determinations give an intricate account of how that externalization can itself 
constitute thought without need of the crutch of originary intention or other 
interiority. In other words, it is a profound misunderstanding to suppose that 
thought must reside in something outside of the marking, whether prior or 
parallel. The point is that the thought is the mark; that thinking, for painting, is 
marking. That is why and how the chapter insists on making making the issue. 
Stiegler writes: "Because it is ciffected with anticipation, becattse it is nothing but anticipation, 
a gesture is a gestttre; and there can be no gesture without tools and artificial 
memory, prosthetic, outside of the body, and constitutive of its world." 54 
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Chapter 2 Gesture and Commodity 
2.1 Serial Singularity 
It is said that art today is free - free of history, free of craft, free of ideology, liberated 
from developmental logic and so forth. Anything goes. We arrive into the 'post-
medium condition,' in Rosalind Krauss's phrase. Alternatively, adopting de Duve's 
--
vocabulary, the abiding imperative is the radically levelling 'Do whatever!' Radically 
levelling simply because when whatever is done by whoever however wherever, 
whatever becomes both prescribed and homogenised by its enforced 
adventurousness and its predetermined diversity. Plainly something is missing in de 
Duve's version of the injunction. 'Do whatever different!' would be more accurate 
because in practice one cannot do whatever: one cannot for instance do the same. 
The same - same as before, same as others, same as the past, same as elsewhere - is 
ruled out. The era of 'Do whatever!' is the era of the law of differentiation. If we are 
to continue to prize artists on the basis of their singularity we find ourselves today in 
a state in which that singularity is common, normalised and found in an infinite 
series. They are all apparently wonderfully distinct. The injunction is indeed 'Do 
whatever different!' This is the kingdom of serial singularity, a domain in which 
distinction is prescribed, where failure to be distinct is punishable by enforced 
invisibility. 
There is of course a pre-cultural requirement for differentiation. For example, 
it's a truism of perceptual psychology that the human organism requires minimal 
thresholds of stimulus differentiation in order to perceive anything at all. Where 
every point in a sensory field is equal, as in white noise, attention subsides and turns 
away. A stimulus is in this strict sense a difference of some kind or degree. This 
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approach is analogous to that of Gregory Bateson in his celebrated definition of 
information as a difference that makes a difference.55 Of course a brilliant definition, 
but one feels that Bateson was fortunate not to be writing for an era, like our own, in 
which it is obvious that most information does not make a difference. Or, to be 
painstaking about the current paradox: it is by making the difference it makes that 
today's information keeps things the same. Today's cult of information is another 
guise of serial singularity. 
The problem of making art - my problem of being an artist now - is a 
matter of seriality. I don't mean serial repetition as in the canonical compositional 
method of minimalism. Here, in the first instance, I mean the endless series - the 
glut - of artworks and of artists. But as we will examine, seriality also stands for a 
more precise predicament. It is a general problem of contemporary life that Sartre 
described rather a long time ago. The traditional notion of the artist auteur as an 
impassioned artisan (one whose artisanal production claims to transcend craft by its 
arrogant passion and refusal to become anyone's tool) whose intense dexterity is 
singular and hard to fake (except by her/himself) corresponds to most contemporary 
painters. The singularity starts out as authenticity but ends up as copyright control, 
i.e. the patent, the anchoring of commodity value. And not just in the sense of the 
commodity critique of art that is over-familiar to us now. This kltid of copyright 
control through artisanal singularity - as in the virtuoso dexterities of David Reed -
also becomes a means of channelling the oeuvre or the project into paths strictly 
commensurate with the past of the project. Despite the artworld's endless bleating 
about its taste for the radical and the critical, despite its oft declared relish for the 
critiques of identity and of essentialism, its entire structure is in fact devoted precisely 
to distributing and policing circumscribed branded identities known as 'artists'. And 
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it should come as no surprise to find that this policing most frequendy takes the 
fonn of self-policing by artists. By their mute acceptance of the law of 
differentiation, artists spontaneously fonn themselves into a self-regulating system of 
measured and calibrated idiosyncratic differences. 
The economic basis for (self-)policing like this is obvious enough. It is the 
political economy of the unique commodity, or the limited edition commodity. In the 
music industry the edition is unlimited. When stock sells, a batch of new units is 
produced: a new job lot of CDs is despatched from the plant to the retail oudets. 
The unique object by contrast - as favoured in the artworld - can appear to only one 
audience at a time and can be sold only once. Thus broad global distribution is 
possible only if the previous and the next unique object in the series are relatively 
similar. 
Given these pressures, it's not surprising that artists repeat themselves. But in 
perfecting their strategies for artisanal singularity what is accomplished? Surely a 
seriai singularity in which art is proffered as the public evidence for the plural 
blossoming of an open society. Such a singularity is however the proof of a 
homogenizing pluralism. Why homogenizing? - Because the set-up prescribes 
singularity. The unspoken imperative is 'Do anything you like, so long as it's 
singular!' In other words, anything goes, except the refusal to attain singularity. We 
hear the utopian slogan of Joseph Beuys - "J eder Mensch ist ein Kiinsder" - in this 
light as being as conservative and banal as "The customer is always right." After all, it 
is almost identical to the recent corporate tagline for Sony advertising, "Go create." 
Although Same's Critique of Dialectical Reason is ponderous and little fun to 
read - by comparison Deleuze and Guattari speed along like an airport novel - it is 
one of the few sustained attempts at analysing serial singularity. Recalling Sartre's 
deep aversion to structuralism, what one can perceive here is equivalent to an ethical 
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application of the concept of differential value borrowed from structural linguistics. 
Serial singularity is differential value in the social-economic sphere. 
[R]eciprocity in the milieu of identity becomes a false reciprocity of relations: 
what a is to b (the reason for his being other), b is to c, b and the entire series 
are to a. Through this opposition between the Other and the same in the 
milieu of the Other, alterity becomes this paradoxical structure: the identity 
of everyone as everyone's action of serial interiority of the Other. In the same 
way, identity (as the sheer absurdity of meaningless dispersal) becomes ... [p 
264] ... synthetic: everyone is identical with the Other in so far as the others 
make him an Other acting on the Others; the formal, universal structure of 
alterity produces the formula if the senes (la Raison de la sene)." 56 
This is the logic of the 'they' in which I structure my activity nbt for itself, not 
according to its own positive qualities and demaHds, but in relation to the practices 
of they. We don't need to propound an ethic of Sartrean authenticity in order to 
behefit from this analysis. What is crucial within. it is the insistence that this kind of 
series is extended and maintained precisely on the condition that its members 
differentiate themselves . 
. . . Thus this rule - the formula for the senes - is common to all preciselY to the 
extent that thry differentiate themselves. 57 
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2.2 The Double Bind 
The double bind is the following: if we favour Conceptual Art we loose contact with 
art's capacity to generate percepts and affects, and instead settle for a stultifying 
tyranny of the concept, which both misconstrues the potentialities of embodiment 
and forgets or overlooks the inherent dynamic at play in the encounter with 
materials; if, on the contrary, we prefer painting, understood as a gestural, embodied 
thinking that manifests itself through the disclosure not of concepts but of percepts 
and affects, we run up against the signature gesture as branded mark, which is the 
ideal handmaiden of the commodity. Why ideal handmaiden? Because through the 
signature gesture the commodity safeguards its link with authorship. And then why is 
this a distinct problem for painting? The answer is that it is of course a general 
problem for art in ways that will be elaborated in what follows. Yet it is a more overt 
and intense problem for painting because painting is constituted by the mark. Thus, 
by contrast, the Conceptual Artist relates individual presentations only at the level of 
the idea, allowing for cortsiderab1e leeway as to ma.terial manifestation. Painting is 
always driven to articulate itself as iterable mark, and as such it is inevitably ripe for 
commodification. 
Given that the gesture invites commodification, the converse is also true: the 
commodity acts as lure for the gesture. Often this luring of the branded mark is 
denied by commentators in the name of a kind of parallelism in which art and 
commodity are posed as parallel though discrete and separable realms. Dave Hickey 
argues for just such a parallelism. In his memoir cum polemical essay Dealing he 
writes: 
... as to my complicity in the hedonistic commodification of art, I can tell you 
two things: First, Art is not a commodiry. It has no intrinsic value or stable 
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application. Corn is a commodity .... Price distinguishes commodities that are 
otherwise similar and destabilizes the market, whereas price likens works of 
art that are otherwise dissimilar and stabilizes the market .... 
Second: Art and monty never touch. They exist in parallel universes of 
value at comparable levels of cultural generalization: Art does nothing to 
money but translate it. Money does nothing to art but facilitate its 
dissemination and buy the occasional bowl of Wheaties for an artist or art 
dealer. Thus, when you trade a piece of green paper with a picture on it, 
signed by a bureaucrat, for a piece of white paper with a picture on it, signed 
by an artist, you haven't bought anything, since neither piece of paper is worth 
anything. You have translated your investment and your faith from one 
universe of value to another. 58 
It's hard to know where to start. I will restrict my response to addressing Hickey's 
sentence: "Money does nothing to art but facilitate its dissemination and buy the 
occasional bowl of Wheaties ... ". :Plainly the claim is empirically false: one has only to 
visit stUdios in the run-up to a major art fair to witness a power that is by no tneans 
equivalent to the "facilitation of dissemination." Nothing so modest. But perhaps we 
need to step beyond the realm of the a posteriori - the empirical - to decisively 
dislodge Hickey's parallelism. It is the understanding that the law of differentiation 
precedes the artwork - indeed, produces the artwork - that propels the discussion 
beyond the horizon of factual observations about art and artists. For what we have 
here is a structural determination of the artwork that both serves and is served by the 
commodity, but which is rooted deeper still. The law of differentiation is the 
synthetic a priori of the artwork. 'Do whatever' is the abiding ethic, so long as the 
whatever is not the same. An adequate description of this synthetic a priori would 
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require considerable attention to the collective desire for individuated authorship, 
indeed for authorship at all, in amongst a lifeworld furnished with predominandy 
anonymous, unauthored artefacts. Such attention is beyond the reach of this text. 
However, let's note here that Hickey's wishful parallelism is no less tactical than 
Christ's parallelism when challenged on the question of Roman authority: "Render 
therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are 
God's." 59 
The crucial point here is that differential markers are predetermined by the 
commodification of the artwork qua token of authorship. And, by extension, 
commodfication here folds out into a wider set of determinations that go beyond the 
narrow purview of surplus profit. There is far more at stake in the commodification 
of authorship than the bottom line. 
Now given the commodification of the artwork - and of the branded mark in 
painting especially - it soon becomes apparent that artwork isn't merely a suitable 
vehicle for the commodity form: it is no less than the ideal cotnmodity. Why ideal? 
Pardy because it is pure exchange value devoid of so-talled use value. But more than 
that, the artwork is the perfect commodity because it is the only commodity that 
cannot be subjected td price reduction through incH~ases iii productivity. The point is 
not that productivity increases are inconceivable for artwork: on the contrary, wasn't 
Warhol's command to Lou Reed always that he should write songs faster? The point 
is rather that the 'work', meaning the labour, in artwork always dissimulates itself to 
the degree that it becomes an imponderable. To this extent of course de Duve is 
correct in his claim - the one that I strived to contest in the first chapter - that in the 
age of Manet the substitution of judgment for craft was already underway. Already 
when Whisder spoke of the mark that was mustered in an instant, but which 
depended on decades of accumulated experience, the notion of the 'working' qua 
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labour in artwork was evaporating. From the perspective of the commodity form, 
this means that art has no definable labour costs. That's why it allows for no 
equivalent to productivity gains. In this respect artworks emerge as the perfect 
commodities, and still more perfect are the works made by the category of artist 
most loved by the market: the dead artist. That is, the artist who certainly cannot 
deviate from his or her constrained furrow of determinate singularity. 
2.3 Group and Gang 
If the branded signature is always the snare for the gesture, and if that mechanism is 
always a means of anchoring authorship, then what if the author is plural, is a they? 
Does the group author offer a liberation from the constraints of the branded mark? 
Let's think about the group. In art it has always been problematic to posit 
the group as an author and producer, which is to say, as an artist. De Kooning once 
said the trouble with the group is that there's always somebody who wants to be the 
ieadet. But it's worth thinking then why groups function effectively in other art 
fotms, but generally not in the visual arts. Music clearly favours the group that is 
extended in space though unified in time because it is an art of simultaneity. 
Simultaneity then already implies a group agetity. The visual arts that Ullfold hi space 
and l10t in time do not easily accommodate the agency of the group as distinct from 
the team directed by a leader, which is not at all unknown to visual art, for instance, 
Warhol, Koons, Murakami, Frize and so on. Yet true group agency in visual art is 
therefore always short-lived: one thinks of the early Art & Language prior to 
Atkinson's departure, some good moments in the life of Bank, the didactic yet 
exploratory exhibitions of Group Material, some wonderful work from the Unovis 
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school. There have also been plenty of forgettable art groups: who now remembers 
or cares about Kids of Survival or PPS or Hobbypop or General Idea or Szuper 
Gallery? The difficulty of group agency in visual art is surely ontological in origin. In 
other words, it is precisely that art's basis in marks that are extended in space, not 
time, tends to mitigate against group agency. It is not possible for two group 
members to mark the same point in space simultaneously. The condition for music is 
then the exact inverse: music requires two or more agents to 'mark' the same point in 
time - even the piano soloist operates simultaneously with two hands. The ontology 
of music requires it to be produced by a group. That explains why musicians are 
always puzzled to learn that visual artists have to make a conscious effort to sustain a 
social life; to be a musician is on the contrary to be socially inunersed in the group. It 
is inevitable that the visual art group has to plan and schedule its activities to a degree 
that excludes the possibility of group improvisation in the manner of a musical 
ensemble. Art-making for the group inevitably becomes a matter of talking about 
ideas and possibilities as opposed to thinking them by just doing them. As Art & 
Language said of themselves: "The Art-Language association is characterised by the 
desire and ability of its members to talk to each other", and: "anyone who asserts 
cotntnon ground with us ... invokes a logically possible 'conversational state of 
affairs.' " 60 In this insistent pull of language it is all the more likely that a contest for 
leadership or for charismatic priority ensues, and that the group acquires a hierarchy 
and so begins to relinquish its claim to group agency proper. Given that the 
dominant medium of thought for the visual art group is always then likely to be or to 
become language, it is clear that it will be well nigh impossible for the group to resist 
the tyranny of the concept. At its best, the group has a productive half-life in that 
benign phase during which figural and discursive thinking elude each other's 
domination. But as soon as one gains the upper hand - and it is invariably discursive 
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thinking that does - 'the writing is on the wall' in all senses. The best account of 
what I call the productive half-life of the group remains that of Siegfried Kracauer in 
his essay 'The Group as Bearer of Ideas.' 61 In it Kracauer describes how increasing 
successes shift the group's centre of gravity. Whereas the embryonic group, with its 
successes still ahead of it, is united, and its members de-subjectivised by the authority 
of the idea, i.e. of the mission; in the successful group members feel their subjectivity 
to be rekindled by outcomes which they take to be proof of their individual 
charismatic power. In this way, success for the group always undermines the 
authority of the idea and creates instead a renewed and intensified contest among 
members for charismatic primacy: Stalin versus Trotsky, Van Doesberg versus 
Mondrian, all the Beatles versus each other, and so on. 
The group does offer resistance to the circulation of artists as authorial 
brands though it is only the promise not the guarantee of resistance. We know that 
all manher of art groups have become stabilized, normal art brands, as have Art & 
Language. But what is the lure of the group, its core of fascination? The attraction of 
the rock group is that of the gang. But I want to consider the group as producer 
rather than Just the gang that hangs out. What is the mystique of the group as 
producer? Isn't it really the riddle of social relations that are not mediated by 
sociability as such? Or to put it another way, isn't our fascination that group 
members relate on the basis of their creation and that this is their decisive form of 
sociality? And sociality on the basis of common creation - not procreation, not 
family life, not hierarchy and not social reproduction - is indeed a utopian notion. 
We don't know how a creative group does or should function. Probably we don't 
know this even if we are its members. 
When Hardt and Negri conclude their dense and bleak analysis of 
contemporary capital in their book Empire with a joyful affirmation of the internet 
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and contemporary communication technologies as that which, for the first time in 
human history, promises the possibility of pure social interaction as the dominant 
mode of production, they both overstate and underestimate the issue.62 They greatly 
underestimate the coercive power of the internet which, put in F oucauldian terms, 
disciplines subjects as communicative interlocutors, as efficient stewards of 
information flows and as instigators of communication-atttactor events.G3 But on the 
other hand their optimism involves a forgetting of the broadly modernist insight that 
McLuhan caricatured under the slogan 'the medium is the message.' This claim -
common to widely differing thinkers since the Enlightenment - that the how of the 
utterance conditions the what of the utterance cannot be forgotten abruptly in the 
rush to eulogise the social spontaneity of the multitude unleashed upon their laptops 
and in internet cafes. Hardt and Negri applaud the internet as if it were neutral with 
respect to sociability: we are right back with Hickey's phrase the 'facilitation of 
dissemination.' Our counter should be the same as to Hickey: No, nothing so 
modest. 
2.4 Bickerton's Susie 
'The question I want now to tum to is this: what happens when the artwork attempts 
to confront its own commodification? Warhol and Steinbach provide distinct 
resportses which we will consider later. But first Ashley Bickerton's early work stands 
as an exemp1ary instance of what Zelda Fitzgerald called "high-rnirtded mistakes." 
In the New York art of the mid 1980s Warhol remained the paradigmatic 
reference. But whereas, for the Pop Art of the 1960s, the appeal to a commercial 
image repertoire and its characteristic modes of marking could be justified both in 
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the name of a critical realism, and as a means to open up and appraise anew the 
rarified marking that painting had come to demand, for the postmodem neo pop of 
the 1980s, the image repertoire of the commodity was too ubiquitous to be worth 
celebrating, too primordial to be a source of liberation, and too much the 
embodiment of the physical environment to even be experienced primarily as image, 
that is to say as flat pictures and signs as opposed to things, masses, solids, bodies. It 
is true that there remains a tone of affection for the ingenuousness of the commodity 
icon in Koons and Steinbach. But this is not the sanguine buoyancy of Lichtenstein's 
Look Mickryf. The 80s artists go to great lengths to bracket off their affections, as we 
will see: they trade their own disingenuousness for the artless address of the 
commodity icon. 
Of all these 80s N ew Yorkers it is Ashley Bickerton who attempts the most 
direct critical confrontation between the artwork and the commodity. Bickerton's 
works of the mid 80s are gleaming metallic sign-strewn parodies of Juddian specific 
objects - not quite painting (too bulky) - riot quite sculpture (still displayed as wall-
mounted boxes). These works, such as Cuh, 1986 and Uuehh, 1986 [Fig.7] and I.e 
Aft (Composition with Logos, 2), 1987 [Fig.6] have a camp techno feel. They seem to 
refer to electronics but in a vague, veiled manner. Bickerton's approach is a kind of 
Russian doll method. There is the artwork by Bickerton. But this turns out to bel to 
contain another artwork signed 'Susie'. In Bickerton's world artists have to be critical 
and autonomous, but in Susie's world they are no more wary of marketing than is a 
car salesman. The works display logos like that of Windsor and Newton as a car 
might display a logo of one its prize custom components. They bear stylised signs 
saying things like 'Season 86-87', and the repeated branded signature 'Susie'. 
Eventually one comes to identify the camp techno look with the technophilia and 
built-in obsolescence of consumer technology products. It would be easy to interpret 
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the works as straightforward stabs at unmasking the commodity life of the artwork 
through burlesque. But the Russian doll apparatus gets in the way. Susie intrudes on 
Bickerton in a way that Richard Mutt never does with Duchamp. Bickerton's 
problem is that he cannot reduce the artwork to the (faux) signature alone. To do so 
would maroon him in a critique already long familiar with Manzoni, Hamilton and 
others. Moreover, it's a critique that keeps everything within an intellectual, elitist 
framework: it does not offer a connection to the modes of attention of the demos, in 
other words, the sensuous realms of the commodity icon. The problem following 
from this is that Bickerton's works must both stage the faux signature and conjure up 
some faux sensuous particularity to go with it. And not surprisirtgly it is this tieetl for 
a sensuous remainder that becomes both the Achilles heel of the (Bickerton's) work 
and the source of what interest it continues to hold. Here is an instance of confusion 
stetnmirtg from the shift between enunciation and enunciated. The difficulty in 
Bickerton is that the designer-techno decorations in the work seem to be the place-
holders for sensuous particularity; but then do they belong in Bickerton's work (point 
of enunciation) or in Susie's work (point of the enunciated)? In Bickerton's critical, 
autonomous artworld, a signature alone can be an artwork; but presumably in Susie's 
world of flattened art commerce, it couid hot, any inore than a Mercedes couid be a 
logo without a vehicle. Ergo the techno-decor is the sensuous particularity to which 
Susie adds her signature. Techno-decor belongs to the art vocabulary of Susie, not of 
Bickerton. However, we've seen that Bickerton's work traces a parodic relation to 
Judd's specific objects. Yet plainly that relation of parody is located in Bickerton's 
artworld, and not Susie's. As we get swept up in this oscillation between the point of 
enunciation and the point of the enunciated, we come to experience Bickerton's 
work as a fragile intellectual conceit rather than a wrought and felt conflict. 
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The scenario with Bickerton's work resembles the medieval carnival in 
which gentry and serfs trade places for a day. In Bickerton the artwork imagines itself 
briefly in the role of the shameless commodity. But this is just a flattening out of the 
real problem. As I will argue below regarding Sony's advertising, it is in the end the 
commodity that holds art to the task of fidelity to autonomy, which is just where 
Susie is found wanting. 
2.5 License to Print Money: Warhol 
Warhol's dollar bill paintings of the 1960s are striking for their thinness. Their 
excessive lack of depth. There is a strong link to the familiar theme of the Jasper 
Johns flag paintings where the viewer is compelled to think the difference - if any -
between a flag and a picture of a flag. To put it in Deleuzian terms, the paintings 
confront us with the movement between a picture of an object and a becoming-
object of the picture. The paintings give us an undeniable yet indeterminable state of 
becoming-flag of the picture. This is a well-worn topic of Johns criticistn.64 This we 
know. But don't we also encounter a cO±r1parable movement in Warhol's dollar bill 
paintings - a becoming-dollars of the painting? Warhol's screenprinting methods 
have usually been interpreted as having only a negative value as tnbdes of matk-
making: they are said to be his way of negating the hand-made mark, its craft skills 
and dexterity, its expressive codes. While those negative forces are undeniable, what 
gets lost in this is the many cases where the negative turned out to be a positive. And 
the dollar bill pictures are a good example. For it is the thinness and evenness of the 
screenprinted colour that allows the weave of the canvas here to be identified with 
the flat substance of the dollar bills. The paintings look like a continuous skin of 
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banknotes, rather like an animal hide or a snakeskin, but sheerer. This is one of many 
cases of Warhol's mark-making creating affective possibilities by denying the 
traditional 'painterly depth' of mark. Indeed, for the most part Warhol's worst 
painting coincides with his attempt to pastiche the expressive brushmark beneath the 
screenprinted imagery in his portraits of the mid 1970s. 
It's hard to resist describing the resonance between these paintings and a 
particular idea - Saussure's metaphor for the sign in the image of the double-sided 
sheet of paper, with its one side for the signifier and the other for the signified. There 
used to be an urban myth which said that the old five pound note could be peeled 
apart into two separate halves, which were identical except for the aluminium band 
which was supposed to come off on one but not on the other. So the lure of the 
myth was the dream of doubling your money. Warhol's dollar bills resemble the 
mythic fivers that can be peeled and halved but thereby doubled. Quite clearly 
Warhol pondered on how the intensely flattened painting should (re)present the 
already flat thing that we know to be double-sided. While he shows us only one side 
in the 1962 painting One Dollar Bills [Fig.8], in 80 Two-dollar Bills, Front and Rear 
(Tv[useum Ludwig) of the same year, he presents them alternately, now showing the 
obverse, now showing the reverse, as if these are indeed the alternate faces of single 
notes that have been split apart. Thus I cannot resist the reading of Warhol's bills as 
dispossessed Saussurian signs that have been split and halved. They are, so to speak, 
flayed signs. But unlike flayed bodies, they have no innards. In Warhol, unlike in 
Hickey'S world, the space of painting and the space of money are identical and equal 
in their lack of depth and in their lateral proliferation. 
Are we then to interpret the dollar bill paintings as a straightforward 
declaration of the emptied, conventional or fetishistic authority of money? Are we to 
conclude that here money is seen to be, in Saussure's terms, a signifier stripped of its 
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signified? Well, no, not quite. ZiZek cautions against the simple acceptance of a 
nominalist critique of the sign of money, along the lines of ''X gave Y a good and, in 
exchange, Y gave X a mere piece ojpapef': 
An everyday bourgeois subject not only (mis)perceives money as a material 
object with the 'magic' property of functioning as the equivalent of all 
commodities; in his everyday consciousness, such a subject is usually well 
aware that money is merely a sign guaranteeing its owner the right to have at 
his disposal a part of the social product, and so on. What an everyday 
bourgeois subject effectively fails to perceive at a much more fundamental 
level, is the fact that money is precisely not merely a token of interpersonal 
relations but emerges as the materialization of the symbolic institution in so 
far as this institution is irreducible to direct interaction between 'concrete 
individuals.' 65 
This is another version of the complaint against Hickey's/Christ's parallelism. For 
isn't Hickey indeed proposing the nominalist reduction that defines the money 
transaction as the mere exchange of a mere piece of paper for goods between two 
concrete individuals. Warhol's painting I think is consistent with the thought of a 
dialectical reversal: we expected the nominalist move to be conclusive, to show that 
the dollar bill is mere signifier, mere paper, exchanged between X and Y; but of 
course this cannot satisfy the analysis because the nominalist's concrete residue is 
exactly what does not account for the possibility of exchange through a transcendent 
institution. I think the Warhol is consistent with the notion that the "materialization 
of the symbolic institution" that cannot be grasped by the nominalist critique is both 
the role of money and of a painting. 
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To a degree Warhol is of course burlesquing himself: 'Look, my painting is 
a license to print money' and equally the converse, 'My money is a license to print 
painting (as currency).' But it is instructive to compare the work with a very different 
and more didactic, more moral work: Rose Finn-Kelcey's Bureau de Change, 1987-2003 
(Irish Museum of Modem Art, Dublin/Loan form Weltkunst Collection). Here Van 
Gogh's sunflowers are re-constructed in a mosaic of coins laid on a floor. This work 
does not warrant much attention, but does illuminate my discussion. In Finn-
Kelcey's work there is no reciprocity or feedback between money and art. An 
arrangement of money depicts an artwork. But the money doesn't affect the artwork 
or vice versa. Nothing is really shifted from its already stabilized identity. In the 
Warhol, an artwork depicts money, yet both are altered by the encounter: the money 
isn't quite money - it is painting in a state of becoming-money - and the painting 
isn't just painting insofar as its being resides in depicting money, it has no identity 
other than that of depicting money. The difficulty in the Finn-Kelcey is the reverse of 
this because the coins obviously do have a stable identity whether they form a 
composite image or not. The contrast shows that the abiding strength of the Warhol 
paintings lies in the very con-fusion of art and money that they enact. 
2.6 Haim Steinbach 
It is clear that in the quattrocento pictorial culture of Florence, Rome and Veruce, the 
gap - both imaginative and material - between painting and relief was as easily 
traversed by artists as by their audience. The pictorial relief is close to painting and 
distant from sculpture because it occupies the wall, or its equivalent, like the doors of 
a baptistry, and one can't move around and behind it. It has no back, only a front 
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and perhaps a side or two. Thus the relief is best understood as a fonn of para-
painting: a mode of re-constellating painting's problematics. This is how we should 
approach the best practitioners of the wall relief in twentieth century art: namely, 
Joseph Cornell, Donald Judd and Haim Steinbach. 
In his wall shelf works Haim Steinbach is a faithful Duchampian to the 
degree that he presents groupings of readymades, but he deviates from Duchamp's 
precedent in that he inserts these readymades into quasi-pictorial relationships of 
colour, composition, contour and figure/ ground. The characteristic effect of 
Steinbach's work lies with the ripples of those relationships across the readymade 
components of the presentations. More than anyone else - more than Koons or 
Duchamp - Steinbach solves the problem of how to display and group readymades 
so as to sidestep their paradigmatic status. Can that be why he said "My work is 
about not transcending"? 66 The answer will become clearer as the discussion 
develops. Steinbach's shelf works establish visual relationships into which the 
readymades can be inserted. To an extent that is as fonnal as Mondrian slotting a 
coloured rectangle between three black lines. For Steinbach also colour is key: it is 
what he uses to generate identities and contrasts. It allows him to extract the colour 
from the readymade object by undercutting its particularity. Steinbach takes the 
property of the object and then denies the object's proprietary rights over it. This is a 
far more complex proposition than Koons' hoovers in their tube-lit plexiglass cases. 
Steinbach takes the particular and returns it to the universal. Why this still is "about 
not transcending" is a question we will need to return to. 
Steinbach operates within a consistent hierarchy of readymade and shelf. It 
is approximately equivalent to the hierarchies of sculpture and plinth, or between 
figure and ground. In this regard, Steinbach, unlike Bickerton, had the considerable 
advantage of adopting a time-honoured convention: figure/ground cast as 
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ornament/shelf. Given the ease of our acceptance of this convention, there's no 
problem of the remainder as we saw in Bickerton, the troublesome remainder of 
sensuous particularity to go with the signature. What is remarkable in Steinbach is the 
leanness: there is so little there except a couple of readymades and a shelf. And yet 
we are confronted by a complex web of sculptural-chromatic relations. It feels 
somewhat scandalous: how can there be so much there when there is manifesdy so 
little there? 
The best works all come in a concentrated burst in 1984-86. Before that the 
display parameters ate too vague to focus the look of the pieces, and this degree of 
promiscuity means the works are unable to frame and circumscribe themselves as the 
best pieces do so powerfully. Later than 1986 the formula of the triangular section 
shelf is retained and further elaborated, but often over-elaborated, and the 
'ornaments' becomes too luxurious, too classy, too distinct from their pedestals. 
After 1986 there is less dialogue across the shelf/ornament hierarchy. This is again 
largely a 11latter of the choice of objects. 111 Steinbath's most wonderful pieces, like 
Exuberant Relative No.2, 1986, [Fig.9] the 'ornamental' objects - two toilet brushes 
in ports and two construction helmets, each of which has holders for two drink cans 
- are fdttnally, chromatically and materially very similar to the formica shelf surfaces. 
The helmets are opaque coloured plastic, very similar in surface and reflectivity to the 
formica. The sculptural toilet brushes, set into their ports, are also immaculate, 
opaque red plastic. 
The horizontal sequence of shelves is white-red-white. The objects are 
arranged in the inverse sequence of red-white-red. The rule is that red objects sit on 
white shelf units, and white on red. As in all the shelf works we get two parallel 
horizontal sequences: the 'ornament' sequence and the shelf sequence. Is this another 
claim for a parallelism? - for a realm of commodities in parallel to a realm of, well 
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what? Of colour? Of a grammar of display? There is no easy analogy to the shelf, 
except at the level of the conceptual hierarchy. Thus for example the hierarchy of 
ornament and shelf is analogous to that of base and superstructure, or, as we've seen, 
figure and ground. The display method introduces a strong division between vertical 
and horizontal. In the vertical plane there is the hierarchy of shelf bearing object. In 
the horizontal plane there are the twin parallel sequences of shelves and objects, each 
forming their own syntagms. As de Saussure writes: "The syntagmatic relation is in 
praesentia. It is based on two or more terms that occur in an effective series"; and "a 
syntagm immediately suggests an order of succession and a fi..'Ced number of 
elements." 67 So the display set-up does institute something closely analogous to the 
paradigmatic/ syntagmatic binary that is conceptualised in structural linguistics. 
Steinbach's works do initiate a parallelism, but then they disrupt it 
straightaway. What we get, as in Exuberant Relative No.2, is a constant flow of energies 
between the vertical plane of the paradigm and the horizontal plane of the syntagm. 
In other words, we get irresistible diagonal force. The diagonals in Steinbach are a bit 
like diagonals in Mondrian:68 they are strictly 'not there' in the art object which 
contains only rectilinear elements, yet they appear when we look at it, when a 
relationship between two or more elements compels us to see a diagonal. Steinbach's 
triangular section shelves already thematize this movement between the visible and 
the invisible because their sole 'really' diagonal element - the frontal plane of the 
shelf - is itself not seen as diagonal when we place ourselves in front of the work. 
How can there be so much there when there is so little there? - Because 
relations multiply faster than rabbits. 'Weak links traverse a society 'quickly': a 
demonstration suggests that any two people in the United States can be connected by 
as few as six weak links." 69 Steinbach plays on these weak links. He indicates how 
relations are latent, inevitable, inescapable, yet arbitrary. Thus in the excellent 1985 
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shelf piece Related and Different [Fig.10] a relation of resemblance is set up: a pair of 
Nike sneakers are compared to a row of brass candlesticks. Both show us diagonal 
lines. There's the diagonal from the ankle to the toe of the shoes; and there's the 
diagonal from the tallest to the shortest candlestick. Of course this is idiotic 
resemblance. A row of candlesticks does not resemble a pair of sneakers. Yet here, in 
one absurdly abstracted respect, they do come to resemble one another. 
It is tempting to interpret this profusive play of spurious relations as a 
parable of the commodity relation in general insofar as the commodity is defined as 
the generator par excellence of spurious relations, as where things with no apparent 
similarities sell at the same price. We come back to Steinbach's declaration: "My 
work is about not transcending." This does not mean that it is about immanence. For 
the relations that I described as diagonal forces in works like Exuberant Relative No.2 
operate to undo the self-circumscribing immanence of the object, the readymade. 
The red of the helmet in Exuberant Relative is at first its property; but the diagonal 
force that links it to the red of the neighbouring shelf steals it away from the 
exclusive confines of the object. And this sttucture of thought is precisely that of 
Hegel's deconstruction of immediacy in the opening chapter of the Phenomenology, 
wherein the consciousness of the immediate is reduced to saying, meadltiglessly, 
"This, here!"; Hegel's point is that "This, hete!" can only become meaningful - can 
only specify its referent - if it is linked to a conceptual genus, as in "This colour 
here!". But then, of course, the arrival of the generic concept is what bteaks the spell 
of immediacy. 
Steinbach's shelf works are neither about transcendence nor 11ll1llanence. 
They are about relationality as such. They indicate how the inescapable spectre of 
hierarchy is nourished and sustained by relations that are at once syntactical 
(Steinbach's horizontal sequences), semantic (his vertical plane); and, more 
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interestingly, that they are constantly subverted and short-circuited by the feedback 
across and between these two planes of meaning - this is what I called the diagonal 
force in Steinbach. Yet as we saw in the apparition of idiotic resemblance in the 1985 
piece Related and Different, Steinbach seems to offer a challenge: that anything could be 
made to resemble anything else in some respect or other. In other words, relationality 
itself is idiotic, always dormant, easy to find, overdetermined. Steinbach's work then 
is about relationality as immanence. 
Steinbach then is an exemplary figure for my discussion in at least two vital 
respects. Firstly, in the context of a Duchampian narrative in which the readymade is 
said to have destroyed the gap, and the very distinction, between artistic fabrication 
and artistic perception, Steinbach must be seen to retu!1l these determinations to a 
nonsimple interweaving of registers. By the minimal operation of placement, 
especially placement into chromatic relationships, Steinbach at the very least muddies 
the waters. Evidently the readymade after the readymade can also be brought back to 
something closely akin to embodied judgment. Secondly, Steinbach sets up a theatre 
in which the artwork looks a lot like a staging of the commodity: a dramatization of 
the commodity through colour, composition and placement and proportion. 
While the readytnade qua commodity here is decisively incotporated as 
chromatic component and therefore subsumed within a visual ensemble, it is still given 
the starring role in that ensemble as the manifestation of the figural for the expectant 
audience. These works make an intense contrast between readymade/ figure and 
shelf/setting. And yet the readymade/figure here seems almost a McGuffin: after all, 
one cannot scrutinize these objects at great length, they offer little or no sustained 
'absorptive' rewards to the viewer. However, where powerful relational vectors 
accrue in affective force in Steinbach's works, something very close to an absorptive 
attraction is generated. 
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What Steinbach's example offers us is important then in a number of ways. 
For one, it manifests a response to the Duchampian lineage absolutely at odds with 
Kosuth's reading of the readymade. In Steinbach the readymade is emphatically 
adjoined to aesthesis - moreover, it is found to be necessarily an aestheticised 
particular. Here Steinbach differs from Duchamp decisively. Where Duchamp shows 
how we can choose to see the merely utilitarian bottlerack as if it were a sculpture, 
Steinbach indicates that in the intensely optical realm of the consumable every 
commodity is by its nature a candidiate for aesthetic delight. Where Duchamp's 
readymades are singular and paradigmatic, Steinbach's are binary, or born into 
comparison, and are phrased in syntagmatic ensembles. Steinbach thus takes a path 
outside of certain foreclosed understandings of the readymade. In my terms, his 
work implies a blending of the readymade with embodied judgment. 
As regards the question of the commodity, Steinbach's shelf works do 
manifest a parallelism but it is far removed from the purist parallelism of Dave 
Hickey. It is rather a nonsimple parallelism of shelf and ornament within which the 
roles of art and the commodity are never fully separable nor finally stabilised. 
Steinbach does not pretend to keep art and the commodity apart, yet neither does he 
propose to identify them with one another, as his contemporary Bickerton surely did. 
2.7 Hegel's Master and Servant 
Where are we? Where does the argument take us? There's a soft solution that 
beckons. This is that we simply insist on preserving the gesture as an event. In other 
words, we merely charge the branded singularity with fraud: it is not truly singular 
because it is predetermined. What then offers itself up is the discussion of the event: 
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the gesture as true singularity. Thus we could enter the philosophies of the event 
with Deleuze or Badiou or Lyotard. The complaint against singularity in series is that 
it is a proscribed singularity. In view of its serial articulation and overdetermination, 
singularity is the wrong thing to promote. Yet for the artist in him/herself, it is the 
rightful goal. Achieving singularity for the artist then amounts to doing the wrong 
thing for the right reasons. 
We are left with a stalemate, or in a Tarantino image, a Mexican standoff, in 
which the gesture/artwork and the commodity confront one another each holding a 
gun to their opponent's temple. Let us then embrace this image of the Mexican 
standoff as a valid image of a struggle between two combatants. Let us then transfer 
this image to the Hegelian dialectic of the Lord, or Master and the Bondsman, ot 
Servant (in Hegel's German the terms are 'Herr' and 'Knecht'). The struggle is the 
common thread between Hegel, John Woo and Tarantino. In Hegel the 
Lord/Bondsman or Master/Servant power relation is the outcome of a struggle. The 
Lord was the victor because he, unlike the Bondsman, wagered his life in the 
struggle. The Bondsman was defeated because he would not countenartce risking 
death in tlie stnigg;1e: "The individual who has not risked his life may well be 
recognised as a person, but he has not attained to the truth of this recognition as an 
independent self-consciousness." 70 In Hegel's mythic scenario the result is a 
hierarchy in which the Lord is at liberty to indulge his desire - or in Marxian terms, 
he may inhabit the realm of the superstructure - while the Bondsman is chained to 
the realm of the object, doing the Lord's bidding at the level of brute production -
the Marxian base. Clearly the Lord is able to produce and consume artwork, while 
the Bondsman is condemned, as the vanquished in the struggle, to produce and 
consume commodities. As Hegel writes, 
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The lord relates himself to the bondsman mediately through independent 
existence, for that is precisely what keeps the bondsman in thrall [denn eben 
hieran ist der Knecht gehalten]; it is his chain, from which he could not in the 
struggle get away, and for that reason he proved himself to be dependent, to 
have his independence in the shape of thinghood.71 
For our standoff between artwork and commodity, a key notion is that of 
independence, or sovereignty. In a functionalist sociological analysis of art72 it is the 
artwork that is dependent - that is consigned to 'thinghood' - qua instrument of 
ends outside itself. At the other extreme, as we will see in the work of Donald Judd, 
there is the attempt to perfect and seal off the sovereignty of art by stripping it of all 
relationality, rendering it instead as sheer immanence. In what follows it will become 
clear that both positions are untelldble. 
It may sound unlikely, but I propose now to read the 'Lordship and 
Bondage' section of the Phenomenology if Spirit as a parable for the relation between 
artwork and commodity. Let's set the scene in Hegel's text. The argument has been 
that consciousness is necessarily self-consciousness. However, self-consciousness is 
not possible in isolation: it requires the recogtlition of and by an othet parallel 
consciousness. Hegel writes his own myth of a primordial encounter between two 
consciousnesses: they contest the attainment of autonomous self-consciousness by a 
fight to the death, or at least it promises to be a fight to the death. The cliirtax though 
is cut short when one party surrenders to the other. In Hegel's telling one party 
wagers its life for ascendancy while the other cannot countenance risking his own 
annihilation. The party of safety first is thereafter obliged to do the bidding of the 
party of risk. In this way the hierarchy of Master [Herr] and Servant [Knecht] takes 
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root. The latter labours, producing for the needs of the Master, who, freed from the 
necessities of useful production, is enabled to lavish his attention exclusively on the 
realm of luxuries, or in another terminology, the realm of the play of representations. 
For our purposes, the analogy that suggests itself at this stage is clear 
enough. The Servant/ Knecht is condemned to reified production, that is to say, 
production defined as labour for an other. The Master/ Herr on the other hand, is at 
liberty to do whatever he wishes for no other. His activities are in the realm of the play 
of representations; this is also the realm of the artwork qua creation for itse1f and 
unconstrained by utility, function or other external compulsion. Put like this, the 
mapping of the artwork/commodity dichotomy onto the Master/Servant hierarchy is 
obviously a proto-Marxian set-up. But we need to go further along Hegel's narrative. 
The question is of autonomous self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is found to 
require teciprocal recognition by an other consciousness: self requites the recognition 
of an othe± seif and needs to be able to recogtlise itself in an other self. In the 
consequent cfulectit of reciprocal recognition [Ankennung] the roles of independence 
versus dependence are in process. Hegel moves through a number of positions: 
1. Self = Other: 
"In the lord, the being-for-self is an 'other' for the bondsman .... " 73 
and 
"Self-consciousness ... has lost itself, for it finds itself as an other being." 74 
2. Self = Self + Other: 
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"The Master is ... a consclOusness existing for itse!f which is mediated with itself 
through another consciousness." 75 
3. Self (Other) <> Other (Self): 
The "double-signifying supersession of its double-signifying otherness is at the same 
time a double-signifying return into itse!f" 76 
4. Self + Other in Self = Self + Other in Other: 
"[The consciousnesses] recognise themselves as mutuallY recognising one another." 77 
The dia1ectic thus moves away from the nominal domination of the Master to a 
condition far more par::tdoxical and troubling. In becoming intertwined with this 
other that was meant to have been subordinated and beholden to the Master, it turns 
out instead that the Master is dependent on the recognition of the Servant, acted out 
in the form of his labour, upon which also the Master depends in order to indulge his 
nominally unconstrained interests. But things are even worse than that for the 
Master: not only is he dependent on another consciousness for recognition in order 
to ground and form his autonomous self-consciousness; he is (how degrading!) 
dependent on a consciousness that is not even his equal, not even a being for itself, 
but a mere labourer who does the bidding of another. Thus the Master's appeal for 
recognition through the hierarchy that was instituted as a truce to end the struggle to 
the death, brings about a fall from grace and a compromising of that very hierarchy. 
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John Woo's movie Face/Off [Fig.l1] is Hollywood's rendition of the 
Master/Servant dialectic. Recall that the dialectic is one of dependence and 
independence in a quest for (self-)recognition. In the film the set-up indicates that 
legality requires crime for its self-recognition. The side of legality - in the figure of 
the John Travolta/cop character - requires the imprisonment of the criminal- in the 
figure of the Nicolas Cage character - in order to recognise its ascendancy. Before 
that can be assured, a reversal takes place: the Travolta/cop character takes the face 
of the Cage/criminal in order to ascertain his plans. Already here we get strong 
evidence that Woo bases his scenario on the Phenomenology if Spirit. the cop has to 
assume the place of the criminal in order to secure his own mastery of the situation. 
This is Hegel's initial complexification of the reciprocal reflexivity. Yet things quickly 
get more complex stilL The criminal responds to the cop's ruse in turn by stealing the 
cop's face, bringing about the complete role reversal. Faces are fully exchanged, with 
cop now as criminal and vice versa. The important detail in the scenario is the matter 
of family values.78 The Travolta/cop is the embodiment of civic virtue, but 
pathologically so. In adopting the role of the pure upholder of civic duty the cop 
consigns his entire subjectivity to the public realm of civic virtue at the expense of 
the private sphere, his wife and daughter. Like the Master in Hegel, the Travolta/cop 
figure has lost touch with the basis - the very justification - of his age±ky; after all, 
isn't the top there in the first instance to protect family life? In the scenario of the 
role reversal, after the faces have been exchanged, it is the disguised criminal who is 
found to be the adequate family man, both good father to the datightet, ptdtecting 
her from abusive boyfriends, and an attentive husband sensitive to the sexual needs 
of the wife. It is made clear that these qualities were absent with the real cop father, 
whose path010gical pursuit of public duty blinded him to the ne~ds of his family. 
Converse1y, the cop, in the guise of the criminal, now comes to appreciate his own 
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previous alienation from the affective wealth of the private sphere as he becomes 
entangled with the criminal's family. Only through his identification with the criminal 
then is the cop able to remember the point of the United States constitution: the 
pursuit if happiness. The cop as cop was condemned to forget it. 
In an excellent detail, the criminal in the guise of the cop teaches his (the 
cop's) daughter how to use a switchblade in self-defence. The logic is clear: if you 
love your daughter you don't balk at discarding legality under certain circumstances. 
True family love, in other words, is excessive with respect to the law. To forget this is 
to forget family love as such. Thus the Travolta/cop figure as the pure upholder of 
legality alienates himself from himself as a family man. His self-consciousness, in 
Hegel's term, is in contradiction and is thereby inadequate to itself. He is obviously 
the Master. The Cage/criminal figure is on the contrary, coherently self-conscious. 
For him familial love exceeds the law no more and no less than do his desires in 
generaL Hence he knows that his very subjecthood is in conflict with the law. In the 
Hegelian parallel thus the criminal is the Setvant who gains an ultimate ascendancy 
and greater autonomy than the Master because he has an accurate grasp of his own 
practice. 
Hegel demands that no one gets killed in the struggle. His is a struggle to 
the death that falls short of death. There can be no Master/Servant hierarchy if the 
Servant is dead, 110 Friday if Crusoe slays him. The Hollywood ending however 
requites victory atid death. But although the ctiinirla1/ Cage figure is finaliy killed in 
Face/ Off, the last gasp of the plot returtls us to the key matter of family Ufe again. 
After both the criminal and his wife are killed, the real cop, re-united with his own 
true face, brings the criminal's orpha.l1 sbh t6 live with his o-wrl wife atid !laughter. 
Now in the guise of dual father, the cop is the criminal, not simply because he adopts his 
son, assuming his paternal responsibilities and so on, but because he acknowledges 
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the transcendence of family love over the partial and contradictory demands of pure 
legality. Therefore the cop is the criminal because he thus recognises the priority of 
the criminal's values. Face/OjJthus ends in a synthesis eminendy faithful to Hegel: 
This process of self-consciousness in relation to another self-consciousness 
has ... been represented as the action of one alone. But this action on the part 
of the one has itself the double significance of being at once its own action 
and the action of that other as well ... The action has then a double entente not 
only in the sense that it is an act done to itself as well as to the other, but also 
in the sense that the act simpliciter is the act of the one as well as of the other 
regardless of their distinction.79 
* * * * * 
How then can Hegel's myth - which, let us affirm, is at once ontological and 
'historical' 80 - how can this myth furnish a model for the artwork/ commodity 
relation? For, while it's easy to equate Lordship qua being-for-itself with art, as 
against Bondage qUa being-in-itself with commodity production, how does the myth 
get filled out as an analogy of art markets? It is intriguing to note that the connection 
between the market and the Master/Servant hierarchy was already implicated in the 
discourse of Hegel's milieu during the gestation of the Phenomenology. In 1798 
Holderlin, a close friend of Hegel, already placed the image of the marketplace 
alongside that of the Servant [der Knecht] who is in thrall to those who threaten 
violence, i.e. to the ascendancy of the Master. In his poem Menschenbeifall ('Human 
Applause') Holderlin wrote: 
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Ach! der Menge gefallt, was auf den Marktplatz taugt, 
Und es ehret der Knecht nm den Gewaltsamen; 
(Oh! the crowd is pleased by what sells in the marketplace, 
And the Servant honours only the violent;) 81 
Thus the analogy I pursue is by no means alien to the Hegelian milieu, though as will 
become apparent later in this chapter, the contemporary marketplace is not one that 
unifies its consumers as a crowd, but rather one that thrives on its capacity to co-opt 
the marginal and the exceptional. So, again, we come to the question of how the 
analogy of the Master/Servant scenario is fleshed out in the art/commodity relation. 
In other words, if the analogy does any real work, what for instance is the equivalent 
- in the artwork/commodity relation - of the Master risking his life or his quest for 
recognition in the consciousness of the Servant? The parallel for risking death is 
demonstrable and, I think, convincing. It is the avant-garde. Thus in certain 
privileged moments, as with Duchamp and the Fountain, there is a suspension of 
business as usual, of 'normal' purposive action in art. The artwork casts itself into an 
unknown region, a zone outside what may be art. Thus in the avant-garde gesture at 
its most uninhibited, the artwork courts its own annihilation in the name of a higher 
truth-content, to use Adorno's term. It courts nonsense. In adopting this stance, the 
artwork testifies that the continuation of art demands the wager on the survival of 
art. This point should not be conflated with the 'content' of Fountain as a local 
contestation of the category 'art.' In other words this topic of the artwork that risks 
its own annihilation as art does not foreclose the scope or character of such artwork; 
the risk does not have to take the form of an analytic/conceptual presentation. 
Pollock's transitional drip paintings of 1948 can be rightfully seen as enacting the 
same wager by foregoing the norms that secure identification of an artefact as a 
114 
painting. Pollock made the point himself in his doubt not as to whether these were 
good or successful paintings, but whether they were paintings at all. In Pollock as in 
Duchamp, the continuation, the very viability of art is risked in the name of, in 
Hegel's terms, a higher order of self-consciousness, of being-for-itself. In this way 
the artwork takes on the mantle of the Master since it too is a self-consciousness 
obliged to risk self-annihilation in order to survive through a constant re-attainment 
of recognition. 
But now we need to say more about the issue of recognition. Why and how 
does the artwork demand recognition? The artwork, like the self-consciousness, 
demands recognition because it does not exist as an unconditional autonomy. It is 
something that escapes the state of sheer thinghood, it is the product that is not 
reified. Therefore it is spectral. Its spectres are indeed occasioned by material objects 
without thereby being identical with them. Its very being as a spectre that is shared 
and distributed among persons thus requires a form of recognition. Inevitably this 
recognition ultimately resides in the commodity. We can then regard the material 
objects that occasion the spectral artwork - the 'medium-sized dry goods' that are 
distributed - as always in need of commodification. It is not that artworks are easy to 
commodify, though they are. It is not that they are vulnerable to commodification, 
though they are. Oo.e must say rather that it is a case of demanding and depending 
upon the commodity form since it provides the sole means of anchoring the artwork 
in the general network of distributed meanings. And it doesn't matter if the artworks 
are missing, as they are with Gordon Matta-Clark. The counterfactual still holds: if 
there were artworks they would be expensive; in actuality there is a vast market 
hungry for Matta-Clarks, but no products to feed it. 
In the first instance then, the commodity form inserts the artwork into the 
network of meanings, or 'goods', literally 'good things' or 'things people believe to be 
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good.' Thus it allocates a status to individual artworks relative to everything, which 
seems to be what Hickey calls a translation from one medium of value to another. 
But the issue is not one of inaugurating translatability across disparate goods. For 
Hegel's myth, the recognition does not reside in reducibility/translatability. That is to 
say the Master is not translated into the values of the Servant nor vice versa. Rather, 
the artwork glories in its independence, in its being-for-itself precisely by reflecting 
itself in the alien mirror of the price index. It claims the refuge of autonomy by 
reflecting itself in the values of dependence, in the prices of goods made to order. In 
other words, the magical remainder that the artwork claims to be requires its barbaric 
other from which to exclude itself at the point of contact: it requires the embrace of 
dependency and servitude and translatability precisely to stage itself as the 
autonomous remainder that exceeds the ubiquitous transferability of the price index. 
It is to render itself as the autonomous remainder without translation that art is 
obliged to seek its recognition in the translatable indeces of price. In order to cast 
itself in the role of the force that witholds its true force from the market, art is 
therefore duty bound to embrace the market and to insert its own dry and not so dry 
goods into the matrix of the general circulation of goods. 
It should now be apparent why the parallelism of Hickey's non-translatable 
universes of value is inadequate. Translation/non-translation is simply the wrong 
model. The reflexive dynamics of reciprocal recognitions is not equivalent to 
(non) translatability. Hickey'S breezy liberal stance lacks analytical substance. But by 
the same measure we can see why a functionalist sociological model of art also fails. 
Pierre Bourdieu's version of this model, in his book Distinction, describes a 
generalised flattening out of cultural phenomena: the victory is that of an 
instrumentality to be named distinction, wherein art as such is of no more or no less 
consequence than jewellery as such, since both are equally beings for an other, for 
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the telos of (class) distinction. This model however says nothing about what art does. 
It merely describes instances where people try to instrumentalize artworks. 
In Hegel's myth there is an extended epilogue. The aftermath of the 
Master/Servant standoff is what Hegel calls Stoicism. Stoicism is the Servant/Slave's 
response to his/her fate as producer to the needs of the Master, that is, as one 
condemned to dwell in reified production. Hegel's decisive point here is that the 
Stoic response is a purely intellectual response. In the Stoic stance freedom is claimed 
as the freedom to think clearly and truthfully: the clear-eyed Servant/Slave 
understands her circumstances, acknowledges the true nature of her labour and of 
the Master's undertakings. Thus the Stoic Servant locates autonomy at the level of 
ideas, while relinquishing the aspiration to autonomy at the level of actual 
production. In this sense the Stoic Servant trades freedom in the realm of 
representations for enchainment at the level of production. If we now turn this 
narrative onto the scene of recent/contemporary art, isn't there one inescapable 
analogy to be traced? Isn't the Stoic Servant none other than the ~oure of the 
Conceptual Artist who denigrates bodily making under the sign of craft, and who, in 
the same movement, stakes his/her autonomy upon the mast of the Idea? The Stoic, 
like the Conceptual Artist, defers indefinitely the staking of his/her autonomy at the 
level of material production. 
The Lord/Bondsman hierarchy for Hegel constitutes a failure, but an 
important staging post on the road of and to Spirit qua self-positing autonomous 
consciousness immanently realised in social relations (Spirit is emphatically not the 
preserve of the individual). Lordship and Bondage is thus a necessary moment in a 
larger process, however unsatisfactory the experience may be. In my deployment of 
Hegel's narrative I do not propose to pay our respects to the larger framework. I wish 
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to apply the narrative ill a freely instrumental manner as an analogy of the 
art/ commodity standoff. 
It seems that the failure of the parallelism in Hickey's description is that it 
pays insufficient attention to the autonomy of the artwork: it fails to grasp that the 
artwork determines its independence in relation to a realm of dependence. On the 
other hand, the failure of the functionalist sociological account of the artwork qua 
midwife of class distinction is, conversely, and perhaps surprisingly, to have missed 
the movement of the commodity. For are not today's producers of consumer 
electronics precisely in the condition of the Hegelian Servant, who in his accurate 
comprehension of his own production perceives both the necessity of his work in 
the global economy and the conditioned, reified and arbitrary nature of his work? 
Thus, for example, the paradox of Sony's recent "Go Create" tagline for its 
advertising. Here is the tell-tale disparity between the point of view of the enunciated 
and the point of view of enunciation:82 it is the consumer who is enjoined to "Go 
Create," which is precisely what the Sony employees themselves are not doing in so 
far as they are too busy designing, manufacturing and marketing electronic goods. 
However the "Go Create" tagline has now been replaced by the altogether subtler 
and more profound ''Y ou make it a Sony". This surely constitutes copywriting of the 
highest order, bettering even Salman Rushdie's immortal cake tagline "Naughty but 
nice." Its profundity lies in its multiple ambiguities: its grammatical ambiguity - is it a 
command or a statement?; then the core ambiguity of 'make it' - meaning variously 
fabricate, transform, or determine a selection as in "Make mine a whiskey". In 
retrospect "Go Create" is confrontational - think of all the slackers who said to 
themselves "Hey I just wanted to grab a beer and watch a DVD - must I be creative 
too?" The new tagline retains the same slippage between enunciation and enunciated, 
only in a subtler guise. If it is the consumer who "makes it a Sony" then clearly the 
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Sony employee falls short of making it a Sony. The latter merely paves the way for 
the consumer's play, which will transform a potential Sony into a Sony. What is this 
scenario if not that of the Lord/Bondsman dialectic, in which the Bondsman attains 
a certain clarity83 regarding his condition by understanding the effects of his 
production? The Sony that is not yet a Sony is the consumer product that already 
conceives a purified realm of autonomous self-positing creativity, which, on its own, 
it cannot attain. So we are emphatically not in the scheme of a generalised 
instrumentality - as in the caste distinction model of art - where what seemed to be 
autonomous creativity on the part of the Master turns out to be a merely 
instrumental devotion to the marking of distinction between the Master and the 
Servant.84 The functionalist sociological model of art does not fully grasp the 
movement of the commodity. For it is the Servant, it is the commodity, - it is the 
Sony that is not yet a Sony - that conceives the locus of a self-positing autonomous 
creativity. 
Given the above, where are we to position art-making? If we take the Hegel 
analogy seriously, as I propose, we don't aspire to break free of the art/commodity 
standoff (the Master/Servant standoff) but resolve instead to contest its stabilised 
moments. The social-functionalist model reduces art-making to an instrumentality, 
equivalent either to the Servant outflanking the Master, - by unmasking his art-far-
art's-sake pose and revealing it as a means to an end - or to the Master's pathological 
immersion in the mechanics of domination. But this is to overlook the complexity of 
Hegel's set-up: for as we have seen in the case of the Sony that is yet to be 
transformed into a Sony, it is the Servant who ultimately holds the Master tb the 
promise of his autonomy. The work of Donald Judd is a case in point. 
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2.8 Ideal Immanence in the Work of Donald Judd 
In the above we dwelt on artists who attempt to picture the commodity relation, or if 
not directly that, at least to bring the relation out into the open, to name it. If we are 
to follow up on the reading of the art/commodity through Hegel, as I proposed, we 
need to disabuse ourselves of the image of the Hegelian dialectic as a narrative in 
which synthesis is a kind of happy medium, or correct measure between two polar 
extremes. I'ace / Off provides the clue, as we saw. The scenario is not at all resolvable 
into any kind of happy medium: it is instead that in the impulse toward one polarity, 
the opposing pole is found to appear. On this reading then the Master/Servant 
dialectic is not at all consistent with the textbook exegesis of Hegelian dialectic with 
its familiar structure of thesis, antithesis and synthesis: at least, not where synthesis is 
taken to be striking a balance, locating the correct equilibrium. In ZiZek's reading: 
Hegelian totality is not an organic Whole within which each element sticks to 
its limited place, but a 'crazy' totality in which a position reverts to its Other 
in the very movement of its excessive exaggeration .... 85 
Isn't that the scenario of Face/ Off? Isn't it that in his literally self-sacrificing gesture 
of surrendering his face in the name of the 'call of duty', the Travolta/cop character 
becomes the criminal, at first merely in the sense that he dons the mask, but then, as 
we saw, in his acceptance of the familial ethic of the criminal? Just where he carnes 
his role to its extreme, the cop turns out to become the criminal. Hence, despite John 
Woo's ethnic credentials, it is not a scenario for a re-assuring Yin and Yang balance 
between good and evil. This is analogous to the Master/Servant scenario. Where the 
Master immerses himself in autonomous creation, he is both maximally dependent 
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on the Servant and completing the offer that is extended by the Servant's 
preparations. Indeed, in so far as the Servant's practice is the bedrock of the 
Master's, it is the Master's activity that reveals the Servant's labour as a preparation. 
The Master thinks he is writing a screenplay on his laptop; he is not wrong, yet that is 
exactly when he 'makes it a Sony'. 
It should be apparent what this has to do with the art of Donald Judd. He it 
was, after all, who attempted artworks, sensuous particularities, purged of all 
metaphorical or signifying relations other than that bom of the sign of an irreducible 
particularity. And what is this gesture except, by extension, an extreme negation of 
the kinds of symbolic relations upon which money and the commodity form depend? 
The ambition to destroy both metaphor and relational structure without 
discarding sensuous particularity is a purist's Holy Grail. It's a quest for a pure 
artwork. Only an artwork qua pure autonomy could sustain the arrogance of this 
ambition. So it stands for one polar extreme, a supreme exaggeration. But - to pose a 
very simplistic question - What do Judd's works look like? In a cliche of art 
commentary, it is said that the exceptional artists impose their own criteria upon their 
critics. Their special newness forces interpretation onto new terrain, and that terrain 
imposes critical concepts of the artist's choosing. Thus, for instance, it is impossible 
to discuss Stella's painting adequately without recourse to his own terminology, as in 
'relational painting' or 'vectored force.' Once the critic starts speaking the language, 
Stella has half won the interpretative battle already. And so it is with Judd, and his 
even more impressive terminology with 'specific objects.' The term has its own 
performative force: you can't define it without largely succumbing to its spell and 
accepting its validity. But strictly speaking it is nonsense: it is not a valid concept. 
Why? Because no object that is realized as a sensuous particularity can fail to 
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resemble. Resemblance can never be wholly extinguished. Perhaps if the specific 
objects were mere thought experiments, rather than compositions of aluminium and 
perspex, they might lack resemblance; but then they'd be specific concepts, not 
specific objects. 
In fairness to Judd, his 1965 text Specific Oljects is equivocal with respect to 
literalness. Since the term 'specific objects' became influential, it is often assumed 
that the text is a personal manifesto for Judd's version of minimalism. In fact the 
article is a broad survey of currents in contemporaneous art that Judd wishes to 
affirm, and several of the artists cited are not minimalists at all, e.g. Warhol, 
Bontecou, Chamberlain, Rauschenberg, Oldenberg. On the one hand Judd writes: 
"three dimensions are real space. That gets rid of the problem of illusionism ... ";86 on 
the other hand, he also says: "Nothing made is completely objective, purely practical 
or merely present." 87 So exactly what is the position staked in the text? We need to 
read the first remark in its fuller context: 
Three dimensions are real space. That gets rid of the problem of illusionism 
and literal space, space in and around marks and colours. 88 
Now things become clearer. The problem is "the problem of illusionism and literal 
space," it is the problem of having the two together. Judd's objection to the 
spatializing syntax of traditional art is not simply that it has illusionistic space; it is, 
rather, that traditional art necessarily uses marks in literal space to set up illusionistic 
space, in other words, it is the conjunction - the awkward sliding together while 
remaining incompatible - of illusionism and literal space that Judd finds 
unacceptable. For him the persistence of the dual manifestation means that the 
apparition of the one constantly undoes the integrity of the other. Judd's positive 
122 
claim in the text is for an art object that declares itself as an indivisible whole and 
thereby offers a total image. In this spirit he enthuses a propos of Bontecou's work: 
"an image has never been so large, been so explicit and aggressive." 89 What is really 
at stake in the Specific Gijects text is a profound aversion to the temporality of the 
mark, and to the sequential movement of thought that it releases. What Judd wants is 
an artwork that is conceived, seen and felt but not evidently conceived in a temporal 
sequence. Judd's artworks have no evident past in the sense of previous states that 
are superseded. Since his pieces are conceived as totalities they must be seen as 
having no incremental developmental genesis. 
Returning now to the foolish question: What do Judd's of?jects look like? The 
interpretative cul-de-sac is reached here when we succumb to the gambit of the 
specific object. If we buy into the gambit then the question 'What do they look like?' 
is an invalid question. From this perspective, it shows only that the questioner hasn't 
understood Judd. But as in other discussions of artworks in this text, it has been and 
will be essential that the viewer insists on the right to an 'inappropriate' or 'ill-
informed' response. Surely the case of the artist who says "Don't ask what the work 
resembles, or you'll miss the point" is precisely the one for which one must consider 
the unintended structures of resemblance. (Or more generally, the viewer's default 
setting should be that of a hermeneutics of suspicion.) So once again, what do Judd's 
works look like? The best ones - those that best satisfy the notion of the specific 
object and remain the most open and penetrating - are the works of the period 
roughly 1965 -1972. And what do they look like? In works like the stainless steel wall 
piece Untitled, 1966 (Museum Ludwig) [Fig.12] one has to say: thry look like corporate 
ornamentation. If the retort then is that the corporate architecture of the period in 
America was overwhelmingly High Modernist, and against ornamentation, this hardly 
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settles matters. Instead it underscores the fact that Judd unconsciously supplied in 
another context what was missing in architecture. 
Judd is the pathological case of art that attempts to cleanse itself of metaphor 
and relation. It tries above all to refuse the metaphorical registers offered by 
relational structure. His objects attempt to be the pure 'this, here.' In our Hegelian 
conversation we accepted the figure of "a 'crazy' totality in which a position reverts 
to its other in the very movement of its excessive exaggeration." Judd's object 
purports to be the pure 'this, here.' The commodity presents itself as 'this, not-here' 
or as 'this, elsewhere' since it heralds "the global usurpation of belonging." 90 Yet, I 
claim, in the movement towards the pure 'this, here' of the Juddian specific object, 
what appears is precisely its other in the guise of the corporate ornament, the 
heraldic call of the commodity, the 'this, elsewhere.' 
2.9 Singular Seriality 
When is a series not a series? - For instance, when it is serial singularity. That's to 
say, if distinction as such is predetennined - as in art's law of difference - then it is 
stricdy not a consequence of the artwork. The causal chain goes in the opposite 
direction: it is precisely the artwork that is the product of the law of difference rather 
than difference being generated by the artwork. It is worth quoting at some length 
Brian Massumi's reflections on the circumstances of a kind of systematic dis-
integration - if such a paradox can be made plausible - of the arenas of cultural 
products in the service of capital: 
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[The] more varied, and even erratic, the better. Normalcy starts to lose its 
hold. The regularities start to loosen. This loosening of normalcy is part of 
capitalism's dynamic. It's not simple liberation. It's capitalism's own form of 
power. It's no longer institutional disciplinary power that defines everything, 
it's capitalism's power to produce variety - because markets get saturated. 
Produce variety and you produce a niche market. The oddest of affective 
tendencies are okay - as long as they pay. Capitalism starts intensifying or 
diversifying affect, but only in order to extract surplus-value. It hijacks affect 
in order to intensify profit potential. It literally valorises affect. The capitalist 
logic of surplus-value production starts to take over the relational field that is 
also the domain of political ecology, the ethical field of resistance to identity 
and predictable paths. It's very troubling and confusing, because it seems that 
there's been a certain kind of convergence between the dynamic of capitalist 
power and the dynamic of resistance.91 
For Massumi then the problem is not only that differentiation serves the needs of 
capital, but, more urgent than that, it's that within this horizon of capitalist 
dissemination and dispersal, everything that used to be an index of otherness, 
outsiderness and dissent is now played by the market as a diversification opportunity, 
a capillary network growth of the market. In a similar spirit, Jean-Luc Nancy declares: 
"when [capital] plays the game of multiplying differences, no one is fooled: difference 
belongs neither to the work nor to the product as such." 92 
Nancy has attempted in a number of texts to provide an account of a 
community of singularities. He begins from the insistence that being singular is 
always akin to addressing something or somebody. Being as such is a mode of 
address that requires something or somebody in the role of addressee. Nancy's term 
125 
for this primordial ontological condition of address is 'exposure.' His favoured 
metaphor for being singular exposed is the human face. The face is, he notes, always 
already an apparatus of address: it faces something or somebody. Its being is to face, 
to address. Whether solitary or gregarious, the face always already implies an 
addressee. But more than that, the face is invisible to its owner. Therefore the face is 
at least doubly dependent on its addressee, since only by scrutinising the responses of 
the addressee does the owner get a feel for the performances of the face, their effects 
and shortcomings. The face then is necessarily an apparatus of exposure, meaning 
being exposed to others. Just as every face in principle addresses every other face, so 
each singularity stands toward every singularity. But this is emphatically not the 
differential value of the structuralists. Structuralist differential value, as modelled on 
Saussure, is a combinatorial syntax, a gridwork of sense. Nancy'S notion of 
primordial address - 'exposure' - is by no means bounded by sense. It applies equally 
to nonsense. Thus Nancy considers that falling outside, being excluded, excluding, 
being rejected, or choosing to reject are all nonetheless modes of relation, or registers 
of 'exposure'. Where singularities reject one another, Nancy insists, a relation of 
rejection holds. The relations between singularities fall where and how they may, 
whether sensically or nonsensically. A community of singularities is composed of 
such relations. But these relations don't operate as structuralist differential value 
because they are not generative of the singularities that are their terms. For Nancy 
singularity cannot be understood as an effect of structure, not because it is prior to 
structure, but because it is equiprimordial with relationality as such: 
... singularity does not proceed from such a detaching of clear forms or 
figures .... Singularity perhaps does not proceed from anything. It is not a work 
resulting from an operation. There is no process of "singularization," and 
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singularity is neither extracted, nor produced, nor derived. Its birth does not 
take place from out if or as an iffect qf On the contrary, it provides the measure 
according to which birth, as such, is neither a production nor a self-
positioning, the measure according to which the infinite birth of finitude is 
not a process that emerges from a ground ifond) or from a fund ifonds) of 
some kind. The "ground" is itself, through itself and as such, alreatjy the 
finitude of singularities. 93 
Singularity then is irreducible. It doesn't require a cause, whether efficient or final. A 
singularity is an irreducible finitude. From the infinity of finite singularities we chart 
relations. It follows that where 'serial singularity' is pre-determined and produced by 
a hungry differential matrix like the contemporary art market, this is really no 
singularity, merely a 'bad infinity.' 
But how are we think about the series in relation to singularity? If our 
diagnosis names the disease as serial singularity, what might be singular seriality? We 
have followed Sartre's account of seriality as a process of continually deferred agency: 
a 'logic of the they' in which I model my action on how I believe 'they' do and will 
behave; a kind of infinite regress of deferred responsibility. In other words, a 
rationality of modelling my behaviour on 'their' behaviour, real or imagined. This is 
not unrelated to the motif in psychoanalytic thought according to which somebody is 
attractive if I believe that others find him/her attractive. Now while we have 
embraced the power of Sartre's critique, we want to locate an alternative 
understanding of the series, of seriality that does not impose a 'bad infinity.' The 
series that predetermines singularity is of course the opposite of what's needed. But 
beyond that, we need some account of how the series could be compatible with 
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singularity at all. That's to say, it is far from self-evident that singularities could figure 
as members of a series, since they are surely singular and incommensurable. 
The series I'm concerned with is the series of artworks. But this already 
suggests at least two distinct series: the series of oeuvres, and the series of works that 
makes up an oeuvre. To cut through the potential complexity here we can approach 
things normatively: the singularity we seek should be realised both at the level of the 
oeuvre and at that of the individual work. Already then there's a partial answer to the 
question about how a singularity can enter a series in that we find a relation of 
singularity to series already in place in the relation of the single work to the oeuvre. 
In his texts of the 1960s, especially The Logic of Sense and Difference and 
Repetition, Gilles Deleuze is concerned with exacdy this issue, although he prefers to 
couch it terms of repetition. And what after all is a repetition other than an extension 
of a series? For Deleuze there is "bare repetition", which is not unlike Hegel's "bad 
infinity," however much Deleuze goes out of his way to distance himself from 
Hegelian thinking in Difference and Repetition; and there is "clothed repetition," which is 
to be affirmed. On one level we are in the vicinity of modernist repetition here, in 
the spirit of Gertrude Stein's "a rose is a rose is a rose": as Deleuze says, he notes 
"how the repetition of the question itself develops the relation between the problem 
and repetition." 94 Thus any attentive, alert and open repetition promises to shift the 
circumstance of our address, the very position from which we repeat. And with each 
subsequent repetition the positions of address are shifted anew. But Deleuze wants 
to affirm something more precise than that. The kind of series his preferred 
repetition may constitute is harder to trace, harder to extend, harder to protend. 
Ordinary repetition is prolongation, continuation or that length of time that 
is stretched into duration: bare repetition (it can be discontinued, but remains 
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fundamentally the repetition of the same). However who is prolonged in this 
manner? A singularity, as far as the vicinity of another singularity? On the 
contrary, what defines the extraordinary power of that clothed repetition 
more profound than bare repetition is the reprise of singularities by one 
another, the condensation of singularities into one another, as much in the 
same problem or Idea as between one problem and another or from one Idea 
to another. Repetition is this emission of singularities, always with an echo or 
resonance which makes each the double of the other, or each constellation 
the redistribution of another.95 
Thus the profound repetition - the 'clothed' repetition - extends a series of events 
which is intensely paradoxical: for at each moment of development - with each 
gesture of re-constitutive repetition - the given or preceding singularities are re-
configured, and so a fortiori their 'togetherness' - their very being as series - is re-
grouped and freshly woven. Thus the next singularity contests and re-casts the prior 
singularities, and thereby contests and re-organises, even re-deploys the series itself. 
Thus at the very least we have a series, a one, which nonetheless differs from itself 
afresh at the point of impact of each of its constituent moments. It is a one, which is 
also not a one: it is a multiple. It is both unified with respect to a problematic, and 
polyvalent. Heidegger, staking similar territory, emphasises the difficulty of genuine 
repetition in the face of the resistance of the possible: 
By a repetition of a fundamental problem we understand the disclosme of 
the primordial possibilities concealed in it. The development of these 
possibilities has the effect of transforming the problem and thus preserving it 
in its import as a problem. To preserve a problem means to free and to 
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safeguard its intrinsic powers, which are the source of its essence and which make it 
possible as a problem. The repetition of the possibilities of a problem, therefore, 
is not a simple taking up of that which is 'in vogue' with regard to this 
problem. . .. The possible, thus understood, in fact hinders all genuine 
repetition and thereby all relation to history .... 96 
The key claim here for our purposes is that continuity of 'genuine' repetition depends 
upon discontinuity. In other words, a problem exerts its weight and sustains its 
currency as an issue only by being continually re-located and re-ignited. For Deleuze 
the event that is the repetition qua intervention does not merely re-constellate 
existing singularities, though it does do that; rather, the evental act of repetition fuses 
and condenses singularities into new singularities. As Deleuze wrote in The Logic of 
Sense, events are to be understood "as jets of singularities." 97 Thus understood, 
repetition is also continuation by re-commencement. 
Deleuze's account of Ideas, with a capital "I", sounds like Plato. His Ideas 
sound like Platonic forms: eternal, inhuman, pre-linguistic and anti-social. He 
acknowledges the point himself when he describes his own movement of thought in 
The Logic of Sense as a "quasi-Platonism". The Idea for Deleuze is not a social or 
linguistic notion: it is a fecund nodal point of problematics "beyond the 
representations of consciousness." 98 It is rather a problematic or 'problem field' that 
has its reality as a virtual domain. 
The virtual possesses the reality of a task to be performed or a problem to be 
solved: it is the problem which orientates, conditions and engenders 
solutions, but these do not resemble the conditions of the problem.99 
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This sounds fine, but what does it suggest for something as much mired in social 
formations as painting? For after all, there may be some plausibility in assigning an 
ontology of the objects of mathematics to a realm outside the historical and social, a 
realm of pure problem-fields. But painting? It seems unlikely. 
George Kubler described a process of development of painting qua series of 
flat pictorial objects. But while Kubler's accountlOO of how painting dissimulates 
flatness is exemplary, his notion of painting's serial continuation is ultimately too 
logical and pseudo-technical. As I have argued above, painting necessarily involves 
technics and a prosthetic immersion in the context of embodied judgment; yet 
painting necessarily exceeds the ambit of its technical considerations. Its 'outside' -
in the guise of and by means of the ruse of the icon, or the sign, or the resemblance, 
or even colour itself, as will be discussed at the end of the thesis - is ever seeping in. 
Thus the notion - which is really Kubler's position - that painting sustains its own 
authentic seriality by successively occupying the logically conceivable positions of its 
pseudo-technical specification is not credible. The real parameters of painting are too 
complex and divergent for such a model. 
Nonetheless, given that there have been modernist affirmations of authentic 
seriality qua 'genuine' repetition - isn't T S Eliot's affirmation of tradition just such a 
claim for creative repetition? - we need to ask what is distinct and enabling in 
Deleuze's account. Henry Ford's standardised production projects and extols an 
image of 'bare repetition.' Yet to a pedantic empirical mind it is a flawed image 
insofar as each ostensibly congruent chassis or crankshaft is in fact a umque 
formation of material with its uruque microscopic fingerprint and its signature 
stresses and faultlines. It is exactly this thought that Deleuze expresses in his 
discussion of Kierkegaard where he states: "According to the law of nature, 
repetition is impossible." 101 To this empiricist-nominalist thinking, sameness is an 
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elusive spectre. It is graspable only with respect to detenninate purposes, such as 
buying and selling cars, i.e. pricing them. From this nominalist perspective it is 
uniqueness that is unavoidable, and sameness that is, on the contrary, astonishing 
and in need of explanation: "If repetition is possible, it is due to miracle rather than 
to law." 102 "In every respect, repetition is a transgression. It puts law into question, it 
denounces its nominal or general character in favour of a more profound and more 
artistic reality." 103 
In what way can we conceive of repetition as a transgression? Or even as an 
act of creation? We've seen that for Deleuze repetition is miraculous whereas mere 
duration, mere extension is the norm, literally, the law. For this thinking then, it is 
repetition that makes the creative intervention by asserting and instituting an 
affective relationship between the events that make up the series. Hence the 
recommencement that is 'genuine' repetition. "(F)ar from being opposed to the 
emergence of the New, the proper Deleuzian paradox is that something truly New 
can onlY emerge through repetition. What repetition repeats is not the way the past 
'effectively was' but the virtuality inherent to the past and betrayed by its past 
actualization." 104 At this point we can start to grasp why we are not dealing here with 
anything like modernist affirmations of repetition. Getrude Stein's poetics of 
repetition hinges on the intersection of the synchronic and the diachronic. What 
matters for us is that the modernist conceptions of repetition are fundamentally 
temporal and linear. The Deleuzian proposal is that, on the contrary, repetition is an 
encounter with the virtual which is by definition eternal, a domain of problem-
fonning potential rather than of moments and durations. The reason that repetition 
is creative is that it (re-)invents the series. Thus, as Deleuze notes, the series is strictly 
many series since each of its constituent acts of repetition has created its own new 
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version of the series. In this sense, the series differs from itself at each link in its 
articulation. 
Alain Badiou's conception of the senes 1S ill some ways compatible with 
Deleuze's accounts of repetition and the 'sense-event.' Badiou, like Deleuze, is 
preoccupied with the problem of the new. But Badiou's version of the event, that 
which exceeds its causal setting and brings forth the new, stresses the creation of 
axioms. An axiom is of course a deliberate presumption,105 not unlike a performative. 
An axiom is not based on evidence or research, or correspondence to a prior reality, 
and, again like the performative, it does not propose to represent any state of things 
independent of its own effects: its validity is not a matter of adequate groundings, but 
of what consequences it is capable of precipitating. An axiom is not a description, 
nor a definition. It acknowledges no past and no precursor, but occurs as a pure 
punctal present: "An axiom is precisely that paradoxical declaration that asserts an 
eternal principle because it is established 'in one point.' " 106 For Badiou, the event 
empowered by the axiom is one that releases an infinite series of resonant 
consequences. This he calls the truth event. The truth event's power is evidenced in 
its capacity to release an infinite series of echoing responses, which in one of 
Badiou's key phrases, are said to be 'faithful to the event.' And in a further 
compatibility with Deleuze, the notion of fidelity to the event proposes a difficult 
creative repetition, one that can re-cast the spirit, rather than the letter of the 
inaugural event. 
Badiou is not concerned, in the first instance, to offer criteria for an event 
that would allow events to be demarcated from non-events. There is the suspicion 
that his preferred exemplary 'events' - Lenin, Mao, St Paul, Danton, Beckett -
contrive a radical wish list after the fact. There is the doubt that if the devil is said 
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always to be in the detail, Badiou's account qua generally applicable model remains at 
best slippery, as in the following: 
The distinction between events is always a distinction between the 
consequences of events because an event itself is always a perfect weakness. 
It is such because the being of an event is to disappear .... The event is 
nothing - just a sort of illumination - but the consequences of an event 
within a situation are always very different. lo7 
If Badiou's theoretical undertaking offers no generalizable criteria for distinguishing 
an event from a pseudo-event we might well ask what its value can be. Badiou 
concedes that he does not and cannot supply criteria in the mode of formulas for the 
event. Thus he notes in his Ethics that the Hitler (bogus) event was "formally 
indistinguishable from an event - it is precisely this that led Heidegger astray." 108 In 
the useful interview seminar that appears at the end of Infinite Thought we get a clear 
sight of how Badiou proposes to account for this problem. There he says that truth is 
"index sui. ,,109 In other words truth is irreducible and therefore not a possible object 
of knowledge. If there were generalizable criteria for the event - which for Badiou 
means for its truth - then truth would be a possible object knowledge. This is what 
Badiou refuses. Instead he argues persuasively that it must be impossible to 
determine the evental force of an act or occurrence from within the setting of that 
act. Thus a stabilised judgment about an event is not possible at the site of the event. 
The event is by definition undecidable, or in his language <supernumerary.' 110 Indeed, 
Badiou's event is liminal in that it stakes a claim that exceeds the parameters of the 
situation, and is beyond the scope and competence and exceeding the symbolic 
resources of that situation: 
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· .. the Iranian Revolution was inscribed in often archaic Islamic preaching, 
whereas the core of popular conviction and its symbolisation exceeded this 
preaching from all quarters. Nothing has better attested to the fact that an 
event is supernumerary, not only with respect to its site but also to the 
language available to it, than this discord between the opacity of the 
intervention and the vain transparency of representations. The upshot of this 
discord is that the events in question are not yet named, 01: rather that the 
work of their naming (what I call the intenJention on the event) is not yet 
I f: fr . 111 comp ete, ar om it. 
Given these commitments, it is not surprising that Badiou insists on the categorical 
separation of knowledge and truth. Truth here is far from banal facticity, nothing like 
the 'what is' of the everyday and the normalised. Truth for Badiou is rare and 
inventive: it is what the event creates. 
The immense tension that persists is that between the contingency of the 
creative act that proposes its chosen axiom - and thereby comes to generate the 
event, and thereafter, in its wake, the series through which it resounds - and the 
universality of the event. There is also, relatedly, the tension between the creativity of 
the axiomatic proposition and the bond of respect in the notion of fidelity to an 
event; moreover, while the former asserts its fumral force, the latter is retrospective. 
And anyway, what are we to do about competing claims for fidelity to a given event? 
The contestations of value in art - specifically in relation to the legacies of 
influence - are instances of these competing claims for fidelity. In the case of the 
Pollock event - surely the universal event of post-Cubist painting - are we to side 
with Greenberg, and agree that Louis, Noland, Frankenthaler and Olitski were the 
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faithful ones? Or do we look elsewhere, outside of painting proper, for candidates 
for fidelity, say, in the work of Eva Hesse or Carl Andre or Richard Serra or 
Lawrence Weiner? Pollock's work at its best has a characteristic fearlessness; yet 
Greenberg's successor team doesn't measure up to such intensity. So there's a 
curious way in which fidelity to the Pollock event mitigates against replicating 
Pollock's painting procedures, since after the event, they no longer require the same 
courage. Fidelity to the spirit, not the letter of this inaugural event therefore demands 
a degree of dissimilarity to the inaugural event. Here then we touch back on the point 
of the earlier Heidegger citation: that genuine repetition - the elusive continuity of 
the series - is so hard to attain. Indeed, it is so difficult that it becomes tempting to 
say that we're still awaiting a series from the Pollock event: nothing yet quite secures 
the necessary re-commencement. Eva Hesse's suspended string works of 1969 come 
closest perhaps to the fidelity we seek. 
Deleuze and Badiou offer powerful accounts of what a 'genuinely repetitious' 
series, or as I call it, a singular seriality might be like, instead of the reductive seriality 
of the self-regulating and self-policing commodity market. I have said nothing about 
the theoretical discords between Deleuze and Badiou. These comprise major 
philosophical disputes too extensive for this text. To simplify massively: Deleuze's 
ontology is vitalist, committing itself to the power of the virtual and of pure 
becoming; whereas Badiou's ontology is oriented around the void. These 
determinations are of direct consequence for their differing views of the event. 
Whereas Badiou's event is said to require a decisive subtraction from the pre-existing 
status quo, and so marks itself off from the past insofar as the site of the event 
represents the sedimentations of the past, for Deleuze the event is always a 
potentiality that was implicit in the latent complexity of the situation. This is an 
important divergence. 
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We can revisit the case of Duchamp now in the light of this divergence. 
Should we understand the intervention of Fountain, or of the readymade in general, as 
a de concealment of a latent complexity in art, or should we grasp it instead as an 
axiomatic gesture that both inaugurates a new series and negates the symbolic 
environment amid which it was staged? The first version is the Deleuzian, the second 
follows the model of Badiou. It should also be clear that these two readings 
correspond to the different readings of Fountain by de Duve and Kosuth. It is de 
Duve who insists that Fountain simply reveals what was already implicit in avant-
garde practice since Manet. Thus for de Duve the readymade deconceals a force 
within the pre-existing complexity. For Kosuth on the contrary the readymade 
decisively negates and subtracts from the pre-existing state of affairs, and institutes 
the reign of art as concept. My disavowal of the readymade in Chapter 1 was a 
rejection of Duchamp's disembodied judgment. It was not a rejection of the bare 
claim that the readymade was an outgrowth of the history of painting in particular. 
So on the question of this pairing up of Deleuze/de Duve on the one side against 
Badiou/Kosuth on the other, I must favour the former. Indeed, in Chapter 3 I will 
examine how the conjunction of painting and the readymade release new 
possibilities. This very claim supposes that there can be some kind of meeting of the 
two - of painting and readymade. If the latter were a resolute and uninflected 
subtraction from inherited continuity, like the Badiou event, it would be hard to 
account for such a meeting. 
If serial singularity as the 'bad infinity' of programmed difference is a means 
of appearing, a way for artworks to emerge out of murky indistinction, then by the 
same token, the 'genuine repetition' of singular seriality involves a risk; in practice, 
for an artwork, primarily a risk of disappearing. This risk of disappearance is real. 
Artworks do disappear. But their disappearance may indicate only that they lack 
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difference with respect to the current circumstance, whereas altered states will aJlow 
them to appear in their full distinction. The latent continuity of the problematic may 
thus overcome the terms of an artwork's disappearance. With respect to the 
problematic, the singularity of the artwork can compose distinctiveness as a 
potentiality. Thus we can adapt from both Deleuze and Badiou in claiming, for 
instance, that Malevich's work disappears and then reappears in the 1960s through 
Blinky Palermo's work. Alternatively, we can return to Duchamp himself. De Duve 
stresses that the reception period of the Duchampian readymade comes 
extraordinarily late: one can plausibly claim that Fountain of 1917 is properly received 
only around 1960. Furthermore, nearly all Duchamp's original readymades are lost -
they literally disappeared. Duchamp had to authenticate replicas, often in small 
editions, long after the event. When we look at Fountain, the Bottlerack and in most 
cases Pharmary (it seems there is still 'the original') in a museum today we ate seeing a 
later replica. It is undeniable then that the readymade disappeared and returned. 
Serial singularity is programmed appearance. The gambit of singular seriality on the 
contrary is that in risking disappearance the artwork also declares a potentiality for 
(re-)appearance. 
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Chapter 3 Gesture and Trace 
3.1 The Indexical Mark 
Returning then to the gesture as a mode of embodied judgment: it would be 
reasonable to expect the indexical mark, as a trace of movement in space and 
time, to be a privileged apparatus of embodied judgment. 
Is there today anything remaining to be said about the indexical mark? 
Haven't we seen it all, heard it all as regards the indexical aspects of the mark in 
painting? About the ways the mark in painting tells a story about its past? It would 
seem hard to find much at all new to add to what we have come to know. 
Then what do we know? And in the spirit of Donald Rumsfeld, can there 
be things that we know, that we don't know we know? We know very well that 
the double code of depiction plus indexicality has been ever central to painting, 
whether it be the European tradition of oil painting since as long ago as the 
seventeenth century (or let's say since late Titian), or the Chinese tradition of 
brushed ink painting. In these traditions the mark that both depicts, and refers to 
its own making, is fundamental and has been endlessly elaborated. We can further 
observe that a key move in modernist painting asks the question about the 
necessity of depiction and then tries to answer it by locating the whole operativity 
of painting in an indexical mark purged of its depictive function. This is one good 
way to understand a painting such as Gotham News [Fig.13] , which will be 
considered further below. But as seasoned postmoderns, we know also that the 
indexical qualities of the mark can be hammed Up.ll2 And we are well aware of a 
varied line of painting since Rauschenberg's Factum I and II, and including 
Lichtenstein's Brushstroke paintings of the mid-sixties, which took that 
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knowingness as its focus and made the older idea of direct indexicality look naive. 
These things we know. 
Later in this chapter we will follow Derrida's account of differance and what he 
calls the trace, or the arche-trace. To grasp the mark as index is to see it as a trace. 
This rudimentary idea of the indexical mark is important, and is by no means 
irrelevant to the Derridean topic of the arche-trace. Yet in crucial respects it is 
quite distinct from Derrida's trace, as will become apparent. So I want to posit the 
givenness of the indexical mark as a necessary preliminary to the development of 
the chapter through the reading of Derrida. But before that happens, we need to 
situate the indexical gesture in terms of its broader commitments and values. In 
other words, given what we already understand about the indexical mark, what do 
we take the consequences of those understandings to be? 
There are broadly affirmative and negative responses to this question. On the 
positive wing, there is the affirmation of the indexical mark as the mark that draws 
attention to its own contingency, and so to the wider contingency of the picture it 
helps to paint and of which it is a component. Indexicality is always a kind of 
'thrownness.' It rhetoricizes the mark, like a scar, as a contingent event in the 
basic sense that the mark has a past, was previously absent; that the space it 
occupies was unmarked space and is now marked space. So the indexical mark 
dramatizes its invasive force as an incursion into unmarked space. In contrast to 
prevailing image technologies, the crucial point here is that this mark emphasizes 
the artifice and constructednesss of the image. In that vital respect it is then very 
unlike the mark in the guise of the pixel that serves much of the surrounding 
visual culture. The mark capable of concealing the constructedness of the image is 
the pixel, and it is calibrated to do just that. Thus it plays a leading role in an 
image culture that conceives the image-making apparatus as transparent. That's to 
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say the image technology is conceived as passive with respect to a pre-existing 
visual entity, and it is understood as recording and documenting that entity. The 
dissonance between the indexical mark and the pixel is evidenced in the difficulty 
of relating indexicality to anything like photographic seeing, as will be further 
considered later in the chapter, in the context of the marked readymade image. 
But the key point here again is that the indexical mark offers a genuine critical 
intensity in contrast to the dominant mark within prevailing image technologies. 
The difficulty of refreshing and renewing that intensity is immense. 
If paintings like Rauschenberg's and Lichtenstein's declare the difficulty of 
renewing indexicality, the negative response might be that this difficulty is not 
difficulty but full impossibility. However, there is a more interesting and 
ambivalent response on the negative side. It is suggested in these remarks by 
Baudrillard: 
In a technical civilization of opera tory abstraction, where neither machines 
nor domestic objects require much more than a controlling gesture ... 
modem art in all its forms has for its primary function the salvation of the 
gestural moment, the intervention of the integral subject.l13 
From this perspective the positive attributes of the indexical mark tum sour and 
reappear as forms of sentimentality. In a similar vein Agamben writes: "An age 
that has lost its gestures is, for this reason, obsessed by them." 114 It's a plausible 
suggestion: the technicity of the lifeworld increasingly trivializes the gesture, 
reducing it to a point. This "controlling gesture" - flipping the switch, pressing the 
start button - offers no unfolding in space or time, no sequential aspect 
whatsoever. And it doesn't really matter what the gesture is exactly - whether 
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done with a thumb or an elbow or a pen - so long as it produces the required 
effect. It is instrumental in this narrow sense that its value is entirely dependent on 
operational outcome - is purely, exclusively teleologica~ while fully exchangeable 
- thumb or pen or whatever so long as it gets the job done. As pure telos, it is a 
gesture without a rhetorical or connotative dimension. Consequendy, in 
Baudrillard's scenario, the artistic gesture is ushered in as symbolic compensation 
for the evacuation of the lived gesture. Hence the gesture in artworks is the polar 
opposite of the "controlling gesture", it is pure rhetoric. It is evident now, 
however, that painting has developed modes for prolonging and re-elaborating the 
indexical mark that by no means safeguard the integrated subjectivity that 
Baudrillard distains. As we will see, in paintings by Reed, Brown and Richter, 
among others, the indexical mark is being developed in new ways that by no 
means offer refuge for such a subject. 
To the extent that every material thing in the world is an outcome some 
causal sequence or other, its appearance could be expected to be evidence of that 
causality. This is the sense in which indexicality ought to be a general condition of 
things. In Gell's terms: "Every artefact is a 'performance' in that it motivates the 
abduction of its coming-into-being in the world. Any object that one encounters 
in the world invites the question 'how did this thing get to be here?' " 115 
Indexicality ought to be a general condition of artefacts. But plainly it isn't 
generally manifest: I look at a TV or a computer or even a roll of selotape without 
ascertaining much at all about how they were made. We agree to defer to the 
expertise of those few who can read off from the appearance of such artefacts, 
pay them to carry out repairs and so forth. Therefore much of the indexicality of 
contemporary artefacts is inscrutable except to the initiated. What that implies is 
that manifest indexicality in painting has to tread a fine line between 
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sentimentality, in a sense very close to Baudrillard's, on the one hand, and a kind 
of symbolic empowerment, on the other. By the latter I mean that the indexical 
mark in painting enables a certain demystification of artefact and artifice. Thus, 
when the perennial scandalized viewer of Pollock complains that anybody could 
make a drip painting - even a child -, the reply should be Yes, indeed, that is the 
scale of Pollock's accomplishment: everything is done with the bare mark. Such is 
the real invitation of Pollock's work: in an important sense anybody could do it. 
So if it's right to speak now of an age of inscrutable indexicality, painting has to be 
grasped in a dialectical relation to that condition: it operates between the 
precarious fringe of sentimentality and affirmative demystification. It declares 
that, on a certain level, all artifice and all technics are as crude as the drip or the 
smear, and that, what's more, the social fact of the inscrutability of technics is 
nonetheless always a theatrical conceit. 
Let us look now at two paintings. Gotham News [Fig.13] exemplifies a 
particular expectation of embodied judgment where the painting is its own making 
and refers to its own making. Yet still it articulates a sense of resemblance. I say 
sense of resemblance because it is hard to specify what the resemblance is of. In 
contrast to de Kooning, I want to look also at Richter's Inpainting-Grry, 1972 
[Fig.14]. Looking at the two it becomes obvious that the sense of resemblance in 
Gotham News depends upon the differences between the marks. Whereas, the 
absence of resemblance in the Richter depends upon the homogeneity of the 
marks. As you spend time with Gotham News you appreciate how fine-tuned are 
its internal checks and balances, and how painstakingly its network of internal 
differences has been composed. You realize that it took a long time. Yet it feels 
fast. It has the feel of an assembly of instantaneous movements. It is a white 
monochrome in disguise, yet it feels colourful. The white allows the wet-on-wet 
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coloured marks to get picked up where white and colour mingle - thus the 
coloured mark can be manifested as a traced movement. This would all be far 
more difficult, if not impossible with any hue other than white. De Kooning has 
to use the white as a bright but neutral medium of the index, without his positive 
chromatic marks getting significantly diluted as they mingle with the white. There 
are many such dissimulations at work here. The fuller complexity of the indexical 
mark is implicit in the painting. One could then interpret much subsequent 
painting, like the Lichtenstein Brushstrokes, as the rendering explicit of these 
dissimulations. But I don't use that word as a pejorative. These are fabulous, 
virtuoso dissimulations that stage the conjunction of seeming spontaneity of mark 
with balanced, sectored composition. 
Inpainting-Grry, 1972 is also an image of its own making. But if Gotham News 
manages to rhetoricize its own component decisions and present them as 
purposeful, decisive and finely poised, Inpainting-Grry suggests instead aimlessness, 
botedom and the atbitrariness and pointlessness of stopping whete it does. 
Indeed, this and the other three grey paintings in the same group by Richter ought 
to be boring. But they ate not. What we find in these dense grey paintings is an 
attempt to open up a position within gestural abstraction which is neither 
affirtnative in manner of the de Kooning, yet nor is it securely didactic in the way 
that Factum I and II must be understood as being. After paintirtg like this, de 
KObrting's idiom can also be seen aftesh. That's to say in demonsti:atHig how the 
gesture can be constitutive of the painted image without playing the compensatory 
role analysed by Baudrillard, Inpainting-Grry re-inflects our tesponse to Gotham 
News. Hereafter we don't concede that the latter's force is exhausted by the 
semiotic of expressive immediacy. The sheer complexity of the image casts doubt 
on the claims around immediacy. The point is rather that every mark in Gotham 
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News is both singular and is a component within an architectonic ensemble. Every 
mark is at once singular and noda~ networked. Every sector is simultaneously 
convex and concave. The marks are by no means accumulations of immediacies: 
nowhere do they lack complexity. Already in the feedback between Inpainting-Grry 
and Gotham News the indexical mark opens a plural field of contingency. 
3.2 Crary's Seurat 
If the discrepancy between the pixel and the gesture is emblematic of painting's 
relation to contemporary image technologies, then isn't it going to be necessary to 
say something about the pixel's forebear in painting, the dot? In this regard it is 
valid to address the work of Jonathan Crary. His atcount of the dot hi Seurat in 
particular, and of the role of embodiment in the visual cultures of modernity in 
general so directly contravenes my own position that I will now spend some time 
responding to it. 
In his book Suspensions of Perception Jonathan Crary provides what will surely 
prove to be the most fruitful account of Seurat's paintings Parade de Cirque and 
Cirque for at least a generation. If anyone doubts the complexity of Seurat's critical 
enterprise this is the text they should appraise. And we should recall that everyone 
from Malevich to Matisse to Picasso to Mondrian to Kandinsky to Picabia to 
Riley confronted Seurat's pointillism at some moment in their careers. Duchamp 
too admired the intervention that Seurat's dot delivered. This community of 
influence was and is so profound because Seurat's reduction of the gesture to the 
dot is one of the fundamental inaugural moments in Modernist art. Crary 
connects Seurat's method of marking and depicting on the one hand to his 
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lffiagery on the other. Parade de Cirque (1887-88) [Fig.31] is an image of a 
sideshow, a stage show of a kind employed along the fayade of a Parisian circus as 
a draw. The stage shows were free, but were intended to entice their audience into 
paying to enter the main attraction, which was invisible from the outside to non-
payers. In other wotds, the stage show is advertising. Seurat's painting is a 
painting of advertising. Crary argues convincingly that Parade de Cirque is a bleak 
but accurate anticipation of the subordination of the aesthetic to the commodity 
by the development in modernity of new modes of (in) attention, especially 
through photography and film. For Crary, visual (in)attention develops in 
modernity into a kind of distracted contemplation in which the presence of the 
visualized realm is always withheld or deferred. In Parade, according to Crary, 
Seurat both anticipates the usurpation of the visual-aesthetic by advertising and 
the commbdity-as-spectacle, and - and this is crucial- allegorises that process qua 
withholding and deferring of presence in his own pointillist mode of depiction: 
thus Seutat himself withholds the presences of his figures from the viewer, for 
whom they disperse into gaseous clouds of evaporating colour particles as one 
draws near to the picture surface. But for Crary the pointillist technique does not 
only allegorise the deferral of presence of commodified aesthesis. It also 
symbolizes the process whereby the advertisement draws together an audience 
which it simultaneously fragments and disperses: it is a crowd but a non-group 
and un-collective. Crary's argument is that the crowd-as-audience is the gathered 
yet dispersed un-collective much as the figure in a pointillist painting is a spurious 
cluster of dots with indistinct boundaries and without organic linkage between the 
individual atoms that compose it. 
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Seurat discloses ways in which individuals, in their status and capacities as 
observers, can be assembled into new pseudo-solidarities, whether as crowds 
or audiences, even while maintaining their effective isolation. The painting 
reiterates on the level of content what it produces through its technical 
system: the work is a solicitation of attention. The sideshow, with its 
musicians and performers, is a device of attraction, meant to focus the 
attention of the urban strollers and to persuade them to buy a ticket for 
access to the 'main' attraction in the tent in front of them. But it is an 
attraction that will forever be withheld from them, from us, for this is a 
painting fundamentally designed around the cancellation and suspension of 
what it promises to reveal. The spectator of this painting, both as individual 
and as part of a collective subjectivity, is inescapably in its perpetual play of 
attraction and absence.116 
There is nothing here I wish to reject. I find the argument persuasive, and Seurat's 
painting comes to light as an exemplary critical engagement with the commodity. 
But there's more. 
Let us place the brilliant analyses of Seurat in the broader context of Crary's 
critical-historical project. Consider Crary's argument in the earlier book 
Techniques of the Observer, which connects in important respects to his 
discussion of Seurat. In the first book the historical argument is that a number of 
overlapping practices and discourses in the nineteenth century - in particular 
photography, the prehistory of cinema in the cinematograph and the Zoetrope et 
cetera, together with physiological research into the nervous system - brought 
about a gradual and accelerating autonomization of vision, in both theory and 
practice, as the precondition for what will be the full-blown technologies of 
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spectacular consumption in the twentieth century. For Crary the autonomization 
of vision means ultimately a disembodied vision; an abstraction of optical 
experience from its intertwining with the other senses, touch especially, and from 
the lived intensities and extensities of embodiment in generaL "The prehistory of 
the spectacle and the 'pure perception' of modernism" he writes, "are lodged in 
the newly discovered territory of a fully embodied viewer but the eventual triumph of 
both depends on the denial of the bocfy, its pulsings and phantasms, as the ground of vision." 117 
In a theoretical montage of Debord and Foucault, Crary develops the ~laim that 
the abstracted optical subject is - in modernity - the subject prepared for new 
informational and behavioural disciplines in order to become the compliant 
consumer of the commodity as spectacle. 
It's a powerful narrative, but is it correct? And do we judge its validity in 
purely empirical, historical terms? 118 I raise these problems because clearly Crary's 
position does two things of great consequence in relation to my position: first, it 
gives a powerful and focused account of modernist painting's relation to the 
commodity in the guise of modernity's new spectacular technologies and optical 
sciences; but second, and more globally, it challenges the entire force of the 
argument about bodily making, since in Crary's history it is the very possibility of 
a fully bodily making of a visual artwork that is eliminated in modernity's drive 
toward an autonomized opticality.ll9 
Seurat is located in this scheme as a historical figure in contradiction. He is 
both the harbinger of the new autonomous vision, its prophet, yet by the same 
token, he is cast in the role of Weber's 'vanishing intermediary': that is to say he 
simultaneously beckons the new opticality, represses within his art its full 
consequences, and clings to those modes of poised, resolved pictoriality that will 
vanish when the new autonomized vision reaches its maturation. But we need to 
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think about Seurat's means, the dot. The dot is absolutely crucial to the 
development of modernist painting. It is no less an icon of modernism than the 
grid. And just like the grid in Rosalind Krauss' celebrated essay,120 the dot likewise 
promises simultaneously to be immanence - a pure punctum of colour without 
extension, a pure quiddity - and transcendence - an informational node in a 
differential network of co-ordinates. In short, the dot is the great unsung hero, or 
rather anti-hero of modern (including postmodern) painting. The dot is always 
thought of as a neutralized mark; a mark purged of expressive or anthropocentric 
values. It is mechanical, automatic, corresponding to no bodily movement, 
robotic, geometric and axiomatic; hence it is the anti-gesture par excellence. In 
this respect it chimes with Crary's notion of autonomized vision as a disembodied 
opticality, an experience of and through eyes without bodies. 
By way of response, let's consider Seurat's drawing styles. The dot, after all, 
is compatible with any drawing style whatsoever, as Lichtenstein deftly showed in 
his mock eclectic pictorial tour of Modern Art. You can draw like Ingres or like 
Soutine, and still use dots. What is puzzling with Seurat, towards the end of his 
short life, is the movement to caricature as the ethic for his drawing. Why does an 
artist so respectful of the academic version of classicism abandon that kind of 
drawing? 121 On the evidence of the paintings the move to caricature coincides 
with a shift in imagery and a shift in technique. The change in imagery is the 
choice of entertainment spectacles, rather than his previous images of Sunday 
strollers and riverside promenaders. The change in technique is the intensification 
of the dot - it is, so to speak, the dogmatisation of the dot. Whereas in earlier 
works like the Bathers at Asniere the dot is still an offer, a proposal for future 
research, and so, occupying only limited passages of the painting, in the later 
works like the final picture of Seurat's wife at her dressing table, the dot is total, a 
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fully instituted programme, and therefore occupying and homogenizing the entire 
picture surface. In the early works the dot is in its Leninist phase, as it were, 
whereas in Parade and Cirque we arrive at its Stalinist phase of claustrophobic 
foreclosure. Here also, as with the portrait of the artist's wife, the drawing style is 
a type of ornamented caricature. Certainly the deployment of caricatural drawing 
has to do with the subjects, placing them as demotic, not classical, modem, and 
implicidy as already within the realm of the pictorial, the realm of received images. 
But I feel that is not enough. For it is when the dot takes over, when it totalizes 
and homogenizes the image that Seurat embraces caricature. 
I think there is something here that Crary misses altogether. The recurrence 
of caricature in conjunction with the dot is a constant in art: we get it in Seurat, 
Lichtenstein, Pollock (in certain of the so-called Black paintings such as Number 7, 
1951 and Number 27, 1951), Picabia, Polke and in 000. There are two broad lines 
of development for the dot in twentieth century painting: one is the all-over 
organization of dots by the grid (as in Bridget Riley, Larry Poons, Damien Hirst); 
the other is, as we've seen, the dot's encounter with caricature, cartooning and 
doodling. (There's no denying that there is also plenty of hybridizing the two, as 
in Polke.) The conjunction of the dot and the grid is inevitable, hence it is 
nobody's mystery. But again, why the constant and continuing conjunction of the 
dot and caricature? And why did Seurat, the arch-classicist, set it up in the first 
place, right there at the inception of the dot in its full rigor? 
This is not a question Crary acknowledges, and for good reason. Because 
the answer has to be that caricature returns a kind of pseudo-gesture to the 
fanatically disembodied matrix of dots. For what is cartooning and the caricature 
except a kind of embryonic gestural drawing of rhythmic movement and staccato 
abbreviation, of lurid exaggeration and autopoietic rhetorical energy? Cartooning 
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is gestural drawing writ small. The pencil wielded from the knuckle as hub 
(Disney) instead of the brush wielded from the shoulder as hub (de Kooning). 
Isn't the issue here that caricature resuscitates the gesture as doodle at precisely 
the moment where the dot neutralizes the gesture? In other words, caricature 
must be understood here as the gestural compensation for the neutralizing force 
of the dot qua pure punctuality. It is as if, right at the onset of the dogmatic phase 
of pointillism, Seurat had built a self-destruct button into the apparatus. For 
already in Cirque the totalising, homogenizing dot, - the icon of disembodied 
vision, of the eye without a body - is wedded to its Other, the bodily mark. 
3.3 Deferral of Presence in Derrida 
Rosalind Krauss introduces the relation between the indexical mark and the 
Derridean discourse of the trace with this passage: 
The graffitist makes a mark. Like all marks it has the character of a sign .... 
With the graffito, the expressive mark has a substance made up of the 
physical residue left by the marker's incursion: the smear of graphite, the 
stain of ink, the welt thrown up by the penknife's slash. But the form of the 
mark - at this level of 'expression' - is itself peculiar; for it inhabits the realm 
of the clue, the trace, the index. Which is to say the operations of form are 
those of marking an event - by forming it in terms of its remains, or its 
precipitate - and in so marking it, of cutting the event off from the 
temporality of its making. 
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The graffitist goes up to a wall. He makes a mark. We would say he makes it 
to register his presence, to intervene in the space of another in order in order 
to strike against it with his declaration, "I am here." But we would be wrong 
to say this. Insofar as his declaration is a mark, it is inevitably structured by 
the moment qfter its making that even now infects the time of its making, the 
future moment that makes of its making nothing else than a past, a past that 
reads "I was here," "Kilroy was here." Thus even at the time that the marker 
strikes, he strikes in a tense that is over; entering the scene as a criminal, he 
understands that the mark he makes can only take the form of a clue. He 
delivers his mark over to a future that will be carried on without his presence, 
and in so doing his mark cuts his presence away from himself, dividing it 
from within into a before and an after. 
When Derrida would come to analyse this condition - the pure form of the 
imprint - to which he would give the name arche-trace, he would invent the 
name dijJerance to account for the temporal disjunction internally fissuring this 
event .... For if to make a mark is already to leave one's mark, it is already to 
allow the outside of an event to invade its inside; it cannot be conceived 
without 'the non-presence of the other inscribed within the sense of the 
p~ present.' -
This connection between the indexical mark in painting and the Derridean trace is 
my focus in this section. I<rauss's remarks are a useful point of departure but do 
little more than introduce the relation and delimit it to the question of 
temporality, or more precisely, to the notion of an interminable fold of fluctuation 
between the present moment of mark-making and the futurity of the address that 
the mark will accomplish qua sign, which will, in tum, cast it as a past event, as an 
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absence. Certainly the figure of the graffitist is a fruitful model for the artist in 
general, for marking in general, since the graffitist is indeed rhetoricizing and 
territorializing123 his/her presence for an addressee who is necessarily absent and 
futural. The importance of temporality in this discussion is clear, and Krauss is 
right to stress it, but in what follows I attempt to broaden the argument, such that 
temporal folding will emerge as just one register of the trace, one among several 
guises of the trace. 
What is specific to Derrida's notion of the trace? As always with Derrida -
and the disciples who still dominate the secondary literature would declare, of 
necessity, given Derrida's (non)-position - arguments such as there are, are not 
cumulative, do not get assembled up through compositions of elements; such 
arguments as there are, are constituted in streams of negatives, of critiques, of 
readings of texts, of asides and parentheses. The demanding reader has to do 
his /her own accumulation and construction. We have a number of materials, both 
'positive' and 'negative', for an argument. We need to consider and relate the 
motifs of: the originary supplement; the critique of presence; difforance, or 'the 
inside is the outside', the failure of a delimited structure to hold at bay its 
exteriority. We need to gain some familiarity with the interweavings of these 
motifs. 
What is the 'originary supplement'? Of Grammatology is about writing. The 
book traces an overarching continuity in Western thought that denigrates writing 
in favour of speech. The prejudice has motivations and consequences that are at 
once epistemological, ontological and ethical. Hence the book takes the site of 
writing, or more exactly the site of the writing/speech dichotomy, as a stage for 
an all-encompassing critique of Western metaphysics. Of Grammatology is an 
obsessive researching into the histories of the speech/ writing distinction as a 
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philosophical trope. The question of the supplement arises at the centre of the 
speech/ writing discussion since, by one account, writing is a supplementation of 
speech. Writing, it is said, is a supplement to the presence of the speaker as speech 
itself is a supplement to thought. Of Grammatology works at undoing this received 
wisdom not by inverting it, though on a sloganising level it sometimes sounds so. 
'Writing'in Derrida's text comes to stand in for signifying in general. In a sense, 
the book works away at rendering this plausible, compelling the reader to allow 
that signifying in general could be thought as a writing. To return to received 
understandings: a supplement is by definition posterior, an afterword, a subsidiary, 
of subordinate status, "an auxiliary aide-memoire to the living memory," 124 an 
exteriority to a presence, a structure established in the absence of the event, of the 
thing, an effect in an aftermath. Originary supplement is then a logical faux pas. It 
is true that the institution of writing in its historical growth and development, 
infects, reconfigures and frames speech and the habits of speakers. Saussure says 
as much. Derrida re-affirms the point, - "Representation mingles with what it 
represents, to the point where one speaks as one writes ... " 125 - but the claim for 
the originarity of the supplement goes further, goes to the root. 
There is the case of the demarcation of an origin, where the origin must 
be celebrated and communicated as origin. Derrida talks of "the supplement of 
origin: which supplements the failing origin and which is yet not derived; this 
supplement is, as one says of a spare part, of the original make (or a document, 
establishing the origin.)" 126 This remark conjures up the image and myth of the 
Founding Fathers and the originary gesture of an institution as in the Declaration 
of Independence of the USA, an example considered elsewhere by Derrida: a 
document, establishing the origin. The temporal and ontological paradox of the 
Declaration of Independence - and therefore its legal paradox - lies in its 
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assertion that the signatories and the 'Americans' they identify with are already 
free and independent: the Declaration in effect states that 'we are now 
independent because we declare that we were already independent.' The paradox 
is that 'our already having been independent' is actualised and effected only by 
means of a retrospective assertion. And obviously it is both true and untrue: the 
'Americans' were de jure and de facto citizens of Crown colonies prior to the 
Declaration. The paradox of the manifest destiny dogma is analogous to that of 
the Declaration. But my point is not to contest legitimacy, ethical or ontological. 
The point is rather that the originary gesture is by its nature mythic and 
paradoxical in this sense. However, the issue for us is more precisely that the 
originarity of the gesture, of the event, is inaugurated belatedly through the 
retroactive supplement which nonetheless casts itself as initiation and semination. 
In this sense the origin is characterised as such posthumously. 
An analogous structure is discernible in the presentation of a contemporary 
artwork for sale in the marketplace: Martin Creed's The Lights Going On and Off, 
2000 [?], in two versions (one specifying 30 second intervals, the other 10 
seconds), each version in an edition of three, £10,000 each (at the time), and the 
buyer receives a description with instructions and a signed statement of 
authenticity and edition number. As with the Declaration of Independence, the 
supplement takes the rhetorical stance of bearing witness to what already is: The 
Lights Going On and Off already exists, it declares, and this is it, and you, dear 
collector, now own it. The affinity with the Declaration is closer still in that the 
certificate of authenticity stakes precise legal claims with respect to copyright and 
intellectual property rights. Hence the certification claims to bear witness to the 
pre-existence of a determinate legal entity, yet this determination is assured only 
by such ex post facto witness. We can now envisage the kind of claim made by the 
155 
scandal of the originary supplement. But are we merely being asked to address the 
application of a signifying structure to a thing or event? Well, yes except for the 
'merely,' since it is the signifying structure that secures the determination of the 
event. 
Now I want to follow the motif of 'the inside is the outside', or 
'differance'. It's useful to read this book alongside Derrida's contemporaneous 
1967 essay DijJerance. Differance is more often than not presented by Derrida and 
his disciples couched in a string of denials: it is, we are told incessantly, not a 
concept, not a method, not a programme, not dialectic, not an absence and not a 
presence and therefore not a force if force entails presence, not even an 
operation.127 It is not even an undertaking of a subject - not something done -
insofar as differance differs and defers, that is, it is a movement that is in no need 
of an external origin of its movement: it moves; it is not put through its paces. So 
this stream of denials has its place but soon grows tiresome. A better approach to 
understanding what is at issue is to follow a localised argument that then is seen to 
fold out into a total horizon. The following deceptively simple argument appears 
in differing wordings and contexts in the Grammatology and the DijJerance essay. In 
the section of the Grammatology called 'The Inside (Is) the Outside' Derrida's close 
reading of Saussure's Course in General Linguistics raises problems concerning the 
classical distinctions between the sensible and the intelligible, and by extension, 
the matter/form or f?yle/ morphe distinction. Derrida follows through an antinomy 
or paradox. The argument runs as follows. The sensible particular, whether a 
sound or coloured shape or whatever, seems to be a given entity. But how does 
that entity, that particular, come to be characterised, qualified and quantified? Its 
qualities and quantities are characterised with respect other possible attributes, 
perhaps including future, past and counter-factual attributes. Hence the 
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detennination of the particular, including indeed its delimitation as a particular, is 
operative only when the thing can be gathered up into a relational structure, a 
relational space with respect to other present, absent or possible particulars. 
Hence the sensible particular, the sound or shape, is characterised and 
circumscribed only a differential structure. As Derrida insists, the differences that 
flow from that relational structure - the difference between this sound and that 
sound - cannot itself be sensible, audible in this instance. The difference between 
two sounds is precisely what is not audible just as the difference between two 
colours is not visible. Ordinary language would suggest otherwise: "Can't you see 
the difference?" While there is the strong probability that seeing and hearing must 
be a matter of the cognitive construction of relations between sensible elements 
such that "seeing the difference" gains theoretical legitimacy, nonetheless, I think 
it is sufficient for Derrida's argument to demonstrate that hearing a sound is of a 
different order cognitively, phenomenologically, ontologically - to 'hearing,' 
recognising the difference between two sounds. Hearing - the sensible in general 
- thus takes place in the movement in a relational space, in a movement between 
the particular and the network, between the present and the absent, between the 
intelligible and the sensible. "The difference between two phonemes, which 
enables them to exist and to operate, is inaudible. The inaudible opens the two 
present phonemes to hearing, as they present themselves." 128 Thus we have 
arrived at the much vaunted Derridean deconstruction, or movement of differance, 
in which a category - viz. the sensible - is found to shelter and nurture at its core 
its supposed opposite, the intelligible: 'the inside is the outside.' Or perhaps we 
should say here that what ought to have been the outside turns out to be the 
inside. I will now cite a lengthy passage where we observe Derrida moving quickly 
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from the above deconstruction of the category of the sensible to broad remarks 
about the trace and dijJerance, the two terms being near synonyms for him: 
the phonic element, the term, the plenitude that is called sensible, would not 
appear as such without this difference or opposition which gives them form. 
Such is the most evident significance of the appeal to difference as the 
reduction of phonic substance. Here the appearing and functioning of 
difference presupposes an originary synthesis not preceded by any absolute 
simplicity. Such would be the originary trace. Without a retention in the 
minimal unit of temporal experience, without a trace retaining the other as 
other in the same, no difference would do its work and no meaning would 
appear. It is not the question of a constituted difference here, but rather, 
before all determination of the content, of the pure movement which 
produces difference. The (pure) trace is dijJerance. It does not depend on any 
sensible plenitude, audible or visible, phonic or graphic. It is, on the contrary, 
the condition of such a plenitude. Although it does not exist, although it is 
never a being-pment outside of all plenitude, its possibility is by rights anterior 
to all that one calls signs, concept or operation, motor or sensory. This 
difference is therefore not more sensible than intelligible and it permits the 
articulation of signs among themselves within the same abstract order - a 
phonic or graphic text for example - or between two orders of expression .... 
Differance is therefore the formation of form. 129 
Here in the figure of the 'originary trace' we are given a taste of how the argument 
around the originary supplement folds into the account of differance. The above 
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"o~o1nary synthesis not preceded by any absolute simplicity" is indeed the work 
of the originary supplement. 
Differance with an 'a' then, is what allows signification to emerge. It is what 
makes articulation possible. Signification is always articulation. So it becomes 
clearer why Derrida might propose writing to stand for signification in general. 
Derrida says "The space of writing is not an originarily intelligible space. It begins 
however to become so from the origin, that is to say from the moment when 
writing, like all the work of signs, produces repetition and therefore ideality in that 
space." 130 We then have a constellation of related concepts, namely, spacing, 
articulation, repetition and ideality. These require some unpacking. The sign in 
general must be exchangeable, therefore its being iterable means that it is 
necessarily repeatable, capable of re-iteration in differing exchanges and contexts. 
As the 'first' inscription/ mark/ sign, so to speak, beckons the series that will 
constitute its repetition, so the future marks cast their shadow back onto the 
moment of the inscription of the 'first' mark. As Derrida puts it, "repetition 
always already divides the point of departure of the first time." 131 And with this, 
we are firmly back with the inscription of Krauss's graffitist. The sign qua sign 
cannot occur only once just as the dollar bill qua unit of value must be always 
available for further circulation. As the song has it, "I recall the actor's advice / 
Nothing happens til it happens twice." Iteration, iterabilty, repetition usher in a 
temporal sequence that is in principle infinite. This alone introduces an aspect of 
ideality. The unity of the sign in the plurality of its repetitious appearances is, or 
requires an ideality. But the inconceivability of the sign that appears only once is 
not only a matter of its iterabilty; it is also a question of establishing the sign in its 
spacing, as a determinate articulation. And as the latter citation from Derrida 
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indicates, the establishment of that domain, that dimensionality for spacmg, 
cannot be accomplished in a sign that is not re-iterated. 
I have considered the arguments for the originary supplement and for 'the 
inside (is) the outside.' It should be apparent how the two motifs are interwoven, 
how they support and require each other. Thus, the originary supplement can be 
portrayed as an application of 'the inside (is) the outside.' Both can stand as 
versions of the complex origin of the entity, of any and all entities. The argument 
for the originary supplement is itself a critique of presence, where the latter is 
understood as the noncomplex originary plenitude. In the case of the Declaration 
of Independence, it was found that there was no originary presence sufficient to 
the task of marking an inauguration. This is not to suggest that there could have 
been, or that fortnerly present moment (of emancipation, of the condition of being 
always already emancipated) was short on intensity. The point was rather that the 
originary moment, or condition needed to be marked as ong,inary, and that this 
marking as originary was necessarily retrospective. So the question of the originary 
supplement has already given us a familiarity with the structure of the critique of 
presence. 
It is valuable to compare the above with the essay Freud and the Scene of 
Writing, in which we find another rendition of the critique of presence read from 
and through Freud. In Derrida's reading, the condition of the Freudian psyche as 
both virginal and always already marked by memory is equivalent to the arche-
trace, or the originary supplement. Freud has to find an enunciation of a structure 
in which the psychic apparatus can contain, at once, " an unlimited receptive 
capacity and a retention of permanent traces" 132 
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And a "psychological theory deserving any consideration must furnish an 
explanation of 'memory' ". The crux of such an explanation, what makes 
such an apparatus almost unimaginable, is the necessity of accounting 
simultaneously ... for the permanence of the trace and the virginity of the 
receiving substance, for the engraving of furrows and for the perennially 
intact bareness of the perceptive surface .... 133 
Derrida continues: 
That the present in general is not primal but, rather, reconstituted, that it is 
not the absolute, wholly living form which constitutes the experience, that 
there is no purity of the living present - such is the theme, formidable for 
metaphysics, which Freud, in a conceptual scheme unequal to the thing itself, 
would have us pursue. 134 
On this reading, the Freudian account is one that denies the presence of the 
immediate imptession on the psychic apparatus, both because the impression is 
always, already structured through memory and as affect; and because it is not 
available - not capable of being assimilated or 'owned' - until filtered through 
meaning, in its most elementary sense. "In Freudian terms, every experience or 
excitation reaches us only after having suffered the transfiguration of secondary 
elaboration." 135 Compare Derrida agaih: "The metaphor of pallibreaking tpreud's 
Bahnungl . .. is always in communication with the theme of the supplementary delqy 
and with the reconstitution of meaning through deferral ... after the subterranean 
toil of an impression. The impression has left behind a laborious trace which has 
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never been perceived, whose meaning has never been lived in the present, i.e., has 
never been lived consciously." 136 
3.4 Presence in Newman 
Newman is hardly an obvious choice for this discussion. Hardly contemporary, 
you might say. I hope to demonstrate that Newman, more precisely than his own 
contemporaries, rehearses the conditions of the contemporary gesture as I have 
outlined them. Newman foresees and rehearses one kind of response to the 
problem of developing the gesture beyond the terms of presence/absence or 
past/ present, by fashioning his own kind of mark that is, at the same stroke, 
deadpan and spontaneous, yet also framed and framing, through its deployment 
of symmetry. What's more, Newman's work links in several interesting ways with 
the Derridean motifs we have just considered. Given the above motifs of the 
originary supplement, 'the inside is the outside', and the critique of presence, one 
can follow structural seams in Newman's oeuvre that are closely and relevantly 
analogous. 
Newman already in his works of the 1940s was exercised with the theme 
of origination. Newman deploys a thematic of the performativity of artistic 
creation - concretised as mark-making - to enact a response to the quasi-
theological, cosmological, metaphysical and anthropogenetic versions of the 
question of origination. In this discussion I am not at all interested in the sublime 
in Newman. I am very much interested in how the theme of origination, as 
articulated in Newman's paintings, complicates the distinction between presence 
and absence. To originate, for Newman, is to appear. The mark is what appears. 
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We will need to study in detail the how of its appearance. But before that, we 
should say that there is already a double structure, of sorts, in the preoccupation 
with origination. For it was, for the Newman of the 40s, a matter of nothing less 
than the origination of painting tout court in a situation where the medium was felt 
to have died: 
I had to start from scratch as if painting didn't exist, which is a special way of 
saying that painting was dead. I felt that there was nothing in painting that 
was a source that I could use, and at the same time I felt that the whole 
situation was such that we had to examirte the whole process.137 
So there was the need to originate painting as if its traditions counted for nothing. 
Or such was the feeling. But for Newman that necessity became itself the subject 
of the paintings. The paintings then also had to be images of origination. This is 
what I called the double structure: painting as a "whole process" had to be re-
invented "from scratch", and in the marks of re-invention it was to construct an 
image of origination. Newman's early titles make the issue fairly explicit: Genesis -
The Break 1946; Genetic Moment, 1947; Onement, 1948; End if 5 iience, 1949. 
Newman, I have said, manifests the performativity of artistic creation. We 
have seen that performativity is a structure in which product and production are 
fused and cannot be satisfactorily separated. As we noted in chapter 1, in its initial 
theoretical formulation in the tabulation of speech acts by J .L.Austin, the 
exemplary performative speech act is the promise, in which speech names itself as 
the production of an act and so institutes itself as an outcome by describing itself 
as the production of that outcome. Thus in the promise we cannot distinguish 
between the production and its outcome, or product: with the "I promise ... " 
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speech both characterizes its own undertaking, somewhat like a live commentary, 
and at the same instant, marks and commemorates an inauguration within a 
determinate institution. Clearly we have a complex temporal determination here. 
It should be clear that this performative set-up is equivalent to the aporetic 
structure of the Declaration of Independence discussed above with reference to 
Derrida's originary supplement. It should also be apparent that this performative 
structure is equivalent to the case of Krauss' graffitist: Newman seeks both to 
originate painting as such, and to make each individual painting a monument to 
origination. And of course, Newman cannot originate painting only once and quit: 
he has to originate it over and over, ushering in here the Derridean notion of 
repetition as iterability. 
Speaking to Thomas Hess about a sacred native Indian site in Ohio, 
Newman said: "Looking at the site you feel, Here I am, here... and out beyond 
there there is chaos, nature, rivers, landscapes. .. but here you get a sense of your 
own presence ... I became involved with the idea of making the viewer present: 
the idea that 'Man is present'." 138 Of course there is a note here that is 
unfortunate for us: Newman's verbal statements are thus frequently couched in 
terms of an ahistorical pan-humanism as in the above. So I will try to be precise 
about what I value in Newman and its relevance for and deployment in the 
argument. 
I accept that in some sense the paintings do succeed with respect to 
Newman's avowed aim, namely, to produce in the viewer a heightened awareness 
of his/her own presence. But just how is that accomplished and at what cost? I 
think we can follow the opening up of a sequential and ontological difficulty in 
Newman with respect to this intended effect of intensified presence. The 
paintings prompt, symbolise, celebrate and theatricalise the experience of 
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presence. But how? If the scenario of standing at the Ohio Indian site as the awed 
beholder of primordial earthworks amid a grand sweep of landscape - if this is the 
preferred analogy for the experience of the viewer before a Newman painting, 
then the conundrum is the following: in the analogy is the painting equivalent to 
the prehistoric earthworks only, or is it instead equivalent to the entire scene such 
that a Newman painting stands for the entire visual field of the beholder at the 
Ohio site? It sounds pedantic, but the point matters. In other words, are these 
paintings virtual chromatic spaces that the viewer enters imaginatively and 
traverses, as one does a Friedrich landscape, or as Diderot wrote of imaginatively 
wandering into Vernet's pictures in the celebrated Salon texts; or are the paintings 
resistant to relational structure and virtual, illusionistic space and, rather than 
establishing a recessive volume or interiority, they are concerned with drawing our 
attention to that space exterior to the painting that is inhabited by and 
proportionate to our bodies as we look? So we have two distinct possibilities: that 
the paintings intensify the experience of presence through their interiority, that is 
by the viewer's imaginative identification with their virtual spaces; or that the 
paintings establish the issue of presence by insistendy drawing the viewer's 
attention to his/her own presence as a physical unit of scale ill the exterior 
surroundings of the painting. 
Newman was evidendy aware of this conundrum, as we see in the interview 
done shordy before his death, with Emilio de Antonio: 
I was concerned constandy in doing a painting that would move in its totality 
as you see it. You look at it and you see it. And if you don't, there's nothing 
to walk into. It's not a window leading you into a situation where you walk 
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through some interior or exterior world from which you then come to a 
conclusion. The beginning and the end are there at once ..... 
I think, in a sense, my painting removes the observer. At the same time I'm 
not too happy about those writers who always talk about some of my large 
paintings as environmental, in which the observer becomes part of the 
painting. I like to think of the person becoming part of the painting in terms 
of meaning, because in the end I feel that most of my paintings are hostile to 
th .. . 139 e eXlstmg enVltonment. 
There is a direct awareness of the conundrum. Newman is, as he usually was in 
interview, fairly frank and ingenuous. But where do his comments leave us? - No 
to traditional interiority, but No also to pure exteriority, as in "I'm not too happy 
about those writers who always talk about some of my large paintings as 
environmental." Then the final sentence which seems to me a cop-out. For me, 
the most generous reading of it would be that Newman fears and opposes 
succumbing to the environment in all senses. That is why he must be "hostile" to 
exteriority. Yet "hostile" is in its way sly: after all, to be hostile to x is to engage x 
in a relation of rejection; it is at once to relate and to contest relation. But what is 
more striking in the passage is Newman's reasoning in rejecting interiority: 
traditional interiority is suspect because it establishes a sequential, even a narrative 
temporality. In his work ''You look at it and you see it. And if you don't, there's 
nothing to walk into." It sounds deceptively easy, but let's unravel it slowly. ''You 
look at it and you see it": the painting gives itself up to the viewer at a glance, all 
at once, withholding nothing from that initial instant. However, if you don't play 
ball, if you refuse the temporality of the instant, of the totality given in the 
momentary glance, then the painting won't play ball with you, it will refuse your 
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demand for a sequential temporality: "if you don't (look at it and see it), there's 
nothing to walk into." To follow the converse: if there were something to walk 
into, then in an important sense, the painting would have withheld its substance 
from the viewer in that first instant of visual encounter. Newman's refuses this 
possibility because it destroys the unity of the appearance qua totality that does 
not unfold successively in time; and moreover, because the very project of 
intensifying presence for the viewer is bound to the idea of removing the viewer 
from narrative or sequential time, which would imply a logic of anticipation (of a 
conclusion to come) and therefore, in Dertidean terms, a deferral of presence. 
I don't believe there is a satisfactory answer to the conundrum. Perhaps it 
is precisely Newman's achievement to hold these contradictory demands in some 
kind of embrace. There is no reconciliation conceivable. But Newman's oeuvre is 
as elegant an illusion of reconciliation as one could hope to attain. 
In the years of success Newman was fastidious, with his multiple studios, 
each apparently hosting a single painting on the go for as long as it took. And 
Newman understood, as a classically repetitive modernist painter, that he had to 
decide the terms of his repetitiousness not so much with rigor as with immense 
tact. That is, I take it, the reason why there are so few paintings - less than 120 
completed for the entire period of the public oeuvre, which spans 1944 - 1970.140 
In a Retrospective show like the one recently at the Tate, the differences between 
the paintings are surprisingly dramatic and surprisingly hard to assimilate. 
Newman is a highly original colourist. But his decisive originality lies in his 
wrestling with the conundrum I have described as the dilemma of interiority 
versus exteriority. The ultra thin, wide-as-a-stripe paintings of the early 50s serve 
as high-water mark for the assertion of exteriority. These awkward pieces initiate 
what will become minimalism, and find its apotheosis in the work of Donald 
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Judd, himself a 'close reader' of Newman.141 Judd's wall-mounted works I 
understand as what is left of or rifter painting when it becomes sheer exteriority. 
Newman's expansive colourzone paintings like Uriel [Fig.15/I6] stake out the 
nearest approximation, within the oeuvre, to landscape-type interiorised virtual 
space. There is no satisfactory synthesis between the two tendencies, but I suspect 
that Newman's insistent verticality lends itself - better than do any of its 
alternatives - to the concealment of the extreme disunity under construction. 
Newman tried horizontal divisions, and then straightaway dropped them. The 
difficulty is that horizontality just gets easily ensnared and transmitted as 
diagrammatic landscape, no matter how rigorous its attempt to eschew 
illusionism. Therefore in Newman's terms, horizontal divisions are always liable to 
offer something you can "walk into." 
So there is no synthesis and there cannot be. Uriel is a great try. Another, very 
different kind of attempt is made using colour density, as in the Who's Afraid of 
Red, Yellow and Blue series, most of which are too easy and too didactic. Who s 
Afraid #4 [Fig.17] is the best of the series, but even it cannot shuffle its own 
spatial pack of cards right in front of your eyes as Uriel does so defdy. Newman's 
oeuvre is in contradiction, to an extreme degree, however it masks the fact. 
I have stated above that Newman prefigures the contemporary condition of 
the gesture. Newman worked out his own gesture that was deadpan and banal, yet 
intensely dramatized through its compositional centredness and its ultra-stark 
figure/ground set-up. The viewer is compelled to acknowledge a very particular 
conjunction: that the gesture eschews technical control at a certain point, 
dramatizing its own contingencies and chaotic momentum; yet, in the same 
instant, it is manifesdy pre-plotted, channelled through a dedicated centre line, 
pre-framed by the parallel vertical sides of the canvas, and pre-scripted to unite 
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and totalise the painting through its very centrality. All of this is apparent in the 
seminal, small (27 x 16 inch), 1948 Onement I. The gesture is chaotic and 
contingent - just a ragged line of cadmium red paint slapped on with a flat knife -
without a neat or straight edge, not uniformly opaque, a bit translucent in places 
where the darker warm brown of the ground shows through. While the gesture is 
aleatory in these respects, it is also tightly controlled: it follows precisely a centre 
line marked by a strip of masking tape, and its path does not deviate from this 
pre-delineated centre channel. I want to emphasize the double structure of the 
contingent-aleatory inscribed into and through the pre-mapped and pre-assigned. 
This offers a significant analogue for the Derridean motifs of the originary trace 
and the critique of presence. 
Newman's gesture, insofar as it is both spontaneous and unconstrained yet 
predetermined and pre-packaged, serves as a kind of prototype for the 
contemporary gesture as it appears subsequently in the overdetermined reflexivity 
of gestural painting at the hands of Lichtenstein, Richter, David Reed and Fabien 
Marcaccio, among others. In this respect, Newman's gesture is distinct from those 
of his contemporaries like Pollock, de Kooning and Kline. 
Can one relate the Derridean motifs back through Newman to gain insight 
into the dilemma I have described concerning interiority and exteriority? Could 
one understand Newman paintings as pictorial renditions of 'the inside (is) the 
outside'? In other words, is the solution to my much trumpeted conundrum 
simply to respond that Newman's paintings are a pictorial deconstruction of the 
dualism of interior/exterior? I think not. Look at those painfully odd sculptures 
Newman did in the 60s, with the sanguine banality of their figure/ground set-up. 
No dilemma here, no complexity at all, no fraught, self-questioning presence here. 
I feel that the sculptures operate as commentary, captioning, for the paintings. 
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That's why I find the sculptures laughable but admire their frankness. Newman 
makes a mistake that may be common in aging and wealthy artists: of presuming 
to transfer the essence of his art from one medium and re-distil in another. For 
the Newman fan there is a jolting shock of de-mystification or disenchantment 
upon first encountering the obelisk sculptures. It is tempting to say that the 
sculptures render the subject-matter of the paintings trite. But I think it is more 
faithful to say that the problem is that the sculptures make one look at the 
paintings as just subject-matter, as themes stabilised and codified rather than 
discrete acts of thinking. 
But these sculptures are exceptional for Newman. Mosdy he is a good 
enough artist to let the work do his thinking. In that sense, some of his paintings 
do do deconstructive work in a ruthless, immanent logic. Differance moves its 
moves, but is not put through its paces. " 'Differance' is neither simply active nor 
simply passive, .. .it announces or rather recalls something like the middle voice, 
.. .it speaks of an operation which is not an operation, which cannot be thought 
of either as a passion or as an action of a subject upon an object, as starting from 
an agent or from a patient .... " 142 The paintings dissimulate the easel painting 
tradition by their insistence on exteriority and symmetry. But they equally refuse 
the resolution of the literal surface that would be pure opacity and pure 
exteriority: Newman's paintings always retain a role for an illusionistic 
transparency of colour. 
Why should it be Newman above other artists who should follow my account 
of Derrida? The equivalences are I hope apparent. And the force and relevance of 
those equivalences for my broader narrative are, I claim, evident from the fact 
Newman is the first painter to work out a modus operandi for the contemporary 
condition of the gesture: a condition in which the gesture has to exhibit, in same 
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movement, manifest origination and spontaneity on the one hand and manifest 
belatedness, pre-detennination and anterior circumscription on the other. But I 
need to clarify. Newman is not presented here as a 'deconstuctionist' artist, if such 
a thing were even conceivable. (Some modernist artists have, after all, been 
described with some plausibility as 'existentialist' artists.) So I am not claiming 
Newman for deconstruction. But assuredly nor am I applying a deconstructivist 
reading to Newman's work, as one might with any 'text', in the broad sense. A 
deconstructive reading would, I suppose, aim to unmask the unspoken, 
subterranean aporias latent in the work. My account of what I take to be the 
central tension in the work has stressed all along that it is anything but unspoken, 
that it is indeed trumpeted by the paintings and discussed openly and identified 
directly by Newman himself. It is hardly a candidate for unmasking. My interest in 
Derrida is, in this way, not at all an enthusiasm for deconstructive readings of 
artworks; it is a concern with how the Derridean motifs modify an ontology of the 
mark. 
Let's end with the Ohio Indian archaeological site and the motif of presence. 
I offer two admittedly lurid metaphors for the Newman works I especially admire, 
like Uriel, Adam and Gate. One metaphor - one pictorial analogue - is Friedrich's 
A Monk at the Seashore [oil on canvas, 1808-9, Berlin-Charlottenburg, Staatliche 
Schlosser und Garten]. In this metaphor, the monk in the Friedrich, as the only 
vertical form in the painting, is equivalent - pictorially, dramatically, ontologically 
- to the thin black vertical band in Uriel,143 and vice versa. In the second 
metaphor, the colour bands in the Newman are equivalent to the coloured line 
markings on a city street - yellow parking lines along the gutter, or the white lane 
divisions. The street markings organize objects in real space. They do not work by 
establishing any kind of virtual, optical space. There is no colour space brought 
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into operation by these coloured markings: they only delimit and divide an 
environmental space. In this second metaphor, the Newman viewer is organized 
in exterior space like a car that is trying to park on or off the double yellow. Yes, 
the metaphors are trashy, but they make a point. With Newman's paintings we 
can't ever settle matters between the monk within the seascape and the car outside 
the parking lines: between presence through pictorial interiority or presence 
through literal exteriority. As I have argued already, this non-settlement cannot be 
claimed as a territory of deconstruction. Newman's non-settlement is, 
nonetheless, one of those forms of generosity and dispersion that allow painting 
to be done, again. 
3.5 A Contemporary Gesture 
Inspite of everything, perhaps because if everything we distrust about it, the gesture 
or the mark is still what makes painting. It is what makes painting a fascination 
and what fascinates painting. What allows work to be done by painting, both 
banally and critically. The gesture is what makes painting as such possible. I have 
been at pains, throughout the entire text, to distance painting from the execution 
of ideas. In one sense, though, I concede, a simplifying one, this is to remove 
painting from Conceptual Art. But it is also to remove painting from designing. 
And it is not just that things go wrong during the making and one is forced to 
accommodate mistakes, though that happens. Think of Hitchcock with his 
shooting script sown up, his crew on salary, which in his view made improvisation 
on set unthinkable, bored by the toil of executing his minutely planned films. "For 
me a film is ninety-nine per cent finished with the screenplay. Sometimes, I'd 
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prefer not to have to shoot it." 144 Painting - thankfully, sadly - is never like that 
even when it pretends it is. Haven't many painters operated with something close 
to Hitchcock's screenplay? - it will be objected. Renaissance frescos with their 
pre-mapped cartoons, Jeff Koons today with precise image scripts for his teams 
of painters, and so on. My position is not at all an insistence on improvisation or 
some kind of theoretically labyrinthine post-Derridean spontaneity. It is rather 
that the mark itself is the thought, the thinking is active in the marking, and not 
prior or exterior to it. That is not to say that the mark is necessarily and narrowly 
identified as the product of a body, or of an individual body: it mayor may not be. 
It certainly doesn't have to be. There's no logic that requires me to say that the 
mark cannot be the mark of a team. The positive claim will be that where painting 
forces the mark to trail in the wake of thought - as in design - and as in what I 
earlier labelled dumb instrumentality - in such cases the outcome will fall short of 
the potentiality of painting and will not avail itself of painting as a movement of 
thought. 
Now, having said all that, it is obvious that all paintings are planned. At 
least in part, if only to delimit their technical field of contingency. It may sound 
innocent to say so, but after all, painting is difficult. Paint is always more or less 
out of our control, more or less meaningless, worthless, smelly coloured poison. 
Getting it to do any pictorial work at all is forever a matter of capitulating to the 
lack of control while at the same time applying a torque, twisting the mode of 
capitulation such that the paint's properties come to converge on some pictorial 
affect. I want to stress both terms: pictorial affect. It is an affect that is pictorial. And 
it is where the pictorial as such is affective. The motif of capitulation must be not 
confused with the image of the abandonment of the pictorial as such, as in the 
tedious Lucio Fontana, for example. So I am not for a moment championing that 
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kind of (post-) painting that stages this desolation of the pictorial as tender 
abjection. That is sentimentality. The pictorial never went away. The pictorial 
indeed is the form of responsibility through which painting has a voice. 
Given that pictorial affect is technically restrictive - which is a certain way 
of saying it offers resistance - clearly all paintings are rehearsed in some sense. 
Because painting requires a technical immersion on the part of the artist, there is 
with every technical encounter a protention forward into future technical 
contexts. The gesture is in this sense always already rehearsed. The contemporary 
gesture, as I have argued, places itself outside a simple logic of presence and 
absence. But now I want to consider specific examples of the gesture in current 
painting. I do not wish to limit discussion to abstraction, but still it is useful to 
look at two abstract painters: David Reed and Fabien Marcaccio. Though 
superficially similar with their carefully rehearsed and calibrated marks, Reed and 
Marcaccio's paintings, as I will now argue, have very different effects in ways that 
are important to the discussion. 
What is it that distinguishes David Reed's painting from Fabien Marcaccio's? 
More specifically, what distinguishes them with respect to the context I have 
called the condition of the contemporary gesture, since both in their different 
ways approach the gesture in these terms? In Marcaccio's energetic but 
unrewarding paintings, gestures are largely freed from the ground: they frequently 
run beyond the perimeters of the canvas support, lift off into surrounding space, 
occasionally link one canvas to another panel. So we have what I earlier called a 
semantic heterogeneity: here in Marcaccio there is a massive insistence on the 
semantic gulf between figure and ground. Like Reed's gestures they are manifestly 
brush-made and combine the roles of depicting the gesture and embodying, being 
the gesture. In this sense both Reed and Marcaccio imply the common influence 
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of the Lichtenstein brushmark paintings of circa 1964, but in them this influence 
is sublimated. 
Marcaccio's brushmarks are not evidently products of a bodily movement 
at all. The paintings seem to be concerned primarily with setting up loud contrasts 
between brush-dragged and dripped paint and their dry canvas support. 
Marcaccio's paintings are clever but turgid. I hope their failure can throw some 
light on Reed's accomplishment in particular, and the contemporary condition of 
the gesture in general. In Marcaccio's Paint Zone #11, 1994-95, [Fig.1S] we find 
elements formed into twists and curves without any evidence or sense of 
movement or flow. The surfaces look dry and icily plastic. The gestures move and 
flow only as signs; as paint stuff and as indices they ate static, immobile, have 
never been in motion. This conjunction as we know is the painting's subject and 
its method, its claim to criticality. I will return to this point. 
David Reed's paintings [Fig. 19] deploy a series of exacting technical 
procedures to produce brushmarks and swirling knife smears that are evidently 
spontaneous, 'first order' gestures, yet which appear also to be images if gestures. 
This is largely because Reed's gestures are extremely flat, making the indexical 
qualities of the marks look simulated, and because the cropping of background 
elements, and of profiled areas that often mark off echoing halos around the 
gestural marks that repeat their perimeter shapes, - all of which makes it really 
impossible for the viewer to ascertain the technical sequence for making the 
painting. That starts to matter for the viewer, because the figure/ground 
relationships are so much a fraught focus in the paintings - and the paintings' 
effects are so closely bound to the fine-tuned figure/ground antagonisms - that 
often the viewer tries to settle a particular case by working out the actual mark-
making sequence. With Reed's precise sanding and masking method, ground is as 
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often as not, applied after figure. So figure/ground becomes an interminable, 
indeed aporetic issue for Reed's viewer. 
Reed's gestures are generated by rhythmic movements of the arms. They 
provide the dramatic focus of his compositions. They are what the paintings 
compel the viewer's eye to dwell on. The blank areas, margins, bands and 
croppings in the paintings are the voids that permit the gestures to designate 
themselves as plenitudes, as activated zones. They set up the gestural areas as 
equivalent to figures in classical painting, by which I mean painting like Poussin, 
for instance, in which figures are organized into choreographed groups, and the 
group as a whole stamps out a gestalt in the design of the painting. In Reed's 
heightened contrast between the agitated paint of the gesture and the 'passive', 
uninflected paint of the ground, between the fluidity and transparency of the 
gesture and the opacity and non-indexicality of the ground, we find again an 
insistence on a semantic discontinuity between gesture and ground. 
In his book Manet's Modernism Michael Fried outlines two decisive aspects 
of the ontology of painting; two unassailable - in Fried's word, "primordial" -
conditions of painting which, as he argues, have critical consequences for the 
practice of painting in all its concerns, whether of subject matter, register, paint 
handling, specific surface or whatever.145 The two are: that the painting as a 
material artefact is static and endures in time; and that the painting seen, is 
grasped in its entirety by the eye, in a flash, in an instant. These are ontological 
constants within painting. They are "limit modes of the representation of 
temporality, each of which is based on a distinct property of easel painting." 146 As 
Fried shows, painting has evolved in immanent, unconscious ways, modes, 
registers and genres that state and exploit these ontological features. The aspect of 
stasis and duration in time is manifested and exploited by the still life genre, and 
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then re-inflected by the genre of still life flower painting, where the flower is 
precisely what, though static, does not endure. The still life genre, Fried argues, is 
powerfully affective precisely because it trades on this structural analogue between 
the ontology of the painting qua stasis in duration and those same qualities in the 
constituent objects of the still life image. The still life genre is in this way 
structurally privileged for painting. But still-life does not monopolize this feature 
of painting; one can follow a lineage wherein the trope of enduring constancy and 
stillness is absorbed into (geometric) abstraction, as in Mondrian, Newman, the 
early Marden, and so on. Now to the second aspect: that a painting is glimpsed 
and grasped in a flash. What genre of painting exploits this ontological constant? 
Well, genre could be a term to mislead us here. But I think it is clear that certain 
registers of painting - Pollock and de Kooning come to mind right away - Ruth s 
Zowie, The Deep are convincing cases - are very much directed at usurping and 
rhetoricizing the encounter in which the gaze feels itself in its duration to have 
occurred long after the explosive instantaneousness of the glimpse, where the 
gaze feels like the afterglow of the glimpse. De Kooning's late 50s paintings, with 
their wide flat brush trails and their simplified compositional scaffolds, as in Pare 
Rosenbet;g, Ruths Zowie, Montauk Highwqy and Palisade; such paintings especially play 
on the instant of the glimpse by suggesting, as they do, that they were painted in 
an instant. Indeed, since these painting compel the viewer to believe that their 
structured appearance emerged solely through their being painted, they further 
conspire to give us the feeling of the paintings glimpsing themselves, grasping 
their own apparitional structure in an instant. 
Reed's paintings, with their luxuriating expanses of gestural folds, bespeak 
a version of this painting register, one that derives primarily from Pollock. But the 
rhetoric of the glimpse, of the instantaneous, that the gestures and brushmarks 
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with their accelerated, washy fluidity encourage and sustain, is interrupted. Reed's 
use of the stretched, horizontally elongated format itself disrupts the 
instantaneous by making it unlikely that the painting can be taken in the scope of 
one glance; instead, the eyes are made aware that they must roll laterally, or the 
head must turn on the neck. Reed's chromatic bands, as they cut through and 
under the translucent gestural areas also disrupt the sense of the instantaneous 
glimpse. For they suggest a mediation and a filtering and channelling of this 
temporality of the glimpse. Reed's paintings exploit the register we have discussed, 
but they tend to place that register in brackets. 
Marcaccio's paintings, qua paintings of brushmarks ill the deconstructive 
manner, confront a difficulty. The problem for this type of self-critical painting is 
this: how do you get the critical work into the paint? - how do you use the paint to 
re-present the painted gesture - without crippling it, and therefore losing the 
register whose energy comes from its fluidity and its structural analogue with the 
ontology of the glimpse? Marcaccio's brushmarks are fully paralysed, they look 
dry, ossified, like petrified traces of organic life. And of course one can say, yes, 
but that is their critical charge, they must be ossified to do their critical work, to 
deconstruct the fluid flowing brushmark. This response has its logic, but it won't 
do. The gestural deconstruction strategy holds the considerable danger of 
forsaking, without recovering any affective remainder, the power of the rhetoric 
of the instantaneous glimpse. Marcaccio pays this price apparently with 
equanimity. 
My refusal of Marcaccio's painting is argued along two trajectories. One is a 
dissatisfaction with its performance as gestural painting. The other is a distrust of 
its performance as deconstruction. Let me re-visit the two complaints more 
slowly. The argument about the gestural performance employs Fried's analysis of 
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the limit conditions of the temporality of painting. The argument does not assume 
that Fried's two limit conditions constitute values - for they clearly do not. So I do 
not claim that in approaching one of the limit conditions and manifesting it, a 
painting gains value. However, the limit conditions inevitably come to have 
evaluative consequences in particular circumstances. And as always with painting, one 
is arguing from the encounter with the particularity of individual paintings. There 
have been all manner of paintings in which the gestures have been slowed down, 
clotted, half paralysed. Think of Jasper Johns in the Number and Alphabet 
paintings with their slow-flowing, molten encaustic paint. Think of Simon Linke's 
Ariforum paintings of the 1980s. These paintings indicate that the paralysed gesture 
works rather well when it collides with the written sign. This is not about the 
technical difficulty of getting the gesture to render lettering and signage, and of 
preventing it from becoming merely gestural writing, as in Cy Twombly, or indeed 
graffiti. It appears, rather, that the paralysis of the gesture relates affectively to the 
indissoluble antagonism between gesture and writing, where writing identifies the 
mark as pure ideality while the gesture returns the mark to difference within 
repetition. Thus the inevitable movement, in the mark, between the sensible and 
the intelligible - as in the Derridean motif of 'the inside is the outside' - re-asserts 
itself here. The gesture that reproduces gestures is, however, playing a very 
different role to the gesture that conjures writing. Simon Linke's own 'paintings of 
gestures' in the early 90s were short-lived and inconsequential. In this sub, sub-
genre of contemporary painting, the viewer is lured by the protnise of the sheer 
instantaneous, in the manner that Fried's limit condition outlines. But as one 
scrutinizes the marks close up, the protnise is withdrawn. We could pay lip service 
to irony, to manipulation and planned disappointment of audience expectation, all 
of which are fatniliar artistic strategies. But these interpretative moves would only 
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re-affirm the problem of rupture in the temporality of the gesture in Marcaccio, 
and postpone its treatment. 
It is this point that the spectre of deconstruction makes an entrance. The 
rationale for gestural paralysis in Marcaccio - a rationale that will name 
Marcaccio's tactic as irony - will say that the ruptured temporality of the gesture is 
the vehicle of Marcaccio's deconstruction. The reply to the argument from Fried 
will then be that it is precisely by disappointing and violating the Fried 'limit 
condition' that Marcaccio's paintings do critical work. But this kind of rationale 
raises again the issue of deconstruction - which we have understood as the 
movement of differance - as an intentional stratagem. Let's recall Derrida's 
insistence that differance "cannot be thought of... as an action of a subject upon 
an object." 
So the complaint against Marcaccio is that his critique 1S too overt, too 
premeditated. But the question is again better clarified by a comparison with 
David Reed. With Marcaccio's work there is the strong sense that the paralysed 
gesture can only possess a deconstructive logic. There is no other conceptual 
register - phenomenological, existential, whatever - that can apply. The 
inescapable conclusion is that Marcaccio's gesture stems exclusively from a 
didactic motivation. There can be no other motivation for doing this to the 
gesture. In Reed the contrast is immense: there a sense of free flow, of balanced 
effusion, both at the literal level of the fluidity and transparency of the gesture, 
and at the metaphorical level. There is no suggestion, as there undeniably is with 
Marcaccio, that the marks have been coerced into their structures purely for the 
sake of an ultra-legible and declarative deconstruction. But this is exactly the 
expectation of deconstruction that was earlier found to be suspect. For Marcaccio 
does nothing but return the gesture to a stabilized, noncomplex meaning. 
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So where are we? What has changed in all this? How has the argument re-cast 
the real, practical stakes for painting? I have used readings of Derrida to re-
orientate the account of gestural painting. One kind of impatience with Derrida or 
'deconstruction' as an academic ideology is expressed here, under the sign of 
'post-structuralism' : 
How can one not recognise, 111 the passionate zeal with which the post-
structuralist insists that every text, his own included, IS caught up in a 
fundamental ambiguity and flooded with the 'dissemination' of the 
intertextual process, the signs of an obstinate denial; a barely hidden 
acknowledgement of the fact that one is speaking from a safe position, a 
position not menaced by the decentred textual process? ... The problem with 
deconstruction is not that it renounces a strict theoretical formulation and 
yields to a flabby poeticism. On the contrary, it is that it is too 'theoretical' (in 
the sense of a theory which excludes the truth-dimension; that is, which does 
not qffect the place from which we speak).147 
That is a fair statement of a dissatisfaction one frequendy feels upon reading the 
literature of deconstruction. Whether it should be levelled against Derrida's texts, 
those of the disciples, or both, is questionable. Derrida speaks of the 
deconstructive reading leaving a track in the text,l4S which can hardly imply that 
either the text or the reader come away from their encounter unscathed. So one 
wants to defend Derrida's texts from the flak, up to a point. On the other hand, 
Derrida's constant reluctance to clarify his position through cumulative argument 
- a reluctance itself, of course, presented as 'on principle' - is forever an open 
invitation to flabby disciples. 
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But the cited complaint helps focus the discussion of Marcaccio. It 
suggests that in several ways Marcaccio matches up to this reviled qffectless 
deconstruction. In my treatment of Newman there was a hesitation around the 
homology with dijJerance and the 'originary trace.' My doubt was about the fine line 
between a deconstructive reading and the claim that the work in question does 
(and sets out to do) deconstructive work. On Derrida's principles, of course, all 
works, all 'texts', are susceptible of a deconstructive reading since all 'texts' are 
marked by dijJerance. There is a delicate theoretical problem here. After all, if all 
'texts' - however dumb - are marked in advance by dijJerance then how does it 
benefit an author to deploy the ('non') concept of dijJerance? The answer must be 
that dijJerance dijJers. It is not a uniform quantity. Therefore the track left in the text, 
to repeat Derrida's image, will always be particular and local. There is a further 
important point here. We might think of the painting as the text and the 
viewer/ critic/ commentator as the reader whose viewing/writing leave its tracks. 
But there is also the strong sense that the painting itself interprets other paintings. 
So a Marcaccio painting is indeed a (mis)reading of de Kooning-type painting, just 
as a Newman functions, in part, as a (mis)reading of Mondrian. This is much 
niote precise and more focused in its motivation than generalised intertextuality. 
Here the painting has itself taken the role of the deconstructive reader. But - and 
here is the trouble with Marcaccio - that deconstructive role should not be the 
whole telos of the painting. If it is then the mark becomes newly instrumentalised, 
is assigned its explicit role and meaning, and therefore does not differ from itself 
at its core. In Derrida's terms, this is not dijJerance. 
What of the complaint about post-structuralism and deconstruction? -
that it does not affect the position from which we speak? The consequence of the 
argument that has been followed, and its borrowings from Derrida's constellation 
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of ideas around the originary trace, is that painting's address - the position from 
which we speak in(to) painting - is profoundly affected by this thinking. An entire 
logic of post-modem style - in which artworks or architecture cloak themselves in 
pre-established codes while claiming a power of domination of those codes 
though irony - that logic is undone by this argument. Why? Because that logic has 
to treat the mark as a given, pre-stabilised meaning in order to then climb - that's 
the idea anyway - to the high ground of the meta-language, from which it casts 
down spells of irony; which in tum are supposed to de-stabilise all the pictorial 
codes. The ruse of the meta-language is another way of denying the possibility 
that marking is already a movement of thought and a theatre of complexity. 
Because in seeking the critical refuge of the meta-language, one is presuming that 
meaning is capable of being opened up, renewed, re-made, only through 
juxtaposition, as where one register of marks is confronted with an alien code. 
The assumption is that meaning is not contestable at the level of the mark. Thus 
the mark is assumed to be a known quantity. In this way the postmodem trope of 
ironic distance in painting is premised on an originary simplicity for the mark. It is 
therefore another way of coercing the mark into an instrumental role, another 
flight from the complexity of the gesture. To render the trace as a telos is at once 
to reify it and to mythologise it. 
The central claim has been that the gesture, surviving by re-casting itself, has 
emerged as a double structure, allowing for a certain autonomy, spontaneity and 
the chaotic and aleatory, on the one hand, and pre-planning, anterior delimiting 
and channelling on the other. As the prototype for such a gesture was set out by 
Newman, I claim, there is seen to be an irresistible homology between Newman 
and Derrida, or more generally, between the gesture and the Derridean themes I 
have followed. The homology is quite precise in its implication. It compels us to 
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recogruse that instrumentalising painting practices return the mark to a 
noncomplex origin, in a suppression of originary complexity. The genuine gesture, 
then, becomes, from a certain vantage point, heady with reflexivity. Perhaps too 
heady. Nonetheless, what we thought would turn out to be a maddening burden 
of reflexivity might, on the contrary, eventuate in an intensely compacted visual 
thrift, as with Monique Prieto, or Myron Stout. It may equally eventuate in 
exuberant and noisy gaming with the banal, the ephemeral and the pictoriality of 
the commodity-icon, as in Pop Art's legacy. So it is impossible to legislate for the 
gesture: to say in advance what kind of pictorial work it can or cannot, should or 
should not do. The gesture, I claim, has to articulate the trace in Derrida's sense. 
The gesture as fun is never incompatible with this trace. The gesture at its most 
potent feels non-coerced. That is why we must conclude from the argument that 
the gesture must rethink and renew constantly its modes of inscribing the trace; 
but that it cannot take the trace for its subject. 
3.6 Gesture and Violation 
Origination and presence were the themes that preoccupied Barnett Newman. We 
saw how Newman thought that painting had to address them in the absence of 
tradition, as if in the state of a tabula rasa. But what if one views the historical 
circumstance at any point as one of thrownness? What if the tabula rasa is 
unattainable because there is always something relevantly already there? This was 
an important aspect of the initial account of the prosthesis read through the work 
of Bernard Stiegler: that the implement is the given that both transmits a past and 
protends a futurity. But the sense that there can be no tabula rasa is also central to 
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Duchamp's intervention with the readymade. As Duchamp commented, one can 
think even of oneself as a biological readymade. With these divergences in mind, I 
want now to consider a different kind of gesture, different both to Newman's 
conception of the mark and to the type of mark one finds in Reed. 
In the context of a response to Derrida, let's note that Derrida's own 
writing practice is very substantially a reading practice. Derrida's method is 
entirely unlike, for instance, Badiou's. The latter proposes to declare and construct 
a philosophical system. Derrida, on the contrary, with no interest in exhibiting 
systematicity, composes his own texts as close readings of received texts, or, of 
readymade texts. Thus, it is no travesty to say that Derrida's texts themselves are 
near to being marked readymades. Duchamp's readymades are almost never 
unmarked: they too are marked readymades. 
The subject of this section will be the case of the readymade as a picture 
which is then newly marked in ways that contradict the original picture. I want to 
consider a structure of violation into which the gesture has frequently cast itself. 
The model is prefigured in Duchamp's Pharmaty of 1914 [Fig.20] in which two 
dots of colour (originally red and yellow, over time decaying to red and green) are 
added to a commercial print of a landscape. Here image-making is equated with 
the readymade; painting is equated with abstracted chromatic decision-making. 
Implicitly image-making here also is kitsch. Around 1960 Asger Jom considered 
making the equation with kitsch explicit. In a group of paintings including 
Hirschbrnrif/ im Wilden Kaiser [Fig.21], Lockung and Abendstandchen [Fig.22] (all 
1960) J om applied a very few marks over a kitsch landscape. The readymade 
landscape painting he used looked a competent Sunday painter product, guided by 
dependable rules of thumb. It was both impersonal and conventionally lyrical, 
hand-painted and signed. It's remarkable to me that Jom did not estimate these 
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superb 'overpaintings' as a threat to the rest of his oeuvre. Jom's 'normal' 
paintings are a turgid mix of Northern Expressionism, tachist marking, traditional 
genres and anti-art posturing. The paintings are too conventional in a variety of 
ways, but they also fall between competing conventions in a manner that is 
disenabling. To some commentators this condition of foreclosure has its own 
quality, even stakes out its own realism. Thus T.J. Clark: "An Asger Jom can be 
garish, florid, tasteless, forced, cute, flatulent, overemphatic: it can never be 
vulgar. It just cannot prevent itself from a tampering and framing of its desperate 
effects which pulls them back into the realm of painting, ironizes them, declares 
them done in the full knowledge of their emptiness." 149 For Clark then Jom 
embodies a real problem for European painting in the 50s: that however i1iformel, 
however aleatory the marking, the result is always framed by taste, or in Clark's 
parlance, refinement. This sounds tendentious but the evidence supports the 
claim: think of the good manners of the supposedly radical European painting of 
the time: Lucio Fontana, Yves Klein. The trouble with Clark's praise is that it too 
easily sets up a self-fulfilling expectation: that Jom conceives painting as endgame 
and then acts out the scripted scenario with generous burlesque. This is of course 
not uninteresting, not least because it rehearses certain discourses of 1980s 
painting. But it hardly implies that J om is comparable to the best work of his 
contemporaries, by which I mean American painting of the 50s. Frequently Jom's 
titles - which convey an epic arrogance of the kind typical of Beuys' titles - are 
more fun than the works themselves. The incontestable evidence of the 'normal' 
Jom paintings is that Jom did not think openly about the technics of painting, by 
which I mean in contrast to the kind of open technical thinking evident in, say, 
Pollock or Robert Ryman or even Max Ernst. There's the strong feeling that Jom 
didn't really look at his own marks or his own paintings except with a jaundiced 
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eye. Everything about them indicates bombast, habituation and dogma. In a word, 
pre-judgment. 
All of which suggests an artist unworthy of attention. But that is the point 
about the overpaintings of 1960. They show, on the contrary, an artistic 
intelligence of wit and agility. The issue of the normal paintings in relation to the 
overpaintings here is one of addition versus not exactly subtraction, but perhaps 
cancellation, or negation. Several alternative renditions offer themselves: 
integration versus difference; construction versus dereliction; norm versus 
transgression; assertion versus denial; health versus pathogen; weavmg versus 
tearing. For Jom the problem with normal painting, and what in the end made it 
impossible, was the additive and constructive nature of its marking. Later in this 
section I will connect these constructive aspects of marking with the notion of the 
'thetic' employed by Kristeva. How are we to conceive the closure that additive 
marking appears to have instituted for J om? Why did it institute closure? I'll offer 
only extrapolation from the paintings. There's a basic commonality between 
Duchamp's Pharma0' and Jom's overpaintings of 1960: in both there are the two 
equations: 
{readymade = image = background = kitsch} 
and 
{painting = violation of the image = pseudo-foreground / picture plane = 
free play}. 
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To put it this way suggests that Pharmary's declaration of pictorial possibilities was 
one that fundamentally did not contradict contemporaneous abstract painting 
practices within the high modernism of Malevich and Mondrian. In Phar7JJary, as in 
Malevich's Suprematism or Mondrian's post-Cubist works, painting is set against 
image-making, against optically establishing a recessive space, and is identified 
instead with marking the surface of the picture plane. Hence it is misleading to 
present Duchamp here, or in general, as the resistance activist waging a guerrilla 
campaign against modernist painting. Pharmary appears on the contrary to chime 
pleasandy with the Greenberg of Avant-Garde and Kitsch. 
The above equations distil themselves down to the pairing: 
{painting = figure} 
{readymade = ground}. 
Both Pharmary and Jorn's overpaintings appear to endorse such a valuation. Jorn's 
problem with his 'normal' painting can then be understood as the extreme 
difficulty of attaining any satisfactory alternative to this reduced pairing of 
equations. 
The first obvious alternative is {painting = figure and ground}. This 
corresponds to traditional painting, most nineteenth and much twentieth century 
painting. J om cannot adopt this mode because, one suspects, he like everyone in 
his generation has been convinced by the pictorial deconstruction of "figure and 
ground" at the hands of cubism implicidy and Mondrian explicidy. So Mondrian 
offers the second obvious alternative. Mondrian is really the first painter to 
achieve a resolved pictorial deconstruction of the figure/ground distinction. The 
cubists in the end were committed to depiction of the human figure and had 
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therefore to reassert the figure/ground distinction without which the human 
figure was not reliably communicable. In Mondrian the constituent rectangles of 
the painting are apparently of equal import; and are no more figure than ground; 
we can see them all as figure or all as ground; but what we cannot do is view them 
hierarchically, with some as figure and others as ground. ISO The Mondrian option 
corresponds to the equation: 
{ painting = not [figure/ground] }. 
Even if it sounds overly Hegelian, this formulation has the advantage of 
describing the Mondrian option as the securing of a historical continuity through 
a self-conscious negation of traditional practice: negation of tradition is what 
guarantees its qualified transmission. We can see this same equation in the Pollock 
of Alchemy, 1947, the Ellsworth Kelly of Paintingfora White Wall, 1952 and so on. 
To review: we have three schemas corresponding to three sets of paintings: 
{ painting = ~oure and ground } [tradition, Old Masters] 
{ painting = [not] figure/ ground} [ Mondrian and after] 
{painting = figure} + {readymade = ground} [ Pharmary and J om in 1960 ] 
This last pair of equations corresponds only to a tiny minority of J om's output, 
namely his overpaintings of 1960. I claim that the fatal difficulty in J om's 'normal' 
work, which makes up the vast majority of his output, amounts to his failure to 
attain any practical altemative to this last pairing of equations. Put crudely, his 
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inability to adopt the first equation - the traditional one - lay with being a good 
modernist, up to a point. More interestingly, Jom tried and endlessly failed in 
practice to realize the second equation - the Mondrian-and-after one. There seem 
to have been two insurmountable problems. First, a refusal to discard decisively 
and unambiguously the human figure, or in general the image-making and 
communicating function of painting. As discussed above, with the case of the 
cubists, the insistence on communicable human figures does not reconcile itself 
with the equation {painting = not [figure/ground]}. Second, the 'Mondrian 
equation' is best satisfied by painting that articulates values of addition, 
accumulation, construction, integration (for examples of parts into wholes) and 
relative homogeneity. It's hard to string those words together without suggesting 
affirmation. I would argue that such values are equally evident in the relevant 
Pollock work I cited in this category, namely Alchemy. Now obviously Duchamp in 
1914 and Jom in 1960 wish anything except identifying painting as credible 
affirmation. But for the latter it's not just a matter of a cowed post-war German 
art context in which an effete painterly abstraction of the Wilhelm N ey variety is 
glorying in institutional approval. The issue goes much deeper than that. I believe 
that J om required a gesture that was manifesdy vengeful, did work of overt 
violence and unambiguous negation. To that extent I'm in sympathy with Clark's 
account. Where I differ from Clark concerns the capacity of the normal paintings 
to do the requisite work of negation. Rauschenberg once spoke of the logic of 
asking de Kooning for a drawing to erase:151 he had already erased his own 
drawings, but found that "too 50 / 50." 152 He wanted 100% subtraction, 100% 
negation, call it what you will. Jom's logic - whether he grasped it or not is 
irrelevant: it is grasped by the work - parallels this. Only in the overpaintings was 
he able to get 100% negation from the gesture. The normal paintings remain 
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50/50, occasionally 60/40. But Asger J om went on doing his normal paintings. If 
we ask why - why in the face of the intensity of the overpaintings did he need to 
prolong the rehearsed agonies of the normal paintings? - we might reflect on this 
from Kafka's diary: "The negative having been in all probability greatly 
strengthened by the 'struggle', a decision between insanity and security is 
imminent." 153 For security read the normal paintings. 
Pharmary, I have argued, does not contradict the painting practices of high 
Modernist abstraction or even Greenberg's early account of "advanced painting". 
It confirms the view that painting is not image-making or recessive space-making; 
that it is chromatic decision-making and marking without depiction. It consigns 
image-making and space-making to the readymade, for which read kitsch. Of 
course the entire Duchampian oeuvre shows the readymade in a variety of lights 
and does mark out a dissident position relative to a notional account of 
modernism that privileges, let's say, 'optical' painting. But there is too much 
deference in the dissident/outsider account. Where Duchamp traverses the stage 
of painting in his post-cubist output, the results affirm the most basic 
understandings of modernist painting concerning the conditions that constrain 
painting. 
By 1960 things have changed. Superficially there is no great gulf between 
Pharmary and Hirschbrunft im Wilden Kaiser. In each the marking imposed onto the 
readymade image occupies a small percentage of the picture area, reinforcing the 
viewer's experience of the readymade as ground to the figure of the invasive 
gesture. In each, the readymade is a landscape image; thus both a standard 
painting genre and a promise of recessive space, as well as inevitably a fantasized 
and consoling other to culture. In each, the gesture violates the integrity of the 
landscape both as genre and as spatial order. The gesture is what dis-integrates the 
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image. Well, kind of. In the Duchamp the gesture is so incidental that the viewer 
could miss it. The disrespect done to the image is, shall we say, procedural rather 
than sensory, a breach of etiquette no doubt, but one uttered in a whisper. In 
Hirschbrunft im Wilden Kaiser the gestures are loud and in bloom. What is hard to 
say is whether they make up an image. You can almost make out a new Hirsch 
(deer) among the smears and drips that mess up the left third of the readymade. 
Abendstandchen feels less febrile, less urgent, more played for laughs. It is also a 
much more complex assertion. And as often, comedy turns out to be serious 
business. The gestures are applied with a knife and they make up parts for two 
faces - eyes, mouth. They are altogether more contained and controlled than the 
gestures in Hirschbrutift, and they need to be, as we shall see. Another yellow knife 
marking conjures up a bird in a depiction that is as skill-free as possible. The 
readymade image is again a landscape - a river scene. 
In Abendstandchen all the added gestures go to form images, or more 
precisely, parts for images: eyes, mouths. The depictions are skill-free yet 
disciplined. There are no added marks that fail to depict: all merrily embrace an 
image-making vocation. In this crucial respect we are already a far cry from 
Pharma0"s oblique collusion with the consensus of Modernist abstraction. For 
Abenstandchen, painting is and must be image-making, and fools itself if it pretends 
otherwise. (A sample Jom title of 1965: 'In The Beginning Was The Picture'[Am 
Atifang war das Bildl.) It is made no less clear that the image-making impulse is 
inescapably infantile. However, the resonance peculiar to this painting lies in 
compelling the viewer's awareness of a beckoning infinite regress as imagery is 
grafted onto imagery potentially without cease. Of course we could have heard 
this said about the use of layered line drawings over backgrounds that is familiar 
in Picabia, and later in Polke and Salle. But why do I want to insist that the stakes 
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are greatly raised in Abendstandchen, and of a different order? In part because the 
Jom picture doesn't rely on line. Line drawings, especially where the line is an 
outline of uniform weight, pace and breadth, as it is canonically in Leger and 
Lichtenstein, abstract from and flatten things by homogenizing them. When line 
drawings are overlaid onto background images in Picabia, Salle, Polke and 
Schnabel too, the dissonance between overlay and ground is - optically and 
cognitively - very secure. That's to say the viewer is never made to feel unsure of 
the distinction between overlay and ground. Whereas in Abendstandchen (roughly 
translates as 'Little Serenade'): though an optical distinction between ground and 
overlay (readymade and painted gesture) is trumpeted by chromatic means (the 
muddy modulations of the readymade's hues contrasted with the saturated colours 
added over), it is much less secure cognitively. To the lower right of the canvas 
J om places eyes and a mouth across a zone of readymade that pictures rocks and 
a cascading river. Again, we know what is readymade and what added marking, 
that much is unambiguous. We are obliged to see a face. There's no choice about 
this. We do see a face. Is there a face there? Well, we do see a face. In other 
words, we are unable to see only eyes and mouth. We see a face that is a river and 
rocks. Should we find the edges of the face? The jawline, the crown of the head? 
There are no discontinuities in the painting that could indicate the edge of the 
face. We could designate the entire readymade backdrop as the flesh of the face, 
but it is very difficult to see that designation, to enact the designation by seeing it. 
We could, alternatively, designate the entire backdrop as a masking screen: like 
those picture boards containing holes into which you place your face to be 
photographed within some absurd illusionistic tableau. In this picture the holes 
would correspond to eyes and mouths rather than complete faces. This 
designation is a little easier than the last, but doesn't work either: the moronic 
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yellow bird towards the top right spoils it by being slightly too translucent to 
sustain the apparition of a collaged cut into a backdrop. We are obliged to see this 
bird as dumb smearing over and across a backdrop, not a shape incised into and 
through a screen. Further, there is a strong network of chromatic equivalences 
established among the added markings. This necessitates seeing them as sharing a 
common layer-status: it's impossible to see some as cuts into the ground and 
other as smears across it. They have somehow to be grasped on equal terms. 
Abendstandchen thematizes the viewer's expectations of painting much as 
Hitchcock's Verlzgo and Rear Window allegorise the desires and identifications of 
the film audience. The comparison doesn't carry far because in Jom's painting 
those expectations cannot and will not be satisfied. The tone is not contemptuous 
of those expectations: the painting's premise is the hunch that they contain more 
possibilities than the art that denies them in the name of transcending or sublating 
them. For the latter read the Mondrian paradigm. Jom has understood the force 
of the pictorial regime that I have gathered under the name of Mondrian. He has 
experienced its fruition and ruination. Painting's older compact with the viewer-
the one that agreed upon the image-making goal and its being embedded in 
cognitively resolvable ~oure/ ground relationships - is the repressed that 
Abendstandchen re-visits upon modernist painting as unfinished business. The 
wonder of this painting is precisely in its knife-edge determination of local 
figure/ground events. Jom both holds figure at bay - eyes and mouth with no 
face to bind them - and simultaneously beckons it by implicating landscape 
features and their profiles as the contours for overlaid figures. 
As I've argued, overlaying in Abendstandchen produces cognitive instability of 
an altogether greater intensity and precariousness than that of the overlaid linear 
depictions in Picabia, Polke, Salle et al. But it must also be stressed that the Jom 
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image is not a matter of a contest between gestalts in the manner ofWittgenstein's 
duck/rabbit figure. The double-aspect figure, for which the duck/rabbit provides 
the paradigm, is a frequent concern of twentieth century painting. In Dali's 
paintings of 1938-39 it is a recurring device, e.g. The Image Disappears, 1938 
[Fig.23]. Notice first that the painting, as in Arcimbaldo's vegetable heads, 
depends for its effect on the traditional pre-modermist continuous paint surface 
and could not accommodate marks that disrupt that continuity. Such a painting 
then cannot contain the gesture understood as a paint mark that manifesdy 
separates its information value from its utterance value. And notice second that 
the viewer's experience here is one of closure: of being shunted from one gestalt 
to another and back again in a closed loop of visual duopoly. Moreover, this is 
closure in the sense that the binary contest is comfortably secured: nothing is 
radically destabilized and the binarity offers its own complacent assurances. Jom's 
overpaintings never resolve themselves into such duopoly. It is never a case of 
either/ or. In the J om works the overmarkings act like performers on the stage 
supplied by the readymade image. In so doing, they inscribe, soil and pollute that 
stage. There is an emphatically transitive relation here for which the equilibrium of 
the double-aspect figure offers no equivalent. 
Obviously the overpaintings of 1960 offer no solutions. They hold great 
clarity, are not confused. Yet they are failures and they know it. That makes them 
poignant and lends them an ease that is absent from the normal paintings. The 
trope of painting declaring the impossibility of painting is a cliche of 
interpretation. Commentators once said it about Pollock although he realized an 
entire new field of potential for the discourse and technicity of painting. It's hard 
now to regard Pollock's oeuvre as anything but an opening fort..h into possibility. 
Jom's overpaintings are, however, the real McCoy, or as near any could be to 
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painting that manifests its own impossibility: it celebrates the pictorial 
expectations sneered at and spurned by modernism, but it too fails them. The 
whole Jorn oeuvre participates in the manifestation insofar as the normal 
paintings are unrelentingly and doggedly inane. 
Perhaps the test for endgame art is influence, or its absence. Jorn's work has 
had no influence but there is an inheritance. The 1960 overpaintings provide de 
facto prototypes for a variety of more recent works. Throughout Richter's work, 
from the 1965 quartet of Baker family portraits (Herr Baker, l'rau Baker etc.) 
[Fig.27] to the oversmeared photo-paintings of landscapes and skulls in the 
1990s, we find the recurrent device of loose marking overlaid upon an integrated, 
stable, self-sufficient image for the purpose of dis-integrating it. Consider also 
Morley's Racetrack, 1970 [Fig.26]; Polke's Profil, 1968 [Fig.24]; Kippenberger's 
Kaputtes Kind, 1985 [Fig.25]. Among these instances it is Richter who has the 
most difficulty with the overlaid marks, because he has found no logic for 
organizing them beyond the fact that they de-stablize and dis-integrate the 
underlying resolution. Richter often hints at a decorative logic for the overlaid 
marking: it's made explicit in the Baker family paintings in which the overmarking 
also readily depicts decorative snowfall. But here decorative is nearly synonymous 
with the gridding up of the picture plane: often Richter's overmarking imposes a 
barely disguised scaffold for a grid, as in his Venice, 1986 [Fig.29]. Elsewhere 
games of symmetry with the surface geometry of the underpainting are played out 
by the overmarking, as in Baumgruppe, 1987 [Fig.28]. These Richter works are 
both unsatisfying and keenly self-critical in a rather worthy, programmatic way. 
They thematize perfection disturbed: a need to challenge the polished finality of 
the photo-paintings. And it should be stressed that such overpaintings are directly 
parallel to the Jorn cases despite the fact that Richter, Morley and Kippenberger in 
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the instances cited, overmark their own marks. Nevertheless, I claim that the twin 
equations of painting with figure and readymade with ground still apply, since, in 
the wake of Pop generally, and in particular, Lichtenstein's work from Look 
Mickryf, 1961, onward, it became possible for painting to absorb the image as 
readymade and to absorb the readymade as image. It didn't matter then whether it 
was handpainted, screenprinted or whatever; the point is that after Pop the image 
could be both intimate, idiosyncratic marking and simultaneously sheer 
readymade. Hence the strong equivalence between Duchamp's Pharmary, Jom's 
1960 overpaintings and the cited works of Richter, Kippenberger et cetera. 
In Revolution in Poetic Language, in a section titled 'Negativity: Rejection', Julia 
Kristeva considers the ontology of negation. Given that the mark we have 
considered in this section attempts to violate - to negate - a readymade image, the 
issue of the ontology of negation is central here. Kristeva's argument, drawing 
substantially on Hegel and Frege, is that signification finally cannot be negation 
since it is always and inescapably a matter of positing something. It is always 
"thetic", always produces a thesis even where it adopts the guise of anti-thesis. 
Following Frege, Kristeva argues that the placing of "not" before a word is itself 
only an extension of predication: "as part of the predicate, 'not' is part of 
judgment - which we call the thetic - and is merely a variant of the positive 
predicate".154 Negation then is a momentary apparition in language; yet qua 
judgment, qua predication, it is a positing. Therefore signification cannot contain 
negation: signification is an ontology of the thetic. 
Kristeva's move at this point is not to banish negation but to find its force 
elsewhere than in signification. Negation, or "negativity," 155 she then argues, is 
not produced in signification but is better understood as a condition for 
signification: 'We must leave the verbal function and move toward what produces it, 
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so as to understand the process of rejection that pulsates through the drives in a 
body that is caught within the network of nature and society." 156 In the psycho-
physiological development of the child on the eve of language acquisition proper 
Kristeva sees "a basic biological operation of scission, separation, and division: at 
the same time it joins the always already splitting body to family structure and to 
the continuum of nature in a relation if r~jection." 157 She continues: 
Within this specific space, which is corporeal and biological but already social 
since it is a link with others, there operates a nonsymbolized negativity that is 
neither arrested within the terms of judgment, nor predicated as negation in 
judgment. This negativity - this expenditure - posits an object as separate 
from the body proper and, at the very moment of separation, fixes it in place 
as absent, as a sign. In this way, rejection establishes the object as real and, at 
th . . ·fiabl 158 e same 1:11ne, as stgtU e .... 
It is in this sense that negativity is a condition of signification. And it is in this 
sense that Kristeva argues that this negativity which is originary with respect to 
signification cannot be represented. 
Ready-made verbalization (language) can register rejection only as a series of 
differences, thus fixing it in place, and losing sight of its dynamic process. 
True negativity is a dialectical notion specific to the signifying process, on the 
crossroads between the biological and social order on the one hand, and the 
thetic and signifying phase of the social order on the other.159 
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The identification of negativity with rejection is highly appropriate for Asger 
Jom's painting. I don't wish to applY Kristeva's theoretical position here. Nor to 
offer it as an abstracted equivalence for Jom's painting practice. I claim that the 
gesture in recent painting inaugurates a structure of violation. I identify violation 
with negation. Citing examples from Jom, Duchamp, Rauschenberg, Richter and 
others, I have traced the resistance of painting to sustaining practices of negation. 
Duchamp's brilliant insight in Pharmary was to have understood so well that 
negation could be accomplished in painting henceforth only if authorship were 
substantially relinquished, in his case via the readymade. The evident difficulties of 
J om, Rauschenberg and Richter in sustaining negation amount to a reluctant 
succumbing to the thetic aspect of painting and drawing as additive, cumulative 
marking, even when, as in Rauschenberg's initital erasures, they are nominally 
subtractive. As already narrated, all three of these discover in their different ways 
that negation is sustainable only in relation to the readymade. Hence painting, 
always thetic, sustains negation only by entering into contact with its other, the 
readymade. 
There is however an alternative register of negation, and a different way of 
engaging with the pictorial readymade, which is altogether more subtle. While the 
examples chosen in this section typically soil or stain a received picture, in the 
work of Glenn Brown the bravura impasto paintings of Frank Auerbach are 
repainted as immaculate flat illusionistic portraits. Now after some fifteen years 
work in this vein, Brown has convincingly extended his practice well beyond the 
framework of quotation and appropriation. Thus what started as cool 
reproductions of Auerbach have now become something much stranger and more 
elusive, pitched at a mode between active and passive, between image creation 
proper and citation of a readymade. [Fig.30] In finding that strange middle voice 
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between active and passive, Brown, more than any other contemporary painter 
has raised the stakes for the gesture in a manner that is fully commensurate with 
the reading of Derrida. 
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Coda: The Chromatic Mark 
Ad Reinhardt liked to say the end is always a beginning. Bearing in mind that 
sense of a process - in this case, the overarching argument of the text - looping 
back upon itself, I want to finish by thinking about colour. Via colour we can 
reach back, through the discussions of the trace, to the starting point of the thesis: 
the question about making; the impact of the Duchampian readymade and the 
situation Duchamp himself referred to by the pun "l'impossibilite de fer:" the 
impossibility of iron/making. 
The response to Derrida ill the third chapter indicated preclse 
consequences for painting. In particular, painting that determines the mark as 
noncomplex, or as straightforwardly instrumental, or even reliably quotable - as in 
so much of postmodern painting - is found by the argument of this chapter to be 
inadequate. Painting can proceed now only through an encounter with the 
nonsimple origination of the mark. But there is something important still to say. 
We need to think about colour. In particular, the mark in its relation to colour. 
This may seem rudimentary: the mark, we might think, can be black ink on white 
paper, as are these letters, or it can be coloured, and placed upon colours, or 
beside them. What more needs saying? In this section I claim that for the mark, 
on the contrary, colour is never just an alternative, or addition, or supplement to 
tone. Plenty therefore remains to be said. Saying it will indicate some important 
limits to the critique of presence as we have adapted it for the painted mark. It 
will also propel us back to the confrontation of painting with the readymade, 
though from another direction. But before we reach those terrains we need to 
establish the milieu of a colour discourse for contemporary painting. 
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Painting has long been capable of isolating and distilling its colour effects. 
But it is only with modernist painting that colour is consciously and 
programmatically separated first from tone, meaning the relative values of light 
and dark, and subsequently from symbolism, and from matter. This separation 
makes possible the treatment of colour as colour, distinct from colour as symbol, 
or colour as coloured stuff, or as tone. It was one of the substantial achievements 
of modernism to make colour in itself a viable mode, and object of address in 
painting. Yet having accomplished the separation of colour as colour, the 
theoretical as well as practical consequences were far from straightforward. 
Within modernist colour pedagogy there was, at the time of the high 
modernism of the 1920s and 30s, a divergence between the systematic and 
hierarchical approach, exemplified by Johannes Itten, and an empirical, nominalist 
approach as in the method of Itten's sometime Bauhaus colleague, Josef Albers. 
We see equivalences to these positions in modernist painting. Thus we find the 
systematic, hierarchical, quasi-Platonic approach to colour in Mondrian, Johns and 
arguably Kelly. Whereas an empiricist, nominalist bias is evident in Newman, 
Albers himself, and later in Marden and Palermo. 
Contemporary colour discourse, however, seems to have arrived at a 
consensus that is anti-systematic, non-hierarchical and relativistic. For recent texts 
like Bachelor's Chromo phobia, and Gage's Colour and Culture, the decisive, if tacit, 
precedent is Wittgenstein. Decisive because the insistence on language as a 
conditioner of chromatic experience, and with it the stress upon the relativities of 
colour vocabularies, are applications of Wittgenstein's concept of language games. 
Wittgenstein himself thought intently about colour. His reflections were published 
posthumously as Remarks on Colour. These compressed remarks are a sequence of 
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thought experiments and phenomenological case studies which work at undoing 
all expectations of systematicity for colour. 
In a characteristic investigation Wittgenstein considers transparency of 
colour. If colours can be transparent - if, for instance, one can have coloured 
transparent glass - then presumably all colours can be transparent. The glass 
could be any colour. But he then notes that, no, it could not be white. One can't 
have transparent white. White is opaque. At this point, as Wittgenstein 
acknowledges, some will say that white, however, is not a colour. Thus we learn in 
physics that white is not a colour, but all the colours added up. But this repost 
confuses the physics of colour with its phenomenology. When we look at a 
tricolor flag we do see three colours: we see red, white and blue as having an equal 
chromatic status. Adopting this mode of investigation, one can easily locate 
further lapses of systematicity in colour. For instance, and most obviously, certain 
colours - red, blue, green - can embrace a range of hues from light to dark, 
whereas yellow can only be light. There is no dark yellow. 
Colour emphatically does not conform to a system. And that radical absence 
of system is crucial. But it is vital not to let that truth be dissolved into the 
language games account of colour, as if one sought to grasp colour in the terms of 
Lyotard's 'crisis of legitimation,' or its scriptural equivalent, the Tower of Babel. 
III bther words, we must respect the lapses of system as singularities, and not 
expect to account for them as the effects of language games. We must not, for 
example, argue that the difference between yellow and other colours is a 
consequence of the distribution of colour names. Instead, we have to admit that 
this difference constitutes a positive difference and as such a singularity beyond 
the effects of language. The peculiar spatiality of colour relationships likewise 
presents further singularities beyond cultural knowledge and habit. It is, for 
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instance, no matter of convention that determines that a blue recedes relative to a 
red. Nor is it something that one learns inductively from an accumulation of 
experience. It may certainly be a matter of culture that determines that such 
sensory effects are worth attending to in the first place, but that's a different issue 
altogether. The crucial point here is that the effects of colour themselves are to an 
important degree irrespective of culture. Is this to argue that colour is nature? No, 
because we continue to make new colours, like the relatively recent day-glo 
colours. Ultramarine was an innovation of the nineteenth century. Colours are 
also technological constructs. Let's consider colour not as nature but instead as a 
domain of singularities. Since colour is a domain of singularities it is never a 
network of equivalences, nor merely a grid of differential values. As a domain of 
singularities colour is also a virtual infinity. Hence in making day-glo colour we 
actualise a virtual singularity. 
If colour is a virtual infinity it can be expected to be ever in conflict with 
its repertoire of names. Colour is infinite. The juxtaposition of one colour to 
another is a singular relation between two singularities, each of which occurs 
within an infinite continuum. I indicated earlier that the examination of colour 
would produce a certain severance from the Derridean critique of presence that 
has shaped my understanding of the mark. While colour is disclosed within 
differential relations it nonetheless retains the positive force of the singularity. 
Another way of approaching this is through the notion of iterability. We have 
seen how, for Derrida, the signifying gesture, such as the performative, must posit 
an ideal such that its repetitions are recognisable as such. This structure of 
(potential) repetition is termed iterability. Signification is dependent on iterability. 
I have argued, both implicitly and explicitly, in chapters 2 and 3 that the mark in 
painting is always lured onto the threshold of signification, either qua signature, or 
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qua pictorial device. However, I claim that colour does not require iterability to be 
affective. In an important sense colour is affective irrespective of iteration, of 
signification. The chromatic intensity is not dependent an iteration whose force 
initiates the repetitious sequence. At this point, then, we make contact once more 
with thetic negativity. As we noted, Kristeva introduces thetic negativity as a 
mode of negation that is prior to signification. If the chromatic mark does not fall 
within the ambit of a logic of inscription, and of signification, as I claim, then it 
has a strong affinity with thetic negativity. What then does it negate? In the 
remainder of this section I will argue that it negates the mark itself, thetically. As 
we now consider further the tension between colour as colour and colour as 
coloured stuff - i.e. as pigment - we will be forced to loop back to Duchamp and 
the readymade. In so doing, we will elaborate on the consequences of colour as a 
thetic negation of the mark. 
We have noted that modernist painting made a conscious attempt to isolate 
colour in itself. Given the advent of colour as colour, the theoretical 
accommodation to the non-systematic truth of colour qua domain of singularity, 
as in Wittgenstein, gathers force. But as was noted above, the practical 
consequences of the separation of colour as colour in painting ate far from 
straightforward. Whereas one might suppose that colour could be treated in film, 
or in stained glass windows, in isolation from coloured matter, as pure chromatic 
apparition, it still remains unlikely that painting, understood as the art of applying 
pigments, can decisively separate colour from coloured stuff. This tension in 
painting between colour as colour, meaning colour as chromatic apparition, and 
colour as coloured stuff, as pigment, as paint - this tension now asserts at the 
heart of the discussion. 
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The issue is touched on in Walter Benjamin's fragment titled A Child's View rif 
Colour. In it Benjamin argues for an autonomous affective domain of chromatic 
encounter. For the child, he writes, colour is not 
a layer of something superimposed on matter, as it is for adults.... Where 
colour provides the contours, objects are not reduced to things but are 
constituted by an order consisting of an infinite range of nuances. Colour is 
single, not as a lifeless thing and a rigid individuality but as a winged creature 
that flits from one form to the next.160 
'A layer of something superimposed on matter' is, undeniably, a pretty good 
definition of paint. Or at least, it is a definition of paint that has been made into 
painting, unlike Duchamp's readymade tube of pigment. The child, Benjamin 
suggests, has a truer grasp of colour than the adult, whose sense has grown reified 
and habituated. The logic must be that only in the reified optic of the adult is 
coloured matter confused with colour itself, as perhaps with gold. The child, on 
the contrary, sees colour for the apparition - the "winged creature" - that it truly 
is. Colour as colour here is never coloured matter. Consider sky blue as the 
emblem: sky is blue, and not blue air. 
The tension between colour as colour, and colour as matter, has long been 
negotiated by painters. It was already central in Duchamp's understanding of the 
tube of paint as a readymade. According to his insight, modernist painting dreamt 
it was devoted to colour when really it was devoted to paint. But one can equally 
defend modernist painting from this charge by the reverse logic. Hasn't modernist 
painting in fact so often understood that it needed to bracket off colour from 
pigment in order to re-think the mark? After all, isn't it obvious that strategies of 
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exclusively tonal, or achromatic painting have often been adopted precisely in 
order to positively investigate the mark in isolation from chromatic qualities? In 
other words, colour has frequently been banished in order to affirm the mark, as 
in early, so-called 'analytic' Cubism, or even in the Richter Inpainting-Grry cited 
above. I argued that Gotham News too is really an achromatic white monochrome 
in disguise. If the logic of radically investigating the painted mark pushes towards 
the achromatic image, then by the same token, the logic of radically investigating 
colour pushes towards the spectre of the unmarked space, as in the monochrome 
or the colour field. And it is probably only Newman who plausibly attempts the 
incompossible simultaneity of the two kinds of investigation. It is indeed his 
respect for these two divergent logics - the logic of the mark, and the logic of 
colour as colour - that drives Newman's painting at it best. Rarely, as in the 
achromatic Stations if the Cross series, does Newman forego the dual logic of mark 
and of colour. Arguably Newman's worst group of paintings, these are weak 
precisely because the de stabilising dialogue between mark and colour is briefly 
banished, and a false and facile perfection offers itself up. 
The key is that colour is not a mark, and not if the mark. Whereas the 
entire discussion has been about the mark, and our reading of Derrida's Of 
Grammatology has been on the basis that it considers what one can call the mark. 
Yet here I claim that colour is not marking. The mark may summon colour - it 
may be the bearer of colour - but in so doing it initiates a further substance 
beyond itself: it supplements and over-reaches itself. 
At this stage we seem to linger at the threshold of another discourse, a 
discourse at some remove from the whole scope of the text thus far. For the 
argument seems to direct us away from the terms of the foregoing discussions. 
But what becomes apparent now is that the modes by which colour is sui generis 
207 
were already a latent issue in the starting point of the thesis. For we began with 
the question of making in the face of the historical fact of Duchamp's readymade. 
With that in mind, let's re-state the central claims of the current section. By the 
reasoning of this section, applying a colour is not marking. Or, at the least, it is 
not co-terminus with marking. Applying colour is and is not marking. Then how 
should we understand it? It should not surprise us to find Duchamp already 
focusing on exactly this question. Via the following remarks we reach back to the 
very beginning of this entire text, and the initial question about making. Whereas I 
answered the question by developing the idea of an embodied judgment, 
Duchamp insists on identifying making as a mental act: precisely a disembodied 
judgment. What is remarkable for the current discussion is that for Duchamp the 
exemplary case of making is the colour decision: 
N ow what is making? Making something is choosing a tube of blue, a tube 
of red, putting some of it on the palette, and always choosing the quality of 
the blue, the quality of the red, and always choosing the place to put it on the 
cativas. It's always choosing .... Choice is the main thing, even in normal 
painting. 161 
It should be clear on what basis I oppose these claims about making. In Chapter 1 
we saw how the Cruyff turn was created through bodily movement, as well as, 
following on Massumi's intervention, a subjective evacuation on the part of the 
player. The turn was done, accomplished, made, but on no account can it be said 
to have been chosen. It was never a matter of choice. And certainly not in 
Duchamp's sense of choosing from among readymades; in other words, a 
scenario in which choice is always choice from among what is already there. 
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Duchamp is blind to the powers of making because he adheres ultimately to 
a kind of Cartesian ringfencing of res cogitans. Doesn't his notion of choice 
resemble the cogito itself? The Cartesian cogito like the Duchampian choice, or 
nomination, is a disembodied judgment. It is the work of a res cogitans that cannot 
account for its liason with a res extensa. For Duchamp, things, artefacts have been 
made: making is what has happened, what was done in the past. Making qua 
ongoing fabrication is denied. His making has no present and no future. Or more 
exacdy, the only making that can occupy the present is choosing. Making qua 
fabrication then is in the past, and takes the present form of an inheritance, a 
description that for Duchamp is both metaphorical and literal: 
Even if you nux two vermilions together, it's still a l:n1X1tlg of two 
readymades. So man can never expect to start from scratch; he must start 
from readymade things like even his own mother and father.162 
My point is that for Duchamp the made thing - which, in a Cartesian phrasing, is 
a res extensa - comes from the past, while the mind moves in the present and into 
the future. He is thus Cartesian to the extent that he cannot account for the 
mind's wovenness into contexts of things, of materials. And, again, as in 
Massumi's depiction of the footballer, there is an important sense in which the 
subjective mind has to be evacuated, forgotten, rendered liminal, in order for the 
player to engage adequately with his/her wovenness into a context of movements. 
Genuine making then requires a certain suspension of self-possessed 
'mindfulness,' which is the polar opposite of Duchamp's punctal choice. 
So, unreservedly, I take my distance from Duchamp's misconception of 
making. But what of his conception of colour? Why is it that, having posited 
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choice as the synonym, indeed the paradigm for making, Duchamp then stages 
the colour decision as the exemplary case of choice? Why colour decisions in 
particular rather than other kinds of decision? 
In the chromatic mark there is an originary severance in which colour is 
discontinuous with mark. The young Duchamp was an admirer of Seurat. It is not 
by chance that both have figured in the journey of this text. Later, in his painted 
readymade Phatmacy [Fig.20], the ghost of pointillism persists. Pharmacy is a 
received image marked with two coloured dots. Duchamp's colour discourse is 
then true to his practice, and vice versa. Colouring in Pharmacy is indeed choosing 
- a pictorial nominalism - and little else, though there is significantly something else. 
There remains the minimal difference between choosing the tube of colour and 
applying a dot of it. At around the same time as Pharmacy, Kandinsky was writing 
his Concerning the Spiritual in Art, which was followed by the distinctly workmanlike 
and far from spiritual treatise of modernist painting, Point and Line to Plane. If we 
take Pharmacy as the exemplary contact of colour with the readymade, where 
colour is conveyed through the point, then we can equally regard Morley'S 
Racetrack [Fig.26] as doing the same through line. Racetrack is the exemplary 
contact of colour with the readymade where colour is conveyed by line. Taken 
together, Pharmacy and Racetrack give us point and line to readymade. The position 
I waht to arrive at will be that, while Duchamp crucially misconceives making, he 
nevertheless grasps something vital and irreducible in his exemplification of 
choice by the chromatic decision. 
Back to the Racetrack. While colour is added to the readymade image in 
Pharmacy as two points, it appears in Racetrack as two lines. We see from this why 
Duchamp had to restrict himself to the point. For in Racetrack the lines are 
imperfect, modestly indexical, drip a little, and where their diagonals meet one 
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runs under the other, disallowing strict planar flatness and instead invoking 
pictoriality. As we saw in the previous section, Pharmary on the contrary identified 
the pictorial with the readymade image qua kitsch, and in an unexpected and sly 
Greenbergian logic, identified painting as a marking that violates the readymade 
by asserting planar flatness. As regards colour, the issue here is that Duchamp 
restricts the mark to a point in order that it exhibit neither duration through its 
indexicality, nor pictorial relation with other invasive marks. In other words the 
point, or dot, serves a mythic function in Pharmary: it attempts to preserve the 
illusion of making as a disembodied and atemporal judgment. Thus it is the dot of 
colour that best serves Duchamp's needs. The dot of colour - devoid of 
extension in space or time - is the emblem of the punctum of judgment, itself 
also a point without temporal or spatial extension. 
Although Morley's painting has strong affinities with Duchamp - it is a 
marked readymade and, what's more, its title is a didactic pun - it however goes 
against his ideolbgy of chr011latit choice. Still I said that Duchamp touched oil 
something vital in his identification of making with chromatic choice, as opposed 
to chromatic marking. Morley initially painted the Durban Racetrack as a unified 
'photorealist' painting, though by 1970 his own brand of photo-painting had 
already become extremely loose. He added the two red lines some time after 
completing the 'readymade' image, upon reading of events in apartheid South 
Africa. So there's a strong sense in which the punctal chromatic choice does 
indeed describe Morley's response to an image he'd already finished. He needed 
to negate the image succinctly and unambiguously and he did so through choosing 
a colour. His red has several roles. It is a saturated colour, so it stands for colour 
as colour, as opposed to the tonal structure of the readymade image. It is also the 
red of the examiner's pen that places an 'X' where it marks a 'wrong.' And it is 
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blood, hence it pulses and drips. Racetrack is without doubt Morley's best work, 
probably his only great painting. Its immense ambition is to weave the didactic 
through the pure gesture. Colour as colour in the overpainting contradicts colour 
as tone in the readymade. Yet here this operates simultaneously as an investigation 
of the condition of the gesture with respect to the readymade, on the one hand, 
and a negation of the image of leisured stability under apartheid, on the other. The 
achievement is this simultaneity and, more than that, an interlocking of the two 
issues such that each is somehow implicated in the other. 
Now we can revisit the notion of thetic negativity adapted from Kristeva in 
the last section. Recall that the key to this notion is that negation is not secured at 
the level of signification. First let's regard Racetrack as putting the readymade 
image in the role of signification. So signification = depiction = teadymade. Then 
it is the gesture, by exceeding the terms of depiction and signification, that attains 
to negativity. There is, however, another way of understanding thetic negativity 
here. Morley, as we've noted, was already doing pretty loose photo-paintings by 
1970. Certainly he had wandered some way from the path of perfected photo-
realism that he claimed for himself five years earlier with his paintings of cruise 
ships. Viewed up close, the marks in the 'underpainting' of Racetrack ate startlingly 
open, mobile, autonbmous. In other words, we don't require the overpainted 
diagonals to introduce the autonomous mark here because it is already there in the 
(re-)construction of the readymade image. Since the mark is already given, we can 
instead understand the diagonals as a chromatic negation of the mark. Racetrack 
then can be seen as a chromatic version of thetic negativity. 
By now we are close to grasping in what degree Duchamp was right about 
the chromatic mark but wrong about making in general. Many of the preceeding 
remarks on chromatic aspects of paintings imply some agreement with 
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Duchamp's insistence on chromatic choice. For example, we saw how shrewdly 
de Kooning constrained the chromatic potentialities in Gotham News. We saw too 
why red was chosen by Morley in Racetrack, and that it was a decision separated 
from and coming after the rest of the making. So chromatic marks have to be 
chosen. To an extent then Duchamp was right about colour. He intuited that in the 
chromatic mark colour exceeds the scope of the mark. In this section I have 
argued exactly that. 
We could say, almost without irony, that Pharmary is a work of late 
pointillism. With Pharmary Duchamp was keeping his hands clean. So clean that 
they wouldn't even be noticed. We saw that in the Leroi-Gourhan/Stiegler 
account of anthropogenesis there is a dependence of thought on the prosthesis. 
At certain stages the limbs themselves play the role of the prosthesis. In Pharmary 
Duchamp attempts a mark that dissimulates its prosthetic dependence. As I have 
argued, Duchamp's prejudices resemble strongly those of Descartes, and it would 
hard to find a thinker less able than him to accommodate a notion of prosthetic 
priority. By specifying the mark as perfunctory and without extension, Duchamp 
tries to sustain a prosthetic posteriority. Let's note that Pharmary's attempt to 
dissimulate the mark through the point does two things: on the one hand, it traces 
the estrangement of colour from the mark, and we too have remarked on that 
estrangement; on the other hand, it declares itself evidence for a disembodied 
judgment. But it is flawed evidence. As I claim, its failure is attested to by the 
more indicative Racetrack. Granted the complex provisos that were noted, 
Racetrack stands emphatically for embodied judgment, though it is an embodied 
judgment within which colour negates the mark. Nonetheless, if you had to 
prolong the fantasy of painting based on disembodied judgement, Pharmary is 
where you'd go again to persuade yourself. 
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